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FOREWORD
Michael Žantovský
Today, it is already possible to say that as fledgling think-tankers, we in the
Program of Atlantic Security Studies (PASS) awaited the launch of our first
conference project last October with some trepidation. For all our internal
debates, for all our research, for all our efforts to put together a coherent po-
licy paper and an agenda, we did not know the answer to at least two crucial
questions related to the topic: 
1) Does the concept of the Greater Middle East, a shorthand for the vast
geographical area from the Maghreb in the west to the borders of Paki-
stan in the east, actually make sense? 
2) Is the involvement of a Euro–Atlantic military alliance in the numerous
conflicts, crises and transformation processes of a small part of Africa
and a large part of Asia at all relevant, thinkable and/or desirable? 
Only the conference itself could start providing answers to these ques-
tions and only life itself could confirm or disprove those answers. Whether it
was beginners´ luck or educated guesses or, most likely, the outstanding con-
tributions of the participants from 18 countries, we are now able to say that
the answers to both our questions have been in some part positive. The con-
cept of the Greater Middle East, albeit as controversial and contested today as
it was six months ago, now plays a central role both in the transatlantic
debate and in the attempts at modernization and/or reforms in the region
itself. NATO has accepted a larger role in Afghanistan and although the jury is
still out on Iraq, it is difficult not to imagine an enhanced role for the Alliance
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even there. The Israeli – Palestinian conflict remains as intractable as ever
and any thinking about a role of NATO or any outside party there is prema-
ture at the very least. Nonetheless, the unilateral, “Gaza first” disengagement
plan of Prime Minister Sharon begs the question of the kind of security
arrangements acceptable to both sides after the Israeli withdrawal from the
strip.
At the same time, there have been developments that we did not and
perhaps could not predict. The stabilization in Iraq turned out to be a more
difficult and lengthy process than many of us thought six months ago. The
search for the weapons of mass destruction, which constituted one of the
most important pretexts for the war, has so far failed to discover stockpiles
of any significance. The Road Map, which looked like another light at the end
of the long Middle Eastern tunnel last fall, is felt by many to have turned out
to be yet another blind alley. And, most significantly and tragically, global ter-
rorism has landed in Europe with the bomb attacks in Madrid on March 11th.
It is this last event which raises questions most relevant to our discus-
sion. Although a member country of NATO was attacked in a most brutal
manner, NATO fell strangely silent in the aftermath of the attack. Although
the attack is now considered to have been undoubtedly of Middle Eastern
origin, it is being treated as a national and European problem. The response
to the attack, such as it is, will be apparently coordinated by the EU rather
than NATO and will be of a judicial and diplomatic rather than a military
nature. All of this would seem to make NATO less rather than more relevant,
in spite of another round of enlargement and the ceremonies that come
with it.
Before the summit of the Alliance in Istanbul at the end of June where
the Greater Middle East concept under it new name is certain to be the subject
of some discussion, it may be worth reiterating a few truths, indeed almost tru-
isms, about NATO, which resonated with such force on the floor and in the
corridors of the conference last year and which may be even more relevant six
months later: 
1) NATO is the Western world’s organization best equipped to meet any
threat aimed at its peoples, values and cultures. There is no other body
with remotely the same inclusiveness, know-how, capability and structure
that NATO has. This is even truer after the latest round of enlargement. 
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2) Although the NATO’s function is primarily a military one, its role has
been wider and deeper. In its nonmilitary guise, it has served as a vehicle
of stability, confidence building and conflict resolution.
3) A failure to call on the vast resources of the organization in situations
which present clear security risks and possibly threats to both Europe
and the United States could seem to indicate either a dissociation of secu-
rity interests between the two sides of the Atlantic, or the loss of will to
effectively address those interests. The outcome in both cases could be
the eventual disintegration of a pillar that has preserved the stability and
prevented a major conflict in our part of the world for 55 years. 
13
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CONFERENCE PROGRAM
Friday, October 17th
Arrival and Registration
18.00–19.30 OPENING RECEPTION at the Residence of the U.S. Ambassador to
the Czech Republic
The Residence of the U.S. Ambassador
Dr. Zikmunda Wintera 3, Prague 6
20.00–22.00 OPENING DINNER at the Residence of the Lord Mayor of Prague
The Residence of the Lord Mayor of Prague
Mariánské nám. 1, Prague 1
Opening Remarks:
Oldřich Černý, Prague Security Studies Institute
Pavel Bém, Lord Mayor of Prague
Keynote Speaker:
HRH Prince El Hassan: “The Greater Middle East and the West”
Saturday, October 18th
The Senate, Valdštejnské nám. 4, Prague 1
9:00–12:30 Panel I, The Senate Room:
THE ROLE OF NATO IN FIGHTING NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY
THREATS IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
CONFERENCE PROGRAM
Moderator:
Alexandr Vondra, PASS
Panelists:
Uzi Arad, Thérese Delpech, Jeff Gedmin, Karel Kovanda,
Onur Öymen
12.30–14.00 LUNCHEON IN THE SENATE DINING HALL
Opening Remarks:
Jan Ruml, Vice President of the Senate of the Czech Republic
Luncheon Speech:
Václav Havel: “Civilizations, Cultures, Democracies”
14.00–14.30 Special Presentation, The Senate Room:
BRUCE JACKSON: “THE FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM AND THE GREATER
MIDDLE EAST”
14.30–18.00 Panel II, The Senate Room:
THE ROLE OF NATO IN PEACE-MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
Moderator:
Jiří Schneider, PASS
Panelists:
Günther Altenburg, Ronald Asmus, Marc Perrin
de Brichambaut, Petr Mareš, Ze’ev Schiff
18:30–19:30 PRIVATE VIEWING OF MUSEUM KAMPA (optional)
19.30–22.00 DINNER AT MUSEUM KAMPA– Jan & Meda Mládek Foundation
Opening Remarks:
Cyril Svoboda, Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic
Keynote Speaker:
Madeleine Albright: “The Road Map: Is It for Real?”
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Sunday, October 19th
9.00–12.30 Panel III, The Senate Room:
THE ROLE OF NATO IN DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Moderator:
Michael Žantovský, PASS
Panelists:
Ariel Cohen, Steven Everts, Muravchik Muravchik, Oliver Roy, Amin
Tarzi
12.30–14.00 CLOSING LUNCHEON in the Senate Dining Hall
Keynote Speaker:
Nicholas Burns: “The New NATO and the Greater Middle East”
Closing Remarks:
Michael Žantovský, PASS Coordinator
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY
Jiří Schneider, Jan Šnaidauf
The conference was greeted by Craig Stapleton, Ambassador of the United
States to the Czech Republic, and commenced by Hon. Pavel Bém, Lord Mayor
of Prague. In his opening contribution on Friday evening HRH Prince
El Hassan bin Talal described the contemporary developments in the Middle
East, as they appear from the local perspective. He urgently called for estab-
lishing of a strong regional organization with similar characteristics to the Euro-
pean OSCE.
In the course of the conference, several further contributions by distin-
guished personalities were made outside the main framework of panel discus-
sions. Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik (the latter in a written contribution)
addressed the participants at Saturday’s lunch with a colloquium reflecting
the experiences with democracy building in Eastern Europe and advocated
a regional approach to problem resolution while maintaining multi-polarity.
At the evening gala dinner H. E. Cyril Svoboda greeted the conference and
expressed a strong determination to help advance settlement in the problem
areas of GME. Madeleine Albright subsequently presented her views and first-
hand experience with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Clinton
administration as well as at present. During the closing luncheon the partici-
pants were addressed by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns who delivered the
official views of the US administration on issues concerning NATO’s role
in the Greater Middle East.
As a basis for the conference discussions a policy paper “NATO and the
Greater Middle East – a Mission to Renew NATO?” was drafted by Jiří Schnei-
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der and Michael Žantovský. The conference was intended to approach the
problem area from three different points of view, i.e. that of challenges (strate-
gic view), that of responses (operational view) and that of consequences and
implications. Three panels were therefore envisaged, respec-
tively.
The first panel was launched by Uzi Arad, who debated the question whether
NATO’s function should be newly defined. He argued that the Alliance should
preserve its focus on the European theater and not go global, stressing also the
necessity to maintain proximity to NATO’s original intent, i.e. security threats
as contrasted to political problems. Within the field of new security threats
Arad further differentiated two sets of problems, one being counter-terrorism
and the other counter-proliferation. The latter is, he said, ideally suited for
alliances, where pooling the resources and sharing the burden is possible. As
for the former, Arad suggested that Israel be a ‘fellow traveler’ and thus a natu-
ral partner for NATO which should view it as an asset and enter with Israel a
kind of ‘discreet alliance’.
Thérese Delpech then pursued a comprehensive assessment of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the Middle East while referring to the
broad spectrum of possible policy responses, whether defensive or preven-
tive. On both proliferation and terrorism tracks transatlantic cooperation is
improving, she said subsequently and mentioned the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) as well as the bilateral ties between the U.S. and European coun-
tries and cooperation within the framework of the EuroPol and EuroJust agen-
cies. Finally Delpech stated that in contrast to North Eastern Asia where there
might be a doubt about the region’s relevance to Europe, there is no such
a question in case of the Middle East since any WMD use in the area would
‘affect us all’. She also referred to Prague NATO Summit’s decision on WMD.
Jeffrey Gedmin, who spoke afterwards, addressed the “software” aspects
of NATO’s engagement, i.e. the political issues that would have been incon-
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PANEL I – The Role of NATO in Fighting
Non-traditional Security Threats in the
Greater Middle East
ceivable in relation to the Alliance only a few years ago. He drew the attention
to the fact that a gap in threat assessment on both sides of the Atlantic contin-
ues to present a major obstacle and requires Europe to realize that its ‘strate-
gic vacation’ is over. The major changes in the strategic environment brought
about by the Cold War ending in 1989 and the 9/11 events also contributed to
a certain ambivalence as became manifest for instance at various conferences
held after the Kosovo war, where European and American perceptions dif-
fered. Gedmin then raised a crucial question concerning the farthest limits of
disagreement within NATO, which, if overstepped, would imply the Alliance’s
inability to act effectively.
Subsequently, Karel Kovanda pointed out that Afghanistan gave a new
meaning to the ‘out of area’ concept. However, political limitations should still
lead to the conclusion that e. g. North Korea is not feasible for NATO’s engage-
ment. Turning to the question of transforming the Alliance into a ‘toolbox’
instrument, he indicated that the idea can be acceptable if understood as a
way of supporting operations like the ones in Macedonia or in the Polish sec-
tor of Iraq. Generally Kovanda finds double danger for NATO, one being not
able to meet the expectations, thus feeding doubts about NATO’s usefulness,
and the other one a possible failure in action. Furthermore, three points are
vital for NATO’s future: a full use of Med Dialogue, which is to be more than a
discussion without any value added; finding a point of equilibrium for the
Alliance; and a serious doctrinal debate over the concept of preemption,
which so far has not taken place within NATO.
As the last panelist, Onur Öymen referred to some of the major Middle-
Eastern problem characteristics such as the big number of displaced persons
or victims of conflicts, lack of democracy and the high percentage of terrorist
attacks in the region compared to the world’s total. He then described the
problems in the political area and called for the establishment of a NATO-EU
commission on terrorism where the issue could be treated in the same way
as in the NATO-Russia Commission (NRC). Öymen expressed his trust in
the Alliance’s capabilities to combat terrorism and underlined the necessity to
fight it everywhere and without discrimination. Nevertheless he finally
warned that not every country of the Greater Middle East would welcome
NATO’s stronger engagement in the region.
The ensuing discussion revealed several other problems. One participant
voiced a doubt concerning the definition of the enemy: terrorism and WMD
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are merely tools, he said, while the enemy should be rather the Islamist totali-
tarianism. Then the question was raised whether the U.S. is prepared to share
with Europe its sensitive technologies to close the vast technological gaps.
Reference was also made to historical experiences with the Baghdad Pact and
CENTO and calls were made for the establishment of a Middle-Eastern
Conference for Security and Cooperation (CSC-ME), for a GME-specific
humanitarian Marshall plan based on human dignity and for a regional con-
flict analysis center. In discussing the radical Islamist groups, three of their
strategies were pointed out: bin Laden’s concept of global struggle reaching
its peaks, a search for a new safe haven after Afghanistan and the idea of a non-
territorial Islamic ummah a warning before preemptive attacks was also
expressed, since these might be used as precedents by other countries. Finally,
the claim was repeated that NATO is running the risk of losing its concentra-
tion on real threats and might dilute into other, i.e. non-security, areas.
Before the opening of the second panel, Bruce Jackson drew the atten-
tion of the conference participants to the contemporary geopolitical visions
of the European and Middle-Eastern arenas. In his special presentation “The Fron-
tiers of Freedom and the Middle East” he indicated several problem areas to be
responded to in NATO’s post-Prague agenda.
PANEL II – The Role of NATO in Peace-
Management Operations in the GME
Günther Altenburg’s speech launched the second panel. He spoke about the
GME and its specific problem attributes, warning before a possible overstretch
in the region that NATO might not be able to cope with. Altenburg further
identified several points, which are crucial for NATO’s future: the need to
make the Afghanistan operation a success, including the option for expanding
ISAF’s mandate throughout the country. Next, the prospective of the Mediter-
ranean dialogue should be clarified. Importantly, the EU-NATO relationship
will require a new transatlantic consensus, he said. 
Subsequently Ron Asmus took over the floor turning to the Middle East
in terms of its significance as ascribed to the region by United States. Now-
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adays the source of conflicts is no longer Europe but the GME, which has
turned to be the place where American soldiers are most likely to be killed, he
explained, concluding that Middle-Eastern threats apply generally more
to Americans than Europeans. Asmus also acknowledged the need for a strong
political statement in order to recognize the Alliance’s role, in that context
referring to the forthcoming NATO summit in Istanbul. He then speculated
about the feasibility of a long-term goal of the GME’s political transformation
into a different set of societies and asked whether it be preferable to find
a comprehensive solution or rather approach crisis-by-crisis.
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut then made what he called a ‘spectral analy-
sis’ of NATO’s roles, which is increasingly important in regard to all the chal-
lenges of the Greater Middle East. He spoke in particular about the Iranian
threat, which will force Europe to be concerned with missile defense as it
already has in the case of Russia. He further reflected the general significance
that oil reserves as well as relations with Israel have for the development in the
GME area. Using a historical parallel, Brichambaut went back to the Suez Crisis
of 1956 and to whether there are lessons to be learned from it nowadays. He
finally stressed the soft-power aspect of European activities and the experi-
ence gained through physical contact with immigrant minorities, which might
give Europe good preconditions for activity in the GME.
Ze’ev Schiff started his contribution to the debate by contemplating over
the actually unclear borderlines of the Greater Middle East. He expressed his
support of the view that instability within the GME would directly endanger
the territory of Europe. On the other hand, he argued against perceiving the
threats as a territorial problem and called for a definition of NATO’s role vis-a-vis
threats of a global scope. As for the facets of international involvement in
peace-management operations, Schiff referred to the Israeli experience with
different international formations sent to the country during its history. From
that point, he derived three basic principles, which are of vital importance for
such operations to be successful: there must be a consent of all parties con-
cerned, there must not be too many parties to negotiate with and there must
always be outside assistance.
Petr Mareš closed the panel. He asked the key question whether there is a
role for NATO in the Greater Middle East other than a purely defensive one and
found a positive answer resulting from the primacy of the Alliance in terms of
its experiences, its power and past successes. Thus NATO should play a stabiliz-
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ing role but it is uncertain whether it is prepared to do so. Nor is it clear
whether the Alliance wants at all to assume such responsibility and since the
institution itself is not used for decision-making, the question remains open. To
avoid a certain failure, though, there must be an explicit determination on
behalf of NATO’s member states to engage in that type of operations.
In the following discussion, the issue of non-military security function by
NATO was addressed, aiming at the process of social & political transformation
in the GME countries. Also the absence of NATO’s capacity to generate integrat-
ed intelligence was underlined as well as the gap between European satisfaction
with the contemporary status quo and the American determination to achieve a
change. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the approaches to Eastern
Europe and Middle East was demonstrated on the Alliance’s will to change gov-
ernance as related to the former, while this was not true regarding the latter.
Only after 9/11 was it realized that dealing with terrorism by military means is
questionable and the need for bringing back the political agenda was acknowl-
edged. Other questions were concerned with defining the conditions allowing
for the use of NATO’s military force and the concept of the Alliance as a legit-
imizing element was voiced. Finally attempts were made at assessing the balance
between hard and soft power, both needed in the GME to achieve success.
PANEL III – The Role of NATO
in Democracy Building in the GME
The conference’s third and last panel was opened with a brief contemplation
of the general questions of democracy by Michael Žantovský. Speaking as
the panel’s moderator, he raised the question of universal nature of democra-
cy as well as of its general transportability among diverse environments.
Besides that, Žantovský warned against excessive haste in democracy-building,
and pointed out NATOs indirect democratizing influence in a number of coun-
tries over the years.
Ariel Cohen as the first panelist drew the participants’ attention to the
war on terrorism that he designated as Fighting for Hearts and Minds. He then
mentioned the unique role that dissidents play in a transforming society,
including Muslim societies like Iran, where a dissident class assists the contem-
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porary social process that might bring an end to the current anti-western ide-
ology, which is feeding terrorism. Next he identified several Islamic group-
ings, which allow for recruitment of terrorists and proceeded further to the
sources of their funding that he said come either from the Gulf region or from
Muslim Diaspora in the West. He also pointed to the roots of terrorism emerg-
ing through fundamentalist religious education.
The next speaker, Olivier Roy started his contribution by indicating
three profound problem areas of the Greater Middle East: nationalism, social
fabric and Islam. Democracy itself, he said, is welcomed in the Muslim world
as well, the question being only how to root it and make people work for it.
Nationalism is according to Roy the actual driving force in the Middle East
interacting with the specific social fabric of local societies. Thus for instance
although Iraq was a nationalist dictatorship, it was not totalitarian, since limit-
ed political space and freedoms were available. As for political Islam, Roy
insisted that it is no longer a real challenge in the Middle East but rather out-
side the region. He advocated a policy of inclusion of all parts of society
whether they are really democratic or not. Democracy does not require every-
one being an a priori democrat, but should be gradually rooted into society’s
fabric by addressing specific human concerns.
Joshua Muravchik went on by designating democratization as the center-
piece of US strategy in the war on terrorism, not only in military terms but also
in relation to its very roots such as poverty. The poisoned political culture in
the Greater Middle East requires a ‘bomb of democracy’, since there are
democrats, who have that need and deserve our help. This would be a job for
the Atlantic community, although it does not fit NATO’s traditional definition.
Muravchik also referred to the recent Arab Human Development Report,
where major democracy deficits are listed. In response to many being skepti-
cal about democracy in the Arab world, he paralleled the situation historically
to Japan after World War II, where similar doubts used to be voiced.
Asking whether the USA and Europe are capable of creating a joint strat-
egy for promoting democracy in the Middle East, Steven Everts commenced
his reasoning over the issue, answering immediately: yes they have to, but the
key question is how. He continued by pointing to the therapeutic value of the
search for common strategy, but reminded of obstacles on both sides: while
Europe struggles with its ambivalent attitude towards assuming the leadership
role in the region, America cannot sidetrack its massive image problem in
25
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spite of the far greater emphasis on democracy as a strategic goal. Concerning
the Western interference in GME issues, Everts gave several policy recommen-
dations including seeing the politics as a vehicle of change, targeting pro-
grams to NGO sector, supporting democratic processes instead of individuals,
using institutional anchors, avoiding temptation to ‘divisions of labor’, patron-
izing attitudes and gimmicks.
Amin Tarzi subsequently briefed on the current developments in
Afghanistan, denying that Islamic radical terrorism is a tangible enemy for
NATO to fight. He called for a clear roadmap for Afghanistan that would set up
the democracy building process.
During the closing discussion a number of so far untreated issues were
addressed. The stimulant question “whether a democracy may be built while
the house is burning” evoked the proposition that extinguishing the fire in the
house would be exactly the task for NATO. Furthermore, while it was indicat-
ed that democracies do not sponsor terrorism, a counter-affirmation has been
voiced that even some secular democracies do breed terrorism. And even
more in the countries where religion and state coincide and cannot be mutu-
ally separated since there is no official religious body that could be a partner
for the state. The proposition was made of the necessity to combine support
for reforms within a country (i.e. for its dissidents) with a care about the envi-
ronment (i.e. the pressure on states) in order to make our intention indu-
bitable. The Middle Eastern situation was also compared to democratization of
Latin America, pointing to the lessons learned there.
According to one participant, the Arab liberal experiment was murdered
in the 1930s and now it is time to pave the way for democratization by defeat-
ing the current enemy i.e. Islamism by means of NATO-the view was further
strengthened through designating attempts at integration/inclusion of
Islamist movements as dangerous experiments that proved to be successful
only in Turkey. The economic dimension of democratization was addressed in
the course of the debate as well as the goal to create a civil society. Doubts
were expressed that a democratic Iran would not pursue the nuclear option.
It was pointed out, that delegitimizing terrorism should ideally occur by using
the concepts of Islam itself. Finally, it was explained that introducing democ-
racy to the Middle East will inevitably bring along Islamic parties that should
not, however, present a problem by themselves, in contrast to the pursuit for
monopolization of Islam on the part of radical movements.
26
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THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
AND THE WEST
HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal
The first words I had on meeting our distinguished host, the Lord Mayor of
Prague, were that I sincerely hope that this country, that has taken so many ini-
tiatives in post-war reconstruction and development, would consider and
maybe assist us in promoting the concept of a post-war reconstruction and
psychological development unit – a post-war trauma unit which addresses in
particular, the trauma that over fifty per cent of the population in our region
lives. It was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General James
Jones, who said that “the center of gravity for the last fifty years in the alliance
has been Western Europe.” For those of us who have lived in the world of the
ancients, the world of the Corpus Hermeticum, the world of meeting between
the Medicis and Islam, I would like to suggest that the center of the world is
possibly a little bit further towards the east. 
The center of activity in my perspective is moving east. As General Jones
said: “…it’s not an understatement to say that the geo-strategic center of inter-
est for the foreseeable future has to be the Greater Middle East.” When looking
at the Middle East region I would like to pick up on the theme of Paddy
Ashdown and Carl Bildt, if I may, by suggesting that the concept of a stability
pact in Europe is a concept that is required in our region of the world. I sug-
gested to Vice President Cheney that it is time we considered an organization
for security and cooperation in Middle East region; a CSCME was actually writ-
ten into the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel: a conference for security
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and cooperation in the Middle East. Today, with the emphasis on the victories
in Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11, the emphasis on the continuity of the pres-
ent military action in the war against terror and the new alliances being
formed as the result of this war on terror, I would like to suggest that it is con-
ceivable that the Western alliance is undertaking its most sweeping transfor-
mation since the end of the Cold War. Simply because I think it is beginning to
realize, or as Donald Rumsfeld put it last month, “that the size and shape of the
‘US footprint’, or deployment posture, in the world will evolve to reflect new
security requirements of the 21st century.” I am sad to say that Donald
Rumsfeld did not offer many details, but I was looking for a glint of what I put
to Vice President Cheney – is it not possible to talk regionally from Cairo to
Delhi, to talk about stabilizing the region? 
At the time the theme was very clear; it is easier to take out Saddam. Well,
Saddam may or may not still be there, he may be produced as a good political
ploy at a given moment, and let’s hope so. And along with him Karadzić and
Mladić, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. I would like to suggest that the
devil lies in the details. General Jones explained that “the Alliance is preparing
to evolve a presence far beyond Afghanistan and the Middle East.” Securitizing
China; if that is the ultimate objective, then this new US strategic center of
influence is an important part of NATO’s metamorphosis into a global military
player. It is strange to be saying this in 2003. In 1958, just to prove my Western
credentials, thirty five women and children of my family were massacred in
the courtyard of the Royal Palace in Baghdad, and at that time we were a mem-
ber of CENTO, the Central Treaty Organisation. 
I do really want to say that in terms of the war on terror my concern is,
to share with you here and particularly with those of you who I hope will con-
sider a group of reflection between now and January – now and the primaries
– that some analysis of a concept of stability and stabilising the region can be
generated. You will remember the words ‘mission-empty stability pact’ – those
were the words of Carl Bildt at the time. Actually, it was not ‘mission-empty’ at
all, and in the absence of anything else on the drawing board I think it was
quite interesting. Why it is that the stability pact concept today sounds inter-
esting to me in terms of reflection rather than in terms of hard fact? You will
immediately ask, how can we have a stability pact between Israelis and the
Palestinians who are at each others’ throats? Well, two days ago at the Dead Sea
we had a meeting of Israeli opposition politicians and Palestinians who pro-
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duced yet another ‘peace plan’, ‘Road Map’. I was impressed by their achieve-
ment, however it was dismissed by the Israeli Government as irresponsible
free-lance diplomacy. I hope you will come away with the impression that I am
volunteering responsible free-lance diplomacy, where I suggest that in terms
of the region every single nationality has sat in a room to discuss a Weapons of
Mass Destruction free-zone. I know I have been there, whether sponsored by
American universities or the Quakers; we have discussed chemical, biological
weapons, nuclear weapons and recognized that there is a certain point
beyond which you cannot go. I am not theorizing – I just flew here, three and
half hours from Amman, to come here to tell you one thing; that we in Jordan
are in the middle of the smoking zone – and I am not talking about nicotine.
When I went to the International Atomic Energy Agency that is what I had to
tell them. My friend, Dr. El Baradei, today reminded us that Iran is potentially
a dangerous country. There is a very macabre good news bad news story that
we tell at home: the bad news is that we all die as a result of a missile attack
from a neighbour, presumably to our East or to our North. I say ‘all’ because
anything that affects Israel affects us directly. Of course they have new gas
masks; we do not have any gas masks. The good news now we are told is that
a modified cruise missile from an Israeli submarine will remove large parts of
Iran and Pakistan. I think that kind of logic – I do not know whether you call
it a ‘lose-lose’ situation – is a logic against which we have to invest in reflection
on the very subject – quo vadis.
A consensus has been emerging, even prior to September 11th, on the
need to deal with the standing global soft security agenda: poverty, environ-
mental degradation and Aids. Steps in that direction include the Millennium
Development Goals (September 2001), The Doha Declaration (October 2001),
The Monterrey Consensus (March 2002), the Johannesburg Program of Action
(September 2002), and others. The US, Europe and Japan have been behind all
these efforts, and presumably if the conversation over consensus in the hard
security field, or the basic and current security, continues there will be con-
sensus there as well. Certainly the Japanese are now interested in financing, if
not sending troops, and the Koreans are still debating the issue. But I would
like to emphasize the importance of giving hope to people in our part of the
world. Why is the war on poverty important? As far as the Palestinians are con-
cerned it is very clear. The Oslo Accords are basically focused on displaced per-
sons, not refugees, which means effectively that the host countries for
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refugees – the donor countries to the United Nations Relief Works Agency –
will be responsible for inclusion of a large number of people. This, I maintain,
requires a non-discriminatory poverty alleviation process. It requires an inclu-
zionist system of government in every host country to recognize that everyone
with Palestinian origin eligible to be a citizen should become a citizen. I am
not talking about settling the Palestinian problem; I am talking about the new
departure where you don’t continue to accept the terms of the extremist
organizations, of the terrorists. As you well know I have said many times that I
believe terrorism is an affront to humanity simply because they are exploiting
despair. 
As far as Iraq is concerned I think you are well aware of the economic
straits that face the Iraqi people. I do not know if you are aware of the fact that
hundreds of civilians are killed every day. I was speaking to the director of our
hospital in Fallujah and the situation is pitiful in terms of the general public.
Of course over half a million children die a year anyway because of sanctions
over the past twelve years, so something must be done. 
I have read all the reports, whether International Crisis Group or the
Nuclear Threat Initiative with which I am involved, which focus on reorganiz-
ing, or reprioritising investment, from weapons to creating new jobs in our
region. But I want to point out that the Security Council is responsible for 85 %
of weapons sales, which is presumably why we all feel so secure. I want to
emphasise the importance at this meeting of the Atlantic Community vocalis-
ing for ‘soft power’ to create viable alternatives: an over-arching framework I
feel is needed for effective leadership of the world economy. Calls for creating
a G2 between the European Union and the United States have recently been
raised; others have proposed a G3 instead, to include the G22 of developing
countries that met at Cancun. This raises the related issue of ESDP (European
Security and Defense Policy). The challenge is to develop ESDP as a comple-
mentary rather than a competitive security project. All of these issues reflect a
fractured Europe and a fractured Western Hemisphere without a foreign poli-
cy towards our region. 
Dr. Frankenthal, an Israeli friend of myself and the late Prime Minister
Rabin, is with us in Prague. He is the man who put together the ‘Parents’
Circle’, 2,500 Israelis and Palestinians who have lost kin in violence over the
past few years. He sent me an e-mail the other day saying I have to see you
before war breaks out in this part of the world. I do not want to sound taken
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away by the moment, but I do want to say that the recent Haifa bombing on
the eve of Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, should have been a day
of atonement for us all. Sadly of course, neither in Iraq nor within Palestine has
the violence abated, nor in the context of Israel and Syria is the violence like-
ly to abate. There is the absence of any form of a regional concept. I have
asked: why did the Quartet did not go regional? Stop attending to micromanag-
ing, small issues, and look a little bit more clearly at the strategy for the region.
We as Arabs and Israelis, have been brazenly flouting international legalities
since 1948; I think we are all hypocrites, we all accuse each other of flouting
international legality, but we have all flouted it in one form or another. We are
desperately in need of a Code of Conduct; a Code of Conduct which attends to
the basic requirements of people, with the emphasis on human dignity. I
would like to point out that I would very much like to interact with each and
every one of you. It was Alfred Tennyson who dreamt in 1842 about the
Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World. Today 160 years later we still
ask quo vadis – where do we go from here? The American constitution calls for
‘a de-cent regard for the opinion of mankind’. I would like to see the develop-
ment of exercises to offer views in an interactive manner. We have had so
many monologues about the need for dialogue that I think I will stop my
monologue now and invite your contribution to dialogue.
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PANEL I: THE ROLE
OF NATO IN FIGHTING
NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY
THREATS IN THE GME
Alexandr Vondra
My name is Sasha Vondra. I am one of the PASS members who organized this
conference. Let me welcome you all to the plenary session hall of the Senate
in Wallenstein Palace.
This is the room where Czech senators meet, discuss and, last but not
least, vote. So the electric instruments in front of you are little bit more com-
plicated than the usual conference equipment, but I hope that it will be easy
for you to learn to use them.
Let me start with a few organizational remarks. First, I would like to repeat
what you may have already read in your folders, the ground rules of the con-
ference. The conference is open to observers and invited journalists, so
Chatham House rules do not apply. But this is not a challenge to be boring!
We would like to have both a transparent and provocative discussion. The
conference is structured in such a way that the panels are longer than usual.
This does not mean that there will not be any interruptions. I think that we
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will have a longer coffee break. You will then have time for informal discus-
sions. 
You may have noticed that we have three panels – one this morning,
one this afternoon, and one tomorrow morning. There is not a strict division
between these three panels; however, several general divisions may be made.
We will have a strategic panel in the morning, and a more operational panel
in the afternoon. However, I would not like to limit strategists like Ron
Asmus and Marc Perrin de Brichambaut to just operative issues. Tomorrow
we will have a more philosophically based panel. In other words, we should
discuss challenges this morning, responses in the afternoon, and the possi-
ble outcomes of our discussion tomorrow. 
When we were discussing the general theme of the conference, NATO
and the Greater Middle East, we were very much aware of the potential
risks of choosing such a huge topic, which is full of controversies. The fact
is that the strategic landscape has changed seriously. Moreover, we have
instruments of cooperation in the transatlantic area, which also have an
institutional expression within NATO. Furthermore, for people like the
Czechs, this transatlantic bond is very important, so we have new chal-
lenges. We also have solid, vital institutions that can contribute to our
response. From our perspective, the theme was obvious, but this is not to
say that it will be an easy undertaking. We are very well aware of the fact
that the Greater Middle East is, from one perspective, the source of all the
major threats we are facing – the combination of terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction, proliferation, and, last but not least, certain ideologies of
hatred. What’s more, there is no doubt that this area, as well as the ways to
handle the problems related to it, is the subject of the most serious disputes
between the Americans and Europeans, as well as among Europeans them-
selves. So this is most likely the most difficult point to start from instead of
the easiest. Of course, there is also the law of unintended consequences. We
can have good intentions behind our actions, but the outcomes could go
the other way.
Yesterday, we heard the great speaker, Prince Hassan bin Talal of
Jordan. We will start today with an analysis of the situation. There is nobody
better to provide us with this analysis than Uzi Arad, a man who worked for
Mossad for more than 25 years, who was an advisor to Prime Minister
Netanyahu, and who is now involved in working with various Israeli NGOs.
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Uzi Arad
I want to say thank you for the hospitality extended to us, and to all who have
contributed to this gathering. I also want to give a word of appreciation for the
very first rate job done on the summation, which was completed by Schneider
and Žantovský, in preparation for the conference. I found this very useful for
organizing my thoughts on the subject. And indeed my thoughts will be con-
fined to two things. First, to make an argument about where the focus of
NATO’s new defined mission should be, and then to conclude by commenting
about Israel’s relevance to it.
Starting with NATO: historically, the strength of NATO has always been
the fact that it was a focused organization. It was focused on the European the-
ater, and it was focused on function, that is to say that it was primarily
a defense, security-oriented organization. The time has come now, because
of changing circumstances, to change the concept of that organization. This is
a process that has been going on for quite a number of years. What I would like
to argue is that the principle of concentration should remain and that in the
process of moving from one concept to another, there should be no blurring
or dilution of the principles that accounted for the success of the alliance dur-
ing the Cold War. Here, I come to a point of some disagreement with the
approach taken yesterday by Prince Hassan because in his vision he made the
point, although he did not allude specifically to NATO, that what is needed is
OSCME (Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East) –
another structure for the stability of the Middle East, a very ambitious organi-
zational and institutional scheme. That may be in order, but I would argue that
this should not be NATO’s function. NATO should preserve the principle of
focus and not become another debating society or multilateral system with
varied functions. It should retain its proximity to its original intent, and this
proximity should be to the European theater. That is why the emphasis on the
Greater Middle East is the right one. NATO should not be looking towards a
global spread but towards the one theater that comes closest to the European
theater and presents the greatest problems for Europe. I strongly support the
point made in the paper by Schneider and Žantovský. 
Similarly, I think that functionally, NATO should stick to the original mili-
tary – and I underline military security threats – and not go into the political
ones, such as regime changes and democratization. These may be laudable
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objectives, but they are very far from the original character and structure of
NATO. We have two clusters of dominant security threats: one has to do with
terrorism and the other with proliferation. These threats are among the so-
called non-traditional threats and present the clearest form of security threats
to the West. Let me make the point, that NATO is the West. So the problem
should be one of adjusting vis a vis the issues of terrorism coming from
the Greater Middle East and the threat of proliferation. 
At this point, we run into the first difficulty, which liesnot in the institu-
tional process, but in the fact that these two sets of problems are completely
different from the old problems towards which NATO originally organized
itself. These threats require new methods, new instruments, new operational
rules, new capabilities, and ultimately, perhaps, new doctrines. They are very
serious areas of action. More than that, when you analyze the trends and when
you assess the threats, they present ominous threats, some of which we have
already sen, and some may only be contemplated. Furthermore, there is a cer-
tain need for urgency; there is not much time to be spent belaboring all of the
institutional permutations that seem to occupy some people. One should have
a sense of purpose and urgency in addressing these two clusters of equally
serious areas of action. 
I will use the word counter-terrorism to refer to the activities meant to
deal with terrorism and counter-proliferation to refer to the activities that per-
tain to the prevention of proliferation in the Middle East. Now, when you ana-
lyze these two sets of very serious problems, consider the kind of challenges
they present. Which doctrine should be employed against terrorism? The de-
fensive doctrine, which puts an emphasis on protection, intelligence sharing
and police, or preventive types of activities ranging from the treatment of go-
vernments hosting or supporting terrorism and activities that incite terrorism
all the way to special operations designed to suppress terrorism and finally to
the use of military force? That, after all, was the essence of NATO in the past.
It was a military organization. Terrorism may need military action. Now, what
exactly are the capabilities that will need to be martialled towards that end and
how will this be accomplished? These are the kinds of serious questions that
have to be addressed quickly if one is to have the capability to cope with these
sorts of problems. 
Counter-proliferation presents a similarly daunting range of options. On
the one hand, we have preventive options, including diplomacy, engagement,
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and the imposition of sanctions on proliferators, and the use of a defensive ori-
entation, such as the missile defense system in order to minimize the risks of
galloping proliferation in the Middle East. On the other hand, we have offen-
sive operations. At this point, we encounter the American doctrine of preven-
tative offensive actions designed to preempt the possibility of proli-feration.
This doctrine is based upon the assumption that other, more traditional, pre-
ventative postures of defense may fail to prevent proliferation and that once
proliferation has occurred, it is too late for other measures. All these options
require not only doctrines and capabilities but also require an enormous
investment in both capabilities and technologies. Based upon general terms,
we can also consider the lessons of Iraq and the current situation in Iran; these
situations may be only a sample of things to come. NATO has not had a role in
either of these situation. The question is, does NATO want to use its capabili-
ties to play a serious role in these games, which, again, are just a taste of things
to come? I would argue that NATO should become involved because if there is
something common to counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, it is that
they are ideally suited for alliances. The argument was made in the paper for
the formation of networks and is based upon the belief that the burden
of such a mission is so large and formidable that no single country, not even
the entire European force, can handle it alone. In this case, we need a truly
international North Atlantic Alliance to confront these threats, to pool their
resources, and to orchestrate international activities. This type of burden shar-
ing has always been the essential element and strength of the Alliance and has
allowed it to utilize its total capabilities in order to effectively cope with two
sets of problems, which by themselves are international in nature. So I would
argue that NATO is, because of its organizational capability, suited to shoulder
such burden. 
The next question is, will it? Historically, it is the United States that has
always shouldered the main burden of both of counter-proliferation and the
fight against terrorism. That is a fact, and in all likelihood, the situation
will remain the same. For NATO to truly rise to the occasion, the United States
will probably have to remain in the leadership position and continue to shoul-
der at least as much of the responsibility as it has in the past. But that may not
suffice. Europe should also be part of it. Certainly, Europe should not under-
cut NATO by employing its own independent forces, which would be too
miniscule to address these sets of problems. I don’t know for what purpose
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these forces are being put together or considered, but certainly they are not
adequate to address the magnitude of the threat of terrorism and proliferation.
Indeed, together, Europe and the United States should amplify the Alliance’s
ability to deal with these two threats. This mission calls for concentration and
focus, not dilution. 
The reason the agenda is full of items that involve pooling of resources,
including manpower, intelligence, and institutional and diplomatic capabili-
ties, is that all those exist separately. There could be a multiplier effect were
these resources to be used jointly. There should be burden sharing and divi-
sion of labor, for maximizing the advantages of this Alliance. We should
employ the fact that there is already an organizational structure that has
worked smoothly to better manage the whole system. We should exploit the
inherent advantages in the membership of that Alliance. These advantages
may be economic, political, and even technological, as some of the future solu-
tions to our current difficulties lay in an area where the West has an advantage,
advanced technology. a full agenda such as this requires urgent action and
a sense of purpose. The greatest risks are dilution and politization. The risk is
in getting bogged down in structural debates about membership and the inter-
national equivalent of bureaucratic politics. That from my perspective is, that
where NATO should be heading. 
Now, should NATO go in that direction, where would Israel fit in? Israel
is a natural partner for that kind of endeavor. First, it shares the same set of
problems. Not only is it at the forefront of those in the Greater Middle East, but
also, in some ways, it is on the Western or receiving end of some of those
threats. Israel shares the same laundry list of friends and foes. However, there
are other deeper reasons for Israel to be a partner. First, it has always been a
fellow traveler of sorts with NATO; a reference was made to Mossad. Mossad
tried to establish a discreet connection with NATO in the mid 50s. And it did
succeed later on. So there has been a functional relationship, discreet, modest,
but one that was pragmatic and reflected the needs of both the Alli-ance and
Israel at crucial times. When one looks into the future, one needs to see that
Israel has much to offer, especially militarily, in the field of intelligence and
technology. Some may call it a political liability, but I would argue it is not.
Traditionally, Israel has had much deeper relations with the United States, but
at the same time it has had good working relationships with a number of key
countries, which are members of the Alliance, and I am not only referring to
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the obvious examples of Germany, France, and Great Britain, but also to other
European countries including Turkey. This is the backdrop against which one
would envision and hope for a process in which NATO, as an alliance, would
concentrate its evolution towards the ability to effectively operate within two
areas of threats which I outlined for you. If, throughout this process, the
Alliance remains viable and does not decay into something irrelevant and
remote from its original purpose, then Israel would be a natural partner in the
venture.
Alexandr Vondra
The next speaker is Thérese Delpech. Thérese has both scientific and practical
political experience with the region. She worked for the UNMOVIC mission in
Iraq with Hans Blix. She also has political experience at home working for
Prime Minister Juppé. Currently, she is both the Director of Strategic Affairs at
the Atomic Energy Commission in France, as well as the Senior Research
Fellow at the Center for International Studies in Paris. She asked me to say that
she is here in her scientific, research capacity rather than her political one.
Thérese, we are very glad that you accepted our invitation.
Thérese Delpech
In my presentation, I will mainly develop three points. The first point is about
the reason why the comprehensive and objective assessment of the WMD pro-
grams in the Greater Middle East is far from being an easy task. The second
point is about the way transatlantic cooperation has continued to improve in
the areas of terrorism and non-proliferation, even as differences in other areas
have emerged. The third point is that there can be no dispute that not only sta-
bility in the Middle East and the Greater Middle East is a common objective on
both sides of the Atlantic, but also that any use of WMD in the region would
deeply effect us all. Therefore, the first step is to cooperate in preventing pro-
liferation and terrorism. 
So let me deal with the first point. Making an impartial and comprehen-
sive assessment of the nature and magnitude of WMD programs in the Greater
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Middle East is no easy task. I will give you four reasons for that. The first one is
political. There is very often a political reluctance to expose sensitive prob-
lems that could endanger the political climate, and this is something we find
quite often in Europe. Second, while Soviet motivation and doctrines regard-
ing Europe were supposed to be known (I said were supposed to be known
because perhaps we made mistakes), much remains to be learned regarding
the Greater Middle East. Here we have an all important ground for misunder-
standing, which is extremely dangerous as WMD are concerned. The third rea-
son is that much proliferation related activity is, by nature, clandestine. As a
consequence, strategic intelligence appears essential, and as you well know,
strategic intelligence is currently the subject of massive, although not always
informed, debate about of Iraq’s WMD. If we examine NATO’s own capabili-
ties concerning WMD, particularly in this region, there is certainly the prob-
lem of intelligence sharing. Lastly, the region itself, the Greater Middle East, is
under constant and rapid development, particularly the Middle East itself.
These developments frequently have WMD implications and here the most
important current point is Iran. 
Now, my second point is about transatlantic cooperation in the areas
of both proliferation and terrorism. I want to make this point in order to illus-
trate something that is not widely known. In fact, proliferation and terrorism
have probably been the two areas where cooperation has not lessened after
the war in Iraq, but, in some respects, has actually improved. Concerning pro-
liferation, let me give you the following examples just to illustrate my point.
First, there is major 2003 initiative called PSI, the Proliferation Security
Initiative. PSI is an initiative of American origin, but it has received very broad
European support and was signed in Paris. It deals with a significant problem,
which no treaty could address. This problem is how to intercept ships and air-
craft transporting equipment that can be used in WMD programs. This is not
only a statement of intent, there have been actual maritime exercises which
have taken place with the participation of the French Navy. Secondly, concern-
ing Iran and its nuclear program, I do believe that transatlantic cooperation is
quite good. The EU suspended its economic and political negotiations with
Iran until a satisfactory solution is found. Furthermore, Paris, London and
Berlin have adopted a common strategy asking Iran not only to immediately
implement the protocol allowing intrusive inspections, but also to cancel its
fuel cycle. Lastly, let me remind you that a joint US–EU statement was adopted
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in June reaffirming a common view on proliferation and the belief that WMD
programs are a common phenomenon in the Greater Middle East. 
Concerning terrorism, there are stronger intelligence and law enforce-
ment ties between the US and individual European countries as well as
between the US and European assets – Europol and Eurojust. And it seems to
me important to underline that even Franco-American cooperation has
improved after the war against Iraq, in particular, we have improved our coop-
eration with preventing the production of false identity document by using
biometrical data. Secondly, the WMD terrorism threat has been taken serious-
ly enough in Europe to justify a September exercise in the London under-
ground that simulated a chemical attack. This exercise will take place again
during the coming weeks in Paris. Thirdly, work is being done on both sides
of the Atlantic to address threats against civil aviation posed by ground-air mis-
siles. You probably recall the Mombassa incident that took place in November
of last year. These threats are considered to be global threats, and measures
have been taken in this respect. 
My third point: it seems to me that there can be discussion about the im-
portance of North-East Asian security to both the US and Europe. Why? While
some would argue that Europe is not an Asian power, I would argue different-
ly and, considering the situation in the Middle East, such a debate seems
absurd. Stability in this region does affect both sides of the Atlantic, and pro-
liferation is a major factor of instability that affects us all and should be dealt
with by both sides in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, it is important to
emphasize the fact that use of WMD in the Middle East would not only affect
the way in which those weapons are perceived, but would also represent
a major catastrophe for both the US and Europe, not just for the Middle East.
I should say further use of WMD because WMD have been used in the Middle
East. Let me remind you of the chemical weapons used against Iranian troops
and civilian Kurds in the 80s. Also, please remember that when the so-called
War of the Cities during the Iran-Iraq War ended, the entire world was able to
see what missiles with conventional warheads can generate in terms of terror
when used against civilians. 
In the Greater Middle East, it is important to take into an account that
WMD programs are not a new problem and that some of them date back to the
60s and the 70s. Also important is the fact that the trend of these programs is
not going in the right direction. Secondly, WMD programs are ubiquitous, and
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in the next ten years, if nothing is done, they could progress to a level that
nobody will be able to stop. Thirdly, constant progress is made on delivery sys-
tems as well, often with the help of North Korea in the case of ballistic mis-
siles, but we have to take into account cruise missiles and UAVs. Here it seems
to me there is a real relation between this phenomenon and the decision taken
in Prague during the NATO summit last year concerning the study on missile
defense. 
To conclude, after the 1991 Gulf War, an effort was made to assess the
proliferation pattern of the region in order to do whatever was possible to pre-
vent it from worsening. It seems to me that a similar exercise is necessary now.
The problem calls for a broad spectrum of policy responses, preventive and
defensive, that cannot be implemented without close transatlantic coopera-
tion. As was said before, a number of the developments are new and the latest
development is the empowerment of groups of individuals that have the pos-
sibility to challenge states in a strategic and a tactical fashion. Let me conclude
by saying that to most outsiders, transatlantic disputes are a luxury that only
rich and prosperous nations can afford. But is this true, especially considering
this troubled region?
Alexandr Vondra
It was very good of you to offer this insider’s practical approach to these issues
because it shows us that if we go beyond philosophical or political voting and
look towards practical cooperation, we have very much in common. 
I think that in order to have the full picture, we need a voice from the US.
Tomorrow, we will hear the voice of the government; R. Nicholas Burns, the
US Am-bassador to NATO, is coming. This afternoon we will have the
Democratic view brought to us by Ron Asmus. We were also eager to bring a
neo-conservative here. We worked hard to bring Paul Wolfowitz, but unfortu-
nately were not able to do so. However, I am very glad that my friend, Jeff
Gedmin is here. 
Jeff is not a newcomer to Prague; he came quite often in the middle
of the 90s to work on the New Atlantic Initiative to bring new impetus to the
Atlantic community with regard to enlargement. This project was very impor-
tant for us in Prague, which played an important role in hosting the launching
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event of the New Atlantic Initiative. Since then, I have always remembered
how hard and committed to that enterprise Jeff has been. A year or two ago,
he moved from a position in the American Enterprise Institute in Washington
to take a new job in Berlin as the Director of the Aspen Institute. He is now
able to see the transatlantic relationship from this side of the Atlantic, in the
city of Berlin. 
Jeff Gedmin
I would like to talk not about the hardware of the problems that we are dis-
cussing today, but about the software and the politics. Sasha, since you refer to
me as a neo-conservative, I want to begin with a neo-con story that some of
you may be familiar with. It is the story of three businessmen traveling recent-
ly in Africa; a Frenchman, a German and an American, all traveling together,
who were arrested for smuggling. And in this small country justice is swift.
They were found guilty, sentenced to death and within two days stood before
a firing squad. The captain of the firing squad approached and said,
“Gentlemen, you do, as is custom, have a one last wish.” He turned to the
Frenchman and asked what his last request was. The Frenchman said, “Well,
that’s easy, my last wish is to have a band play the French national anthem, and
I would like to sing along.” The captain of the firing squad agreed to the
Frenchman’s request. Then he turns to the German and asks for his last wish.
The German says, “Well, that’s easy for me, too. I would like to deliver a lecture
and the title of my lecture, which have I already pondered, will be ‘The Legal,
Moral and Political Criteria and Principles Governing the use of Force in
International Relations With a Special Discussion of the Role of International
Organizations and Supranational Institutions, in particular, that of the United
Nations.” The captain agrees to grant him his wish as well. Then he turns to the
American and asks for his last wish. And the American businessman says,
“That’s easy, shoot me first I don’t want to hear that lecture.” This brings me to
my first question – whether NATO has the possibility to play a significant role
in the Greater Middle East? 
Broadly, to get the platitudes out of the way, I will say this. There is much
that unites us across the Atlantic – free trade, our commitment to democracy
and the rule of law, our commitment to defend against terrorism and to pre-
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vent proliferation. I also think that NATO has inarguably come a very long way
in a very short amount of time. The out of area question has been answered to
some extent. Also, the question of NATO as a global organization has been
answered. Questions that are being asked today, like those of this conference,
were unthinkable just a couple of years ago, and I do not exclude the possibil-
ity that in the future, NATO could play some meaningful role in Iraq. At the
same time, I think we should guard against irrational exuberance on this topic.
I think that the debate and the divisions that we had over Iraq are more symp-
tom and not cause and that there are some differences and some divergences
that are very real. I think the proposition put before us today is a very ambi-
tious one when you consider that this is the area of the world where this set
of issues has traditionally been a source of the disagreement between Ame-
ricans and Europeans. Now, I too read the paper prepared by Jiří Schneider
and Michael Žantovský. And the question posed was whether this project is
something that can renew NATO. Michael and Jiří argue that there are power-
ful rational arguments in favor of this, and I have the fullest sympathy for that.
However, there are also at least two serious and powerful obstacles that would
have to be overcome if this topic is to be dealt with seriously. 
The first is a common transatlantic threat assessment. Thérese, I was
quite taken by what you said about the progress that has been made on this
issue, and I respect it. I was also taken by something that you said almost a year
ago in Washington while delivering a paper on the subject of proliferation.
You said that for us Europeans the strategic vacation is over. I wish that were
true. And I wish that you or Mark Perrin de Brichambaut or Jacques Rupnik
were more representative of Europe. I don’t think that you three have ever had
a long weekend when it comes to strategic issues, but I am not entirely con-
vinced that Europe, as a whole, has left its strategic vacation behind. Certainly,
in my judgment, the country where I live, Germany, has not. People ask why
Germany, Europe’s largest economy, spends roughly the same percentage of
their GPD as Luxembourg does on these issues. Is it because Germans believe
more in soft power? Is it because history still inhibits Germans to think con-
structively about the use of force? Is it the lack of political will? Is it a lack or
resources? It is probably a little bit of all of those things, but overall it is essen-
tially because Germans do not feet threatened. This is a country of 84 million,
sitting in heart of Europe, and Germans do not feel threatened. Before, during,
and after the war, the Iraq debate in Germany has been approached reluctant-
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ly, ambivalently, and resentfully. I believe that even if Al Gore had been the
president and Edmund Stoiber had been the chancellor, Iraq still would not
have been a very interesting subject for the Germans. I think Germans would
still have had other domestic and foreign policy priorities that would have
been more regional such as making the Euro work, European Union enlarge-
ment, a European Constitution, and creating a European defense force more as
a symbol of European identity and European emancipation than as a force to
defend against something or for something. 
Common threat assessment and encouraging NATO to move forward in
a significant, meaningful way is a rather serious challenge. I think that it has to
do with a changed strategic environment after the end of the Cold War and the
changed strategic environment since September 11th. It has to do with
Europe’s relationship with us, the Americans, because we are an important
member of NATO. The Chairman of the Defense Committee of the French
National Assembly says, “If we are to agree to this, and this being the wider role
of NATO, including Greater Middle East, we run the danger of being at the
mercy of all the international policy decisions made by the Americans.” Der
Spiegel complains, “The Americans are now acting in the absence of limits put
to them by anybody or anything as if they own a blank check in their own
McWorld.” Both those quotations come from the good old days of cozy alliance
relations when Bill Clinton was president, multilateralism was in, NATO was
in favor and we Americans had a kinder, gentler Secretary of Defense. Those
were the days when there were endless complains in Paris about America,
the hyper power, where across the continent you could hear from politicians
and editorial writers that NATO was going to be manipulated as a tool
of American global interest. Milošević was indisputably the butcher of the Bal-
kans, Wesley Clark and Dick Holbrook were the bullies of the Balkans. Remem-
ber the conferences on the lessons of Kosovo after Kosovo? The conferences
in Europe were different than the conferences in America, and the lessons, to
some extent, were different. I mention that because I think some of these
issues started before the Iraq debate, and they are now more challenging. As I
said at the outset, Iraq was a symptom not a cause. 
Now, we have moved beyond the most acrimonious parts of that debate.
President Chirac and President Bush are talking, Chancellor Schröder and
President Bush are meeting, and their security council appears once again to
be united. However, if we are going to move on this subject, for NATO, as tra-
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ditionally conceived, we have to answer at least two questions. One is from
the Iraq debate. Are there limits to disagreement in our Alliance if we are
going to have a functioning Alliance? It was – to put it mildly – extraordinary
that during the Iraq crisis at least two members actively worked to undermine
the position of the US and Great Britain. And the second question has to do
with Iraq itself because I don’t think the Iraq debate has entirely resolved
itself. I wonder if we are already drawing different conclusions? After the war
in Iraq, the German president, Johannes Rau, gave a speech in which he said it
was wrong to say that Iraq had divided Europe. He said that Europe was never
more united because the populations from West to East were united in their
opposition to the war and that the result from the war validated the German
and French positions of having opposed the war. This found a positive echo in
the press and resonance in public opinion and did not trigger a peep from the
opposition in Germany. 
In closing, I am aware that I have concentrated in very broad brush-
strokes on Germany and France, and that they are not the whole of Europe. I
am aware that the skies are not falling and all is not lost, that Germans are with
us in a very constructive way in Afghanistan, and that the French are working
with us in very important ways on WMD issues. I am aware that the admission
of ten new members to the Alliance will change the character of the Alliance.
Also, I do not exclude that NATO will play some role, in places like Iraq.
However, if it is going to be a substantial role on any sustained basis we have
to tackle two problems. One is the still existent gap in threat assessment, and
the other is the deep ambivalence that has emerged over the last decade about
America, in general, and its role as the leader of the Alliance.
Alexandr Vondra
Thank you for being provocative. As is our privilege, it is time to give the floor
to a Czech voice. The PASS view, as was mentioned by Uzi and Jeff, is included
in the policy paper, which was distributed. Now, let us hear something about
the Czech government’s approach.
Karel Kovanda is our Ambassador to NATO. He was our first Czech
Ambassador to NATO, arriving there in 1998, the time of our accession into
the organization. Karel is a man with great deal of expertise in policy making
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vis-a-vis the Greater Middle East because when Czechoslovakia split, we
thought how to strengthen our muscles during a period of increasing weak-
ness. We decided to run for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council,
and we won. We sent Karel, who spent 15 years of his life in the Uni-ted States,
to represent us there, considering him to be someone who would be formida-
ble in the round-table discussions. He was there during the interesting years of
1994 and 1995 when there were many debates about Iraq and WMD’s prolifer-
ation. Karel, please tell us about the atmosphere in Brussels in the days follow-
ing the Iraqi war.
Karel Kovanda
I am delighted to be in Prague as well. Never get to be here often enough or
for long enough. Today, I am wearing my special NATO tie, I see someone
wearing an EU tie. I am wearing a NATO tie. It is very discrete, very subtle, and
you have to look very closely to see that it actually has a NATO emblem on it.
I will first make one general point and then offer you a set of disconnected
remarks. 
In the last twelve months, NATO has started to go through an extension
in three absolutely different areas. Two of them concern the Greater Middle
East. One concerns the Greater Middle East and is in the geographical span
of operations. We are in Afghanistan; who would have ever thought that we
would get that far? Frankly, the first thought about going into Afghanistan
downed on us in December 2001. Again, very soon after 9/11, we toyed with
the idea of sending a sort of humanitarian operation to Afghanistan, building
on our expertise from the Balkans, where it turned out that we are the only
people who can build 100.000 tents in three days. However, at that point it did
not work out. Nevertheless, interestingly, the fact that Afghanistan is so far
away was not the reason why it didn’t work out. In other words, Afghanistan
gives a whole new meaning to the concept of “out of area,” which hither to
had been more or less limited to the Balkans. It also demonstrated how wise it
was, especially in the debate that preceded the Washington Summit of 1999,
that the concept of what “out of area” actually entails was never set down in
concrete. It still remains an open question, whether there are places in
the world where we would not go and, theoretically, there are none. This is all
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part of the footnote of the paper where Reykjavik and Prague reiterated that
we will go anywhere we are challenged. Politically, I am sure that there are lim-
itations. For example, I can’t see us going into North Korea under any circum-
stances right now. So we can see that the geographical extension of NATO’s
field operations is one way in which NATO has extended. 
The second way it has extended is through membership enlargement,
but I am not going to talk about that. And the third way in which NATO has
extended is in the type of operations it does. Historically, it was always pre-
pared to do the Article 5 stuff, but never got around to it. Since 1995, we have
actively been involved in non-Article 5 operations. We have reached a time
when we operate indirectly by supporting other organizations and countries
interested in doing their own thing. NATO provides them with tools such as
its expertise and capabilities. Some people, including Schneider and
Žantovský, talk disparagingly about NATO turning into a toolbox. I have never
understood what’s wrong with this. If being a toolbox means things such as
providing support for Germany and the Netherlands in Afghanistan, the EU in
Macedonia, and Poland in Iraq, then what’s wrong with being a toolbox? Are
we going to find that the tools are broken as the paper says? No, what we are
going to find is that using our tools sharpens them. Use it or lose it as they say
in America. 
My second main point is about the prospects of where we are and where
we might go. We are in Afghanistan with 5000 plus people, and we will be
there for a long time. Right now, NATO is reflecting on which areas of Afgha-
nistan it can be present in. As you know, there was a parallel debate going on
in Brussels and in the UN Security Council regarding whether people can and
should be allowed, to go beyond Kabul, which the Germans wanted to do very
badly. The UN passed a resolution authorizing us to do so, and now, we are fig-
uring out questions such as how, where, under what circumstances, and
where we get the forces from.
Is it conceivable that if Turkey decides to go into Iraq and takes over
a sector just as Poland has, NATO would provide Turkey with support simi-
lar to what it is providing to Poland? Absolutely! Is it conceivable that NATO
would take over a sector in Iraq similarly to ISAF? Frankly, I can’t exclude
that today either. An appropriate UNSC resolution is, of course, a necessary
condition, and I return to this question to examine whether it is a sufficient
condition. Nevertheless, it probably could be in the works for the debate.
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Israel, Palestine is there conceivably a future role for NATO there? I am not
going to touch on that one. It is a tough prospect, and I have no doubt that
Ron Asmus is going to talk about this in the afternoon. Now, in Iraq, a UNSC
resolution would be a necessary condition for NATO’s direct involvement,
but not a sufficient one. We are facing increased pressure for NATO to do
more stuff. I don’t know why this is happening, if it is because other people
are incapable of doing it or because NATO has proven so successful. We have
to reflect very seriously on what NATO can do, as well as how much we can
do and what do we have the wherewithal for. There are important changes
taking place within NATO since the Prague Summit of just a year ago. NATO
is building up its response force and its capabilities and is debating about
usability of forces. Usability of forces: it turns out that the Europeans in
NATO have a million people in the uniform, and they are hard pressed to
find 2–3 percent of those people who can be sent out for operations, none
of which in the foreseeable future are ever going to be in anywhere near
NATO’s own territory. So do we have the wherewithal? My message to you is
that today we hardly do. Today, we are hard pressed to meet the absolute
minimum requirements that our soldiers have to do ISAF in Kabul, let alone,
outside Kabul. But still, we are determined to go outside Kabul. And so what
I see here is a double danger for NATO. On one side, we may feed doubts
about NATO’s relevance by not meeting the expectations of international
actors, including everyone from the UN and the US to the non-governmental
organizations to the people of the countries themselves. On the other hand
we run the risk of failure if we start a job only to find out that we cannot
complete the task. These are the twin dangers that NATO is facing today. So
does NATO have the self-confidence to say: “We can take on this job, but that
job we are not suited for?” Can NATO have the confidence to say this with-
out paying a price in its relevance?
When it comes to fighting terrorism, there is a doctrinal point which has
been touched upon by some of the speakers, and that doctrinal point is pre-
emption. Preemption is one part of the UN national security strategy, but it has
not been debated in NATO. In fact, NATO exercises have, on occasion, been
judiciously shut down the moment the question of preemption would even
have had to be discussed. Preemption is not in NATO’s history. When it was
facing the traditional threat from the East, NATO’s doctrine was to absorb the
first strike and then retaliate. The question is whether this can happen with
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terrorism. The debate will have to take place in Istanbul Summit or some time
later; and the result of that debate will have to be reflected in the new strate-
gic concept, whether this takes place. 
So, as I mentioned, we are in Afghanistan directly, we are in Iraq indirect-
ly, and there is a third way in which NATO is involved in the Greater Middle East
today. And that is called the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean
Dialogue is a strictly political, diplomatic matter in which seven countries
of the Greater Middle East: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, three Maghreb countries and
Mauretania hold discussions individually with NATO. Sometimes as a group, we
have a 19 plus 7 meeting. Those meetings, however, are rather strictly limited to
NATO informing the Med Dialogue partners about what we are doing. Perso-
nally, I have found the Mediterranean Dialogue to be a barren exercise. I think
we have not managed to fill it with value. Characteristically, the Mediterranean
Dialogue is only mentioned once, in the back of today’s paper, and it is only
mentioned in the same parentheses as Ukraine. This tells me that the authors of
the paper do not feel that this is a sexy, exciting, contributing issue for many
countries, including Turkey. I would not be surprised if my friend, Onur
Öymen, touched on this. The Mediterranean Dialogue is very important from
the political point of view, but we still have to find the best use for it. Our meet-
ings with Israel are the most substantive ones. I would say that those meetings
are more like talking to non-NATO allies than our discussions with other mem-
bers of the Med Dialogue are. We have not found the way to integrate the
Mediterranean Dialogue with our discussions concerning what we are actually
doing, be it in Afghanistan or indeed even in Iraq. Perhaps it is not surprising. 
So, Mr. Chairman, let me close by recapping three challenges that I see
NATO facing. The first challenge is finding the right balance between
the work it takes on and the capabilities it has. The point of balance should
move over time, especially as we improve and increase the capabilities we have
and as we further develop and acquire new ones. The second challenge is a
conceptual debate on preemption, which NATO has to have sooner or later.
And the third challenge is to figure out a productive political relationship of
real value with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners, be it collectively or indi-
vidually. If we do not sort out these issues, Mr. Chairman, NATO will resemble
my tie. It would be elegant but too discreet to notice without looking very
carefully to see it. And so let me say this, Mr. Chairman, the big question is not
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only what can NATO do for the Greater Middle East but also what can the
Greater Middle East do for NATO.
Alexandr Vondra
You mentioned many times that we are somewhere half way between the
Prague Summit to the next NATO summit which will take place next spring in
the great city of Istanbul. We are very happy to have with us today the great
Turkish expert on the NATO affairs. Onur Öymen combines political expert-
ise with the experience of being a practical politician. He served as the
Turkish Ambassador to NATO for almost five years starting in 1997. Now, he is
back in Ankara as a Member of the Parliament. He is a member of the opposi-
tion party, which may be an additional reason to hear his arguments about
what we can expect in Istanbul and what the Turks wish to achieve our cur-
rent debate.
Onur Öymen
We have heard a lot of references to Turkey, and it is good to be referred to. It
is good to talk about Turkey, but it’s even better to talk with the Turks to learn
their opinions. Therefore, I would like to thank the organizers for allowing me
to share my views on this extremely interesting subject with you. I understand
that your intent is to talk about the greater area and not to focus precisely on
the Middle East in the classical sense. At this moment, we are mostly talking
about Iraq and the Middle East, but we should not forget the rest of the area
where today, as we speak, there are about 1 million displaced persons and
large parts of territories are still under occupation. I want to talk about possi-
ble role of NATO in all of these areas, that have been a source of tension and
conflict for the last three decades or more. The number of persons who have
lost their lives in this area during these conflicts, clashes, and acts of terrorism
is over 1 million. The question we are addressing today is an extremely serious
matter and should not be compared to any other ordinary political discussion.
The latest figures show that practically one fourth of all international terro-
rism activities are taking place in the Middle East. In the narrower sense, the
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figure for this year is that 23 % of all terrorist activities in the world happened
in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Palestine and Israel. Another char-
acteristics of this region is the lack of democracy. We are talking very little
about the lack of democracy, but perhaps, this is the crux of the matter. The
absence of democracy in the region creates a lot of insecurity, a lack of confi-
dence, and other sources that lead to violence and terror. Therefore, we
should remember that in this whole area we have only Turkey and Israel act-
ing as Western style democracies. Democratization of this region should be
tremendously helpful for the peace and stability in the entire area. 
What role can NATO play? First, our colleagues, particularly Mrs. Del-
pech, have mentioned weapons of mass destruction. This is an extremely
important issue. And as far as Turkey is concerned, we are in the geographic
area where any attack by WMD will hit first, before reaching all other NATO
countries. We are in the range of missiles that some countries of the region
already possess. Therefore, nobody can support NATO activities against prolif-
eration of WMD more than Turkey. However, do we really have a firm policy of
acting against those countries possessing these weapons? If we had one, we
would be very happy. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction, is
always a priority in our foreign policy. Now, I am not necessarily talking only
about Middle East, I am also talking about the sub-continent. I remember our
first reactions against those countries producing WMD in the sub-continent,
and how we shifted policies as a result of the war in Afghanistan and other
developments. If we are firm against WMD, we have to be firm in practice, not
only in words, but also in deeds. 
With regards to terrorism, we have an extremely interesting history in
NATO, and I would like to share with you my own experience. For many years
we [Turkey] fought the fight against terrorism on the agenda in NATO. During
this time, if you saw any references to cooperation or determination to fight
terrorism in NATO’s ministerial communiqués, you can be sure that it was the
product of the efforts of only one country, Turkey. Until September 11th, there
was a significant reluctance in NATO to include terrorism on the agenda. Be-
fore this day, I don’t remember one single NATO council meeting where we
had terrorism on our agenda. Karel Kovanda would confirm that. Since Sep-
tember 11th, I can’t remember one single council meeting where fighting ter-
rorism was not at the top of our agenda. Everything in NATO changed in half
an hour. We heard the news of the attacks against the Twin Towers and the
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Pentagon while we were in a meeting. On that same day, NATO changed its
policy. During the same evening, we published a declaration on a topic about
which we had never ever published before. Moreover, the following day, unbe-
lievably, without discussion, we unanimously decided to implement Article 5
of the Washington Treaty upon the request of the Americans. The United
States shifted NATO position. In fact, it was a good decision, and as far as
Turkey was concerned, we wholeheartedly supported NATO’s new action. If
NATO was well prepared to fight terrorism, it was because of the infrastruc-
ture, planning capabilities, military forces, and experience of a number of
countries like Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Nothing is
more proper for NATO than to play an active role in combating terrorism. Not
only in Europe, but also everywhere since our new strategic concept, adopted
in April 1999 at the Washington Summit, permits NATO to operate outside its
traditional area and to address issues like crisis management, which includes
terrorism. NATO is well placed to play an extremely active role, and we are
very sorry that NATO has so far not been involved in the Iraq problem. We
wish that NATO had been involved from the outset as we previously proposed.
But where is the problem? It is within the political dimension. We should
be fair enough and have the courage to share our views about the real issues
with each other. This is a political issue because while NATO is an extremely
important organization in Europe, it is not the only organization dealing with
this problem. We should not overlook the existence of a big organization
called the European Union. When we were talking in NATO about terrorism
we, Turkey made a concrete proposal. We said, “Let’s establish an ad hoc com-
mittee with the European Union to combat terrorism.” We tried hard and had
the support of others including our American friends, but so far we have not
received a positive answer from the European Union. Today, we do not have,
to the best of my knowledge, and correct me if I’m wrong, one single mecha-
nism of cooperation specifically designed for discussing terrorism between
NATO and the European Union. Surprisingly enough, we have such a commit-
tee in NATO with another country. Which one? Russia. Our cooperation with
Russia, on this particular issue is closer than our cooperation with the Euro-
pean Union. The new NATO-Russia forum is designed in such a way that
encourages the study and discussion of issues like terrorism. This forum
includes the right to vote for everyone, including Russia. NATO’s cooperation
with Russia is more advanced than its cooperation with the European Union. 
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In regards to the new structure of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force, we
believe that such a force may be extremely useful, but we need political will
behind this force. As long as we don’t have this will, we cannot operate. Here
is an example that I believe illustrates my point. After September 11th, both
Americans and Europeans prepared lists of terrorist organizations against
which they need to take appropriate actions. The American list was rather
comprehensive, and we are thankful to our American friends for including the
notorious PKK organization on their list from the outset. This was a good mes-
sage to terrorists. However, the PKK was not on the European Union’s list. It
took us several months to persuade our European friends to put the PKK on
their list of terrorist organizations, and the day we successfully persuaded our
European friends to include the PKK on their list, the PKK changed its name
to KADEK. The Americans were kind enough to immediately include KADEK
in their list, however, more than one year later, we are still waiting for the
Europeans to include KADEK on their list of terrorist organizations. So, my
dear friends, as long as you don’t have the political will to fight terrorism and
don’t feel the security threat at home and continue to overlook them; if you do
not want to take action against terrorist organizations that are not directly
threatening your own security, we cannot be successful. NATO cannot be suc-
cessful so long as we don’t all have the spirit and determination for solidarity
to fight all forms of terrorism in all countries all over the world, without any
exception and without any discrimination. I remember what President Bush
said after 9/11. He said that in our fight against terrorism, there is no gray area.
Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists, this is exactly what we, in
Turkey, have been saying. If we have political determination in NATO, we will
be extremely successful. 
On this particular point, since I referred to President Bush’s statement,
I have a friendly suggestion for our American friends. We are thankful to them
for their past cooperation and support of Turkey in fighting terrorism, but at
this very moment in northern Iraq, an area controlled by American forces,
there are six thousand KADEK terrorists freely operating. Not a single terror-
ist in modern Iraq has been arrested, detained and delivered to Turkey so far.
We know that American and Turkish authorities are talking about strong coop-
eration, but so far we have not seen any results. 
My last point is with regards to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. It
is not enough that NATO is determined to cooperate with its members and to
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be operational against terrorism or weapons of mass destruction in the Grea-
ter Middle East. We also need the cooperation of the countries of the region.
We cannot operate alone. We cannot be considered as an underline of a super-
power. NATO is also a political organization, but for that matter we need
the participation, the cooperation, and the aproval of the countries in the re-
gion. Mediterranean Dialogue countries, at least most of them, were reluctant
to cooperate with NATO. They were eager to cooperate on technical matters,
but when it came to political issues, they were reluctant to even talk. Our first
talk with Mediterranean Dialogue countries on political issues of the Middle
East was right after September 11th. Even today, I am not sure that all Mediter-
ranean Dialogue countries are eager to see NATO active in the region. They
should think of this dimension as well, and Turkey, being the only member of
NATO and the Islamic Conference, is ready to bring our contribution to such
an initiative.
I would like to end my words with a reference to Iraq. Turkey has often
been misunderstood and misquoted on this issue. What we have to say is that
we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in Iraq. We should con-
tribute, but according to our constitution, in order to do that, we need legiti-
macy. We are happy that we finally got the resolution in the UN, but it is not
enough. We also need the elimination of terrorism from the north of Iraq, and
also, we need a request from the representatives of the Iraqi people. So far
they are not interested in having more troops, particularly Turkish troops. You
should not interpret the Turkish position in Iraq as unwillingness to cooper-
ate with our American friends, for as long as these conditions are not met, we
believe that sending Turkish troops to the area may create more problems than
solutions. And at this moment more troops does not necessarily mean more
security. This is our message.
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Alexandr Vondra
Ladies and gentlemen, as I told you, we will have approximately 30–40 min-
utes for a discussion, and then we will give our panelists the opportunity to
respond. The first name I see is Eran Lerman. 
Eran Lerman
I have a possible answer to offer to Karel Kovanda’s question as to why NATO is
all of a sudden so much in demand. I would like to suggest that, unlike other
organizations, NATO is capable of coming to grips with the concept of “an
enemy out there.” This concept is fairly alien to the EU mindset and totally alien
to the current UN, although the UN was originally very much a fighting organi-
zation. In other words, it was the alliance of World War II. This is no longer the
case, but, because NATO is capable of this, I would define the question, not in
terms of “why does NATO need the Middle East,” but rather “why does the
Middle East need NATO?” I remember the jokes about EDS, Enemy Deficiency
Syndrome, in Washington and Brussels, but I think that those jokes are no longer
relevant. We have the enemy and NATO is the only organization that can come
to grips with this fact.
The challenge is to define the enemy properly, and, the enemy is not ter-
rorism. I will borrow an expression that I have heard from others – to call this
a war on terrorism is like calling World War II a war on tanks. Terrorism is
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a tool, so are weapons of mass destruction. The question is, the tools of what?
There is an answer, which says the enemy is Islamic civilization. But no matter
to what extent Mahathir Muhammad and Samuel Huntington play off each
other that is very much the wrong answer. I think the enemy is precisely the
same enemy that NATO was created to fight, namely totalitarianism. In this
case, it is totalitarianism under the guise of Islam. After all, the enemy that
NATO was created to confront was not Russia or Eastern Europe, it was com-
munism as a system. And today the challenge in the Middle East, by states and
groups, comes from a perversion of Islam, which is largely colored by modern
European totalitarian ideologies of both fascism and communism. I have heard
a leading Russian official describe the enemy as Islamic Bolsheviks. I would
also say that in a larger sense, fascism played a role in the creation of these
movements in the late 1920s. I would call it Islamic totalitarianism. a focus on
the identity of the enemy is necessary. It will also help to create better criteria
for defining who is with us and who is against us. In this case, leaving Israel
aside, I would say that once you start casting a broader net, not only Russia,
which has already been mentioned here, but also India begin to look like “out
of area” anchors for a new conceptual framework. 
Two further quick comments: I share the view that the Med Dialogue has
failed to deliver, this is a tragic failure because creating the Mediterranean as a
community could be one of the most important instrumental building blocks
for a better future. The reason it has failed is very clear. From day one, a decision
was taken that it would not advance faster than the slowest participant was will-
ing to allow it. Here, it ran up against the traditional Egyptian objection to any ac-
tive integration that includes Israel. To remove this Egyptian objection and to
create a dialogue which runs forward with every willing participant as far as that
willing participant would go would be a major breakthrough in the relations
with NATO and a good number of Mediterranean countries not just Israel. 
Finally, to borrow an important element from what we heard yesterday
from HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal. If we are in a war against an ideology, its
allies, and those who deliberately use it as an instrument, then this work cannot
be entirely confined to the military dimensions. It also has to deal with certain
fundamental issues. The mobilization ground for these movements is the mas-
sive migration of the Middle Eastern people. What we see in the Middle East is
not unlike what we see in other parts of the Third World, a move from the coun-
tryside to the cities. That historical movement is, to a large extent, the result of
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the failure to resolve questions about the future of agrarian and rural societies.
In this respect, the failure of Cancun was a blow to this struggle. Here is the
domain where, focused on the same enemy, the EU and international institu-
tions can play a role side by side and in coordination with a robust NATO military
strategy.
Alexandr Vondra
You mentioned Prince Hassan, so let me welcome His Royal Highness, who has
just joined us for the morning session, and who would like to participate in the
discussion. Before he speaks, I will call others who have already asked to speak.
Ishak Alaton
I wish to inform you that there are some Turks in this room who support the
deployment of Turkish forces to Iraq. 
And for Ambassador Kovanda, what do you discuss in NATO if you don’t
discuss preemption? 
We have an inclination to deal with blocs. We acquired this inclination
during the Cold War. Now, we must be aware that this concept cannot be fully
applied to the new situation because the Greater Middle East is not a bloc in
the sense of the Soviet Union. 
And my last point – can we really reduce everything to terrorism simply
because there is a terrorist act involved? What I’m trying to ignore, in a sense, is
its political content. If we consider the political content underlining a terrorist
act, how can we deal with it unless we take into account the entire picture?
Amin Tarzi
I have a comment and a question for two of the participants. The first part of my
question is to Uzi Arad. You cited two main challenges to the West, specifically
using NATO in the Greater Middle East, as well as proliferation and terrorism.
I actually totally agree with you about that, and you caution against NATO going
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into state building and regime changes. However, what we see in Afghanistan,
the only place where NATO is involved, is precisely state building. NATO is not
really fighting terrorism. Yesterday, Kabul International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) had four Germans and two Canadians killed by terrorist actions;
however, ISAF is not fighting terrorism. If you look at the conflict, the terror
aspect is mostly in the south of the country, and ISAF will not be there in the
foreseeable future. ISAF is expanding northward, which is mostly state building.
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ task is state building rather than fighting
terrorism. Furthermore, when you look at Iraq, that was a regime change.
Terrorism may have become an issue, but initially it was not a primary issue. So,
the two things that you cautioned against, and I personally agree with you, have
happened. However, when you look at the core issues, terrorism and prolifera-
tion, nothing is happening in the areas where these are a primary concern. We
heard that we won’t even touch the issue of NATO being involved in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. If we do not discuss that then what are we doing? As for the
issue of proliferation, what about the very serious situation in Iran? Is NATO
going to get involved in that? What if after October 31st, Iran is not abiding by its
demands, and if after that, Iran continues activities such as importing enriched
uranium for the purpose of making nuclear weapons? Do you foresee NATO act-
ing, and if not, is the concept you mention really valid?
The second point of my question goes to Thérese and regards the same
Iranian issue. She mentioned that the EU, specifically France, Germany, and
Great Britain, have been acting vis-a-vis Iran. I, too, see that; for the first time,
there is a gelling of these activities. My question is about the demand that they
should stop the fuel cycle. Do you think that France or the rest of Europe will
act if Iran doesn’t comply?
Lastly, I have a comment about the conceptual idea of an enemy who is
“out there.” NATO is expanding into the Greater Middle East. Looking around
the room right now, although my tag says I am representing Afghanistan, my
parents are from Afghanistan, I was born in Prague and served with the US
marines in the Middle East in the 1990s. So I am as much of an American as
much as it gets. With the exception of Turkey and Israel, I don’t see anybody
from the Arab countries. If you are expanding there, and we are not fighting
Islamic civilization as such, shouldn’t their ideas be incorporated into this very
open type of forum? If not you are sidelining them by essentially fighting the
civilization and not the bad guy within.
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Alexandr Vondra
Germany was mentioned a few times in the panel, but there is not a German
panelist, so I am very glad that Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg is entering the dis-
cussion.
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg
This is a question for Jeff Gedmin. You mentioned, as an obstacle to the expan-
sion of NATO, the difference of the common transatlantic assessment again. I
agreed with you on that with regard to the war in Iraq, but I wonder how in
this context you see the role of the Solana Paper, which was put on the table
in June, especially in relation to the national security strategy of the United
States.
Margarita Mathiopoulos
Margarita Mathiopoulos, another German. Jeff, you know how much I usual-
ly agree with your comments, and I do agree with what you said about the
kind of freelance diplomacy our red-green government performed during
the Iraq crises, which I think damaged German interests, European interests
and Atlantic interests. Now, as Günther Altenburg said yesterday, you need
two to tango. As a very old-fashioned Atlanticist, I would like to say that if we
do not clear up certain fundamental issues, and reach an agreement on these
issues between the Americans and the Europeans before embarking on such
a very important debate about NATO and the Middle East, and whether this
could be a project to renew NATO, which I believe could be a very nice proj-
ect, we will fail. Again, as an old-fashioned Atlanticist, I think of one of
NATO’s finest hours, on 9/11, when the Europeans invoked Article 5, and we
were a bit disappointed when the US Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld,
came to NATO and told us, “This is all very nice of you, but I think we can
manage alone.”
Second, I think we have to clear up the question of whether the US con-
tinues to see NATO as the single military organization to project power to
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address the new challenges of the new security environment on a global scale,
or will Washington continue to use NATO as a toolbox and so marginalize the
Alliance, and push NATO into the role of a second CSCE (Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe). I agree very much with His Royal
Highness that CSCE is a very good instrument to use in the Middle East, but I
think we need both.
And my third question, “Are the Americans finally prepared to share sen-
sitive technology that will enable NATO to become operable?” Two weeks ago,
I was very privileged to join a conference in Rome about missile defense,
which is also a very relevant issue in the context of NATO and the Greater
Middle East. I think this area will be a prime test where we should, from the
European point of view, come in and work together closely with the Ame-
ricans, but will the Americans really be willing to share sensitive technology
with us? These fundamentals need to be addressed openly and answered pos-
itively so that the political elites in Germany and in other European countries,
who continue to believe in the transatlantic relationship and that the Alliance
matters and that the strategic vacation in Germany and in the rest of Europe is
over, can have proper arguments to use in our parliaments as well as in our
constituencies. So again, to tango you need two, and therefore, don’t only ask
what Europeans can do for America, but also ask what Americans can do for
the Atlantic-minded Europeans – particularly those in Germany, who are a bit
left out in the cold these days.
HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal
I would like to quote Ambrose Bierce who suggested that “war is a God’s way
of teaching Americans geography.” And on the subject of the Greater Middle
East, as a member of a state that was part of the United Kingdom once upon a
blue moon, I would like to mention once again, that the Baghdad Pact was
actually the center of CENTO. 
Once again, I will go back to the basic question that many of you are ask-
ing, “Are you with us, or are you against us?” First of all who is the us? Are we
trying to promote public reason, the majority of the sane, and are we planning
to empower the majority of the sane in the fight against terrorism? Or, are we
seeing a situation where progressively new leadership is being encouraged to
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take over from the rather tired leadership in our part of the world? We have
passed through the traditional monarchies. Now, we have the hereditary
republics, and I think that the moment is coming when the decision has to be
taken either to maintain the state system under enormous stress and strain,
because of the lack of pluralism and governance, or succumb to ethnic and
sectarian breakup of the region. Balkanization. And my friend, Onur Öymen,
knows very well what Balkanization means. 
With all due respect, I would just like to point to the suggestion I made
that it was not the only call for a CSCE; in fact, both Israel and Jordan called for
CSCE, jointly in the peace treaty. My call was for the kind of support that
Jordan received, on more than one occasion, not least of all during the last war
where it was an exception, not a norm, in terms of the public view that Jordan
actually managed to host American troops for a period of time to protect its
airspace against the possibility of an air strike going seriously wrong. 
I would also like to touch on the idea of our continuing to tell creative
lies. As I was sitting in my home, huge transporters of the American Air Force
were flying over my head, and I was supposed to tell the general public “No,
this is not happening, we don’t have American troops.” The idea of clearly rec-
ognizing that a new modality is incumbent on our agreements with the US,
with all due respect to my Israeli colleagues here, is not a competition with
Israel. How could we compete with Israel in terms of its standing with the
United States? It is a complimentary role, an activating of what I call a majori-
ty of the sane not only in the fight against terror, but also in the fight to create
a basic security situation. And this is why I have hosted meetings with Indians,
Pakistanis, Israelis, Turks, all the nationalities of the region, and called for
a WMD free zone, but, of course, when everyone steps out into the light of day
they are not interested in multilateral solutions. I have called for a clear defini-
tion of terror as Uzi Arad, in terms of the Herzlia Center, has also called for a
definition of terror. Lastly, I have called for a culture of compliance, a code of
conduct for state and non-state actors alike. We have also heard a lot about the
importance of a humanitarian program like the Marshall Plan. Shimon Peres
once spoke about the importance of a new Middle East, unfortunately his
emphasis was on IT and investment. As I have said to him, with all due respect,
the emphasis should be on human dignity. Moving from refugee mode to
poverty alleviation mode, is one of the direct security investments that must
be made in order to help change this hotbed of terror. 
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As far as religion is concerned, I just want to make one point that within
the Greater Middle East there are three hundred million Shia. I find it rather
sad that the confrontation today is, on the one side, Wahabi zealotism and on
the other, clearly an Israeli position. My sadness is that this confrontation is
one where Shiismism is regarded synonymous with Islam. The other day,
before going to a Paris mosque, where I took with me the former chief Rabbi
of France, Catholics, and Protestants, I was talking to the Minister of Interior
about the separation of church and state. I cite this as an example because cul-
ture is a security issue. I said why is it that we cannot elevate religion above
state. Why is it that we do not find a point of reference for all of this? I think
that the problem is the absence of cultural affinity. All the international medi-
ators who entered the scene without any background are facing enormous dif-
ficulties in understanding that they are losing the majority of the sane. I am
not talking about the super-rich who are making money out of these projects;
I am talking about a group of people from Cairo to Delhi. I say that with some
feeling because I have in-laws in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and they
know very well how jitters develop, particularly in Muslim minds, when Mr.
Sharon visits India and signs an agreement to develop advanced early warning
capabilities with India and Russia. So I think in these changing times of
alliances and unilateral actions, the time has come to call things directly by
their names. We are only a region in name, and in the days of CENTO, Indira
Gandhi would refer to the Middle East and say it is not the Middle East, it is
West Asia. 
Finally, I would like to add one point, groups such as the Netanya Center,
whose membership includes Mikhail Gorbachev and F. W. de Klerk, are wak-
ing up to the importance of eastern Mediterranean security, including the
Greek-Turkish confrontation. I find this extremely helpful, and please, let’s
give meaning to what I call “alphabet soup” – Partnership for Peace and Part-
nership for Mediterranean, and the OSCE, who is a major non-NATO ally. I am
not sure what being a non-NATO ally means, as it didn’t give us a civilian airlift
capability to help refugees coming out of Iraq. Continuing without the region-
al concept, without sensitivity to the possibility of ethnic and sectarian break-
up is threatening not only to the region but also to the whole concept of secu-
rity. There are 26 American bases between the Caspian Sea and China. What
are they doing there? What is the logic? If there is a logic can we share in it?
Can we ask NATO “quo vadis” in terms of the absence of one regional center
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for conflict analyses in our part of the world or conflict avoidance? Can we
ask, “Isn’t this the time for us to have one single regional center for public pol-
icy analyses, so I am not the only token Arab in such a meeting?” Can we have
a regional capability of discussing the issue that we are discussing today? The
last meeting of this kind was the globalization commission in Brussels. I was
chairing the session, and the Americans and the Europeans abused each other.
When the moment came for them to turn to me, I asked them to cool it and
said that I was supposed to be the token representative from the region, and I
would just like to focus again on the region and not on interests. This concept
of the revival of the common security and foreign policy initiative in the con-
text of the Western hemisphere is something that needs to be discussed away
from the cameras and with some sense of urgency and responsibility before it
is too late.
Alexandr Vondra
What you have said is important, and it reminds me of a comment that
František Šulc, a journalist from Lidové Noviny, made during the coffee break.
He said that he feels that we are all in the same forest, but the problem is that
some of us have the tendency to see, think and talk about only the coniferous
trees, while the others have the tendency to see or to talk about the deciduous
trees. We have to keep in mind that we are all in the same forest. 
Ariel Cohen
Before jumping into the discussion this morning, I think that we should have
focused a little bit on some differences between NATO during the Cold War
versus NATO in the current stage. During the Cold War, NATO was an alliance
that faced a very clearly defined enemy and ideology. It was basically facing a
nation state cum empire, the Soviet Union and the coalition of its satellites. It
faced the clearly defined ideology of communism. Today, NATO, if we can
agree, and I hope we do agree, is facing a threat and there is some kind of an
enemy. It would probably be beneficial to ourselves to try to define the enemy
and the threats. I would submit that we are facing a global movement that I
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would call a Jihadi movement. I agree with previous speakers that this is some
kind of malignant evolution of Islam. No sane person would talk about a fight
against Islam per say; after all, we are talking about 1.3 billion people on this
planet. It is a global movement which has different constituent parts, different
organizations – including Sunni and Shia – with different roots, the Wahabi
roots, the Muslim Brotherhood roots, and the Shia roots. For NATO, which
defined itself as European and a regional bloc, we have to keep in mind that
some of the threats are out of area, really out of area – Southeast Asia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and now, even places like Cambodia. Who could
have imagined radical Wahabi groups found in Cambodia financing madrases
and training little jihadis? 
So again, the changes are fundamental. And the responses have to be in
areas beyond that of the conventional military. They have to be in intelligence,
law enforcement, and in common threat assessment, as was mentioned here,
but I would suggest that we are still lacking political leadership. We still are
lacking the perception by the top level of the politicians, with the exception
of the United States and some of the European allies, that we are in real war
with real threats. It is a low intensity, protracted conflict which requires differ-
ent responses. 
One other point that was mentioned this morning by our Turkish allies
and friends is a danger of picking and choosing the terrorist organizations we
feel comfortable fighting against and leaving aside those that we for some rea-
son feel like setting aside. For example, the Turks mentioned the PKK; I would
add to that: how long did it take for the Europeans to face Islamic Jihad and
Hamas, which were recently proclaimed as terrorist organizations?
I would add one point of very respectful disagreement with Uzi Arad.
Tomorrow, I am going to speak about what I call “the battle for hearts and
minds” or “the war of ideas.” I was told by the State Department not to call it
“the war of ideas” because it is too controversial. However, we need to face the
ideological dimension of this war. Just as during the Cold War, we did not only
fight with tanks and missiles – in fact, actual fighting with tanks and missiles
during the Cold War was minimal – but we also fight using public diplomacy,
international broadcasting and other instruments of the war of ideas. This
aspect has to be reformulated, reexamined and reconfigured. At one point,
Prince Hassan mentioned, very importantly, that we need to educate ourselves
as far as cultural, religious, and linguistic literacy is concerned. In my country,
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the United States, I find a woeful lack of people who make political decisions
with education on Islam, on different currents of radical Islam, who speak
Arabic, and who know Arab and Muslim history. This also has to be addressed.
Alexandr Vondra
The last speaker on my list is Ely Karmon, and if there is anybody who would
like to speak let me know as Ely speaks. Otherwise, I will pass the floor back to
the panelists.
Ely Karmon 
I would like to make several comments, not on the NATO strategy, but on the
strategy of the enemy, namely the radical Islamist movements, some of which are
direct enemies and some of which are potential enemies. I see three new strate-
gic concepts in these movements since the debacle of Afghanistan. First, there is
a discussion among ideologues of these movements, especially in the radical
opposition in Saudi Arabia, about the role of bin Laden. They say that bin Laden
is finished as a leader of the Islamist movement. Perhaps his global struggle
against the US and the West or “the infidels” has been achieved, and it is time to
go back to the local arena and to try to overthrow the local governments?
Perhaps, we can see this result in the bombings in Saudi Arabia and in Morocco
in May 2003. Connected with this strategic concept is another one which was
presented by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the real strategist of Al-Qaeda and the deputy
of bin Laden. After Afghanistan, he asked to find a fundamentalist Islamist safe
haven outside Afghanistan. He seemed to mainly target Pakistan and Indonesia.
Pakistan is very important because of its local Islamist movements and also, per-
haps, because of its nuclear capability. But it seems that lately there is an effort
of all these movements to concentrate on Iraq because of the consequences of
instability in Iraq. We see people flowing through Syria, through Iran and even
from Saudi Arabia in order to fight in Iraq and to try to transform it into an
Islamist state. The last concept, which is also very interesting, is a new concept
called non-territorial umma or non-territorial Islamic nation. Which means that
Islam has to be fought for not only in the territory of the Islamic nations but also;
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wherever a Muslim is present, he must fight Jihad. That means that all the com-
munities, Muslim communities, which are now in the West, in Europe or the US,
or even in other countries in the Far East, must wage a war of Jihad against the
infidels. And I think that if these three concepts are implemented, they will influ-
ence the NATO strategy and the NATO members’ situation.
Joshua Muravchik
Just a short response to Eran Lerman and Ariel Cohen about what we call the
enemy. I think that President Bush has it right and that it would be a big mistake
to try to find some definition, other than terrorism, of what the enemy is.
Looking at Ariel Cohen’s analogy to the Cold War, he said that instead of fight-
ing Russia, we were fighting communism. That’s not quite right. There was no
Russia; there was the Soviet Union. The enemy was Soviet imperialism, and the
ability to rally people to the battle to counteract Soviet power was dependent
on being able to show that the methods that were being used by the Soviets
were fundamentally illegitimate, that they involved aggression and subjugation
of other nations. Certainly, if we get into a discussion over war against Islamism
or Islamic fundamentalism or even Ariel’s term Jihadism, we are going to open
an enormous cans of worms and embroil ourselves in endless debates about
what this enemy is and who is an Islamist or a fundamentalist or Jihadist. The
point is we don’t care at all about how fundamentally some Muslims may inter-
pret their fate. What we care about is when people plant bombs in pizza parlors
and attack American barracks and all the other things that the terrorists do. I
think that saying that we are engaged in a war against terrorism is something
that enables us to rally people in the West for what needs to be done. Also, there
needs to be a tremendous effort to delegitimize terrorism to the public of the
Middle East. We are going to make that effort much more complicated if we
start to try define the enemy in some other way. 
Daniel Kumermann
I refer to Mr. Gedmin and his quote of President Rau. The question is how will
the European public feel if something like 9/11 happens in Europe? When it
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happened in America, it actually brought American and Israeli public percep-
tions closer together. If something like that happened in Europe, would it
bring Europeans closer to where the Americans stand now? Or would they see
it as something like a punishment for being in the same group as Americans
and try to pull farther away from them?
Alexandr Vondra
I was asked to make an exception to the rules, and so, with your permission, I
am giving the floor to HRH Prince Hassan.
HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal
I would like to go back to three previous speakers and say that Bengurion, one
of the founders of the State of Israel, in reference to a dissenter within the
Jewish community, asked, “Why do you call them dissenters, why don’t you
call them killers?” And I would like just to point out that in terms of acts of vio-
lence – whether the blowing up of the King David Hotel or any other event –
we have different perspectives on how these things happened. I would also
like to point out that as far as Muslims are concerned, those extremists are not
dissenters, they are killers. 9/11 may have privatized war, but it has also priva-
tized Islam. You speak of Islam and you say where is the sane Muslim voice?
The Muslim voice existed in Mecca right up to 1924. There were four schools
of Islam and our four schools of Sunni, orthodox Islam. Every Friday, these
four Imams led the prayer, and the family of the prophet’s house had the
respect of the Shia. There was legitimacy. Now you may not want to hear all of
this, but the fact is that either you have centrism, which is the way of Islam, or
you yield to anyone who grows a beard and wears a funny hat. And that applies
to so many different religions. But please, do not confuse the body of Islamic
learning, in terms of consultation of developing a shared consciousness in this
world and analytical concordance of meanings of what these value systems
stand for, with the actions of the so-called Jihadi minorities. The very fact that
they choose these names to ennoble themselves is the problem of the crises of
legitimacy. Restore moral authority to a Shiite, create a Vatican, an 18 km by 18
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km Mecca or Jerusalem. I don’t want to strike the parallel, but create a situa-
tion of moral authority that rises above politics, and then you will invite schol-
arship and stewardship and education and governance in the religious
domain. But, at the present time, I am afraid we are running after a privatiza-
tion of war, individuals with enormous egos, and enormous bank accounts
who have been penetrated and played by every so called intelligence service.
I think it is Groucho Marx who said that military intelligence is a contradiction
in terms, and we are living the result of that contradiction today. 
Jeff Gedmin
I will respond very briefly to four points that were made. One, if Europe expe-
rienced its own 9/11 what kind of difference would that make? I don’t know
how that would play out but I think it would make a big difference. We have
talked a lot in the last two years about September 11th as being an attack on civ-
ilization, an attack on liberal values, and an attack on democracy. However, it
was also first and foremost an attack on the United States of America, and that
has shaped the debate in our country in a way that is different than in Europe.
By the way, it was not the first attack by that network on the US. There were
two on the embassies in Africa, there was a ship, the USS Cole , in harbor in
Yemen, and there was the first attack in 1993 on the World Trade Center. It
would make a difference. 
Secondly, as to the question about common threat assessment in the
Solana Paper. I am interested in the Solana Paper, I applaud the Solana Paper,
and I think it is an interesting step in the right direction. In her presentation
Thérese mentioned some of the steps in the right direction in convergence
between America and Europe in looking at the threat of WMD and nuclear
weapons in the hands of mullahs in Iran. What happens in those next steps, I
don’t know. Whether you and other good people in this room win that argu-
ment within the European Union, I don’t know. I think we will reach a
moment of truth sooner or later. If and when Iran does not abide by certain
obligations, when diplomacy appears to fail, when industry pressures
increase and traditional constituencies for constructive dialogue are back
again, we will find out. And I am not pessimistic, I am just raising skeptical
questions. 
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Third: Margarita and the three fundamentals that you laid down, and
regarding Article 5 and American indifference to NATO’s Article 5 Declaration
after the attacks on the United States. Tomorrow, R. Nicholas Burns, the US
Ambassador to NATO, who is the kind of member of this administration that
you Europeans like – he is moderate, multilateral and loves NATO – will be
with us. However, he makes a very spirited argument that NATO, as such, was
ill-equipped to respond as an organization at that time. There are serious peo-
ple, Margarita you are one, I think Ron Asmus is another, who disagree with R.
Nicholas Burns. I will let you take up that debate with Nick tomorrow, but I
will concede that politically and psychologically we didn’t handle that well.
And it had the effect, intended or not, of telling some of our closest allies, “We
do not appreciate you, we do not need you, or we don’t see a central role for
you.”
Second point of yours, Margarita, do we Americans continue to, or will
we see NATO, as you put it, as the single security defense organization to deal
with threats and challenges on the global scale? I only speak for myself, but I
am not willing to say that. When you say single, it sounds exclusive, and I
think global challenges need global partners. Iraq showed us that there were
certain traditional members of NATO who did not want to join us, other part-
ners, Australia, South Korea, Japan did. So we have to think more creatively
about this in the future. It does not preclude or exclude a very important role
for NATO, but I, for one, am not willing to sign on to it as the single and exclu-
sive body for dealing with global issues. As far as the Americans marginalizing
NATO to make it something like the OSCE, Margarita, I think you give us too
much credit and undervalue your own power. Where interests coincide and
you bring the capabilities to the table, this question resolves itself. 
The last question you asked, “What can the Americans do for the
Atlantic-minded Europeans?” is a very fair question. It is my own view that
this Administration in Washington had little maneuvering room to move your
government in Berlin to a different position on Iraq. After all, it was the
Chancellor who, before a decision was made on Iraq and before Germany
was even asked for anything, said “No, we will not participate, even if you
have a UN mandate.” As a footnote to that, I can recall a senior State
Department official going to Berlin shortly after that to confer with the
German government, and he spent the entire day at the Hilton Hotel doing
emails because the German government did not want to confer with him.
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Having said that I think your point is a fair one, Margarita. We do have strains
of American nationalism. At times, we are guilty of gratuitous unilateralism,
and at critical moments, we have been inattentive to the Alliance. We do have
to ask ourselves the question you have posed, “What can we do for the pro-
American Europeans who share our strategic outlook and who, on the one
hand, do not wish to be forever the junior partner of the US, and on the other
hand, understand the dangers of trying to build Europe in opposition to the
United States.
Mr. Chairman, if you permit me one last final brief comment, I agree
with everything that’s been said on the subject of preemption and the
absence of a vigorous debate. I think that it is a very important question that
relates to all of this. And for those of us who supported the war in Iraq, and I
certainly did, we have to address the issue in the months ahead. It relates to
preemption. Where are the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? If we do not
find the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, what is the credible explana-
tion of their absence? To that, I would add also and submit for discussion, we
need a vigorous debate about question of authority, too. Because even if we
had to this date found substantial amounts of weapons of mass destruction,
the opponents of the war would be arguing yes, they are there, but the inten-
tions were not or the authority was not. I understand preemption to be an
interesting and complex topic, I think authority is, too. If I recall correctly,
when Israel decided in 1981 to attack and destroy a reactor outside Baghdad,
the Israeli cabinet had an interesting and vigorous debate about authority
with one side arguing no, he doesn’t have a nuclear weapon, he is not on the
verge of attacking us, and the other side arguing but wait a second, he is
about to load fuel into the reactor and if we pass that threshold, the price, the
danger, the difficulty of intervention becomes much more expensive. With
that I will stop.
Onur Öymen
I would like to comment on one or two points; the first, being a reference to
a comment made by Eran Lerman about Islamic terrorism. We discussed this
matter at length in NATO and our conclusion was that we should not put any
adjective before terrorism. There is no such thing as Islamic terrorism or eth-
72
NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
nic terrorism. Terrorism is terrorism. This was the conclusion of nineteen
NATO nations. If we call what’s happening in the Middle East Islamic terror-
ism, should we also call what’s happening in Spain Christian terrorism? Is
there something like Christian or ethno–terrorism in Spain? There is not, so
let’s stop putting adjectives in front of the word terrorism. We should not give
any credibility to terrorism by using noble words like Islam to describe them.
They should not abuse Islam for their purposes. 
Again, to a comment by Eran Lerman who brought up the Egyptian’s
objection to cooperation with NATO. It is true that on some points we dis-
agree with Egypt on the assessment of the situation. However, it is also true
that Egypt was the first Mediterranean Dialogue country to invite NATO for a
consultation meeting. Although this meeting has not materialized because of
regional developments, we should give credit to Egypt for being the first Arab
country to invite NATO for consultations. 
My friend, Mr. Alatan, spoke about the political content of terrorism.
Again, this is something that we discussed in NATO, as Karel Kovanda will con-
firm. We concluded that no political constellation should justify terrorism.
Although all terrorist organizations claim that they have a noble cause and that
their violence is justified, at NATO we believe that there is no justification for
terrorism. If we start to negotiate the root causes of terrorism, there would be
no end to the discussion. Therefore, our point of view is that no political con-
stellation should be attached to the fight against terrorism. 
I believe that it is hard to find a justification for preemptive attacks. The
main problem is that once you have a preemptive attack, it may set a precedent
for other countries. Then you have other countries attacking their neighbors
using your actions as an excuse. Therefore, a preemptive attack is an action
that we should use very cautiously. 
In regards to Paul Wolfowitz’s disagreement with NATO involvement in
Iraq, I personally believe that it would have been much better to involve NATO
from the outset of this operation. Nothing justifies the exclusion of NATO from
this operation, and it would be much easier for Turkey to be involved if NATO
was involved as well. What is written in Financial Times yesterday, is not true;
because of constitutional constraints we could create problems for NATO. On
the contrary we have constitutional constraints as regards to sending troops
abroad, but there is an exception in our constitution for our existing interna-
tional agreements, which includes our NATO treaty. Therefore, as far as Turkey
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is concerned, there will be no more legal objection to any NATO operation.
We have never objected to NATO operations beforehand, in Bosnia, Kosovo,
etc. 
Prince Hassan asked, who is “us”? Us is all of us. Us is the countries who
attended the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit right after the first bus attack in
Jerusalem. “Us” means the United States, it means Russia, it means Germany, it
means Turkey, it means Egypt, all civilized nations have suffered from terro-
rists. This is “us.” So, when we interpret the words of President Bush, “either
you are with us or with terrorism,” does “us” mean the United States? No, us
means all of us. I would like to tell you, that I am among those in the NATO
Council who said on September 11th, “Today we are all Americans.” So us is all
of us. 
The Collective Security Council (CSC) is a very important subject. Turkey
made a proposal on this subject that at a foreign ministers’ conference of
Islamic countries in Amman in 1998. We proposed establishing confidence
and security building measures for the region, and, to our surprise, our pro-
posal was accepted. The Islamic Conference formally agreed to start an OEC
(Organization of Economic Cooperation) type operation. 
We even started to organize groups of wise men, and we had five meet-
ings of these groups. However, our proposed organization has never been real-
ized because some of the Islamic countries wanted to include religious con-
cepts in our Helsinki-type proposal. Our country secularized in 1937, and
secularization is one of the fundamental articles of our Constitution. We
believe that in countries like Turkey, democracy cannot survive without secu-
larism. Therefore, we are strong supporters of secularism. 
As for NATO, I would agree that NATO was considered to be more impor-
tant during the Cold War. However, don’t forget that NATO was operational
during the Cold War; it was a deterrent power. We again became operational
after the Cold War, in Bosnia, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc., and so
I believe that NATO has not lost its viability. 
Who speaks on behalf of Islam? This is another question of Prince
Hassan. Fortunately, nobody is in a position to speak on behalf of Islam. As we
do not want anybody to speak on behalf of Christianity in the European
Union, we don’t want anybody to speak on behalf of Islam in the Middle East.
The last Caliph was an Ottoman Caliph who was sent abroad in 1924, and
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since then there has not been anybody in the world with the ability to speak
on behalf of Islam.
Finally, to the question of what would the reaction of Europe be in the
case of 9/11 type attack? Immediate reaction – cutting off diplomatic ties, very
strong action against the perpetrators, the country, all the perpetrators of this
attack. So as long as it happens in our territory, we react very strongly, but
when it happens elsewhere, it’s another question.
Thérese Delpech
Of course, we women are much less talkative than men! So, first I want to
repeat that I do prefer toeing the line where we converge because I do believe
that we are the rich, the prosperous, and the peaceful nations in a world where
these three qualities are very rare. So we do have a duty to at least try to under-
stand each other and to work together. 
Second, concerning the Solana Paper, there are three Solana Papers, not
one. One, which is quite good, is on non-proliferation. One, which is new in
many ways, is on security strategy and in particular, effective multilateralism. It
does speak about international terrorism not as a strategic threat, but as a tacti-
cal one. Finally, there is a paper on terrorism, which is being drafted. So there
are three different papers. 
My third remark deals with Iran. Iran says it wants electricity. Let Iran have
electricity. If what Iran wants is [nuclear] electricity, it is perfectly possible to
have it with fuel provided from the outside. Additionally I want to say that we
have three European ministers currently in Iran, I am sure they are making this
point clear. 
Lastly, I will make a very un-French point. Since the current fashion seems
to be for the French to speak for the Germans, it’s a German point. In response to
His Royal Highness’s comments about elevating religion above the state, I want to
reiterate by what Luther said in the 16th century as he made his reforms, “We have
to separate God and Caesar; this will be good for God, and good for Caesar.”
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Uzi Arad
I am under the influence of the very effective points made by Thérese
Delpech, and I think that she points out the right direction for us to pursue.
That kind of practical approach, banning Iran’s fuel cycle program, for exam-
ple, is an interesting case in point, but another interesting point was also
made. What happens if these efforts encounter Iranian resistance? That
indeed may be a moment of truth, and it is in that context that the need for
reflection about future NATO missions arises. Yes, we do need to be taking
the kind of practical actions that Thérese mentioned, but at the same time,
much thinking ought to go into other contingencies. Remember, there is
Libya, there is Syria, and other countries that pose similar problems. That is
why, more than anything else, I fear a loss of concentration or focus and the
risks of either deflection or dilution. Indeed, the point was made a number
of times that what NATO might be suffering from are insufficient resources,
insufficient agreement among allies, difficulties about definitions, and the
like. Now, not all of that is true, but if it is true, then it is all the more impor-
tant that NATO prioritize action and not make mistakes by departing into
areas which are not typical of possible future NATO missions. There are
some areas where multilateral frameworks other than NATO are better
equipped to intervene, and NATO should capitalize on its tradition of mili-
tary concentration, and its organizational capability, and being lead primari-
ly by the United States. 
It is in that context that I would like add one point regarding Prince
Hassan’s valid point about the value of multilateral frameworks for the Middle
East. Indeed, I am very much in agreement with the need for a CSC type struc-
ture for the Middle East. More than that, I think that we missed an enormous
opportunity when we had the multilateral meetings in the Middle East. For
example, we had one devoted to arms control and regional security to which
Jordan contributed by offering ideas and practical steps borrowing heavily
from the CSC experience in introducing these kinds of multilateral solutions
to regional problems in the Middle East. The failure to advance the multilater-
als that were initiated in Moscow in 1992 falls primarily to the United States for
being neglectful of it and to Europe for not rising to the occasion. If there is
one continent with solid experience in multilateralism, it is Europe. But the
Europeans wanted to insert themselves into the bilaterals and they love noth-
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ing more than shuttling from Ramallah to Jerusalem. In the process, they
dropped what they could have done much more energetically on this score. So
this is called for and this remains a challenge more for Europe than for others.
But that is not the NATO task. It may dilute NATO. So let me simply reiterate
the appeal to let NATO do what it could do best, particularly in light of great
obstacles and insufficient resources that have been eluded to. 
Karel Kovanda
Let me comment on two points. Terrorism is a tool, as Eran Lerman pointed
out,and I agree with that. However, our saying, “the fight against terrorism,” is
not the first time that the international community has applied a certain label
of a certain tool of war as going beyond the limit of what is acceptable in war-
fare without, at the same time, addressing the question of what to do with the
adversaries. Here I come down on the side of Joshua Muravchik. 
As for Margarita’s question of whether the USA needs NATO anymore, I
would say that the answer depends on the answers to two other questions.
One, “Can NATO improve its strength and sharpen its own capabilities?” The
answer to this is influenced by two other sub-questions, “Is the US to share the
technology, as Margarita calls for, and will the US get rid of such garbage as
‘buy American’ slogans?” The second question that Margarita’s question
depends on is, “Does Europe need NATO anymore?” I’ll leave it at that.
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CIVILIZATIONS, CULTURES,
DEMOCRACIES
Messages by Adam Michnik and Václav Havel
Adam Michnik
Dear Friends,
Because of the hearing before the special parliamentary commission on the
corruption affair, made public by Gazeta Wyborcza, I cannot participate in this
conference. However, I would like to share with you some reflections on one
of the topics discussed.
During the years of dictatorship, we developed a view of the world in
which democratic order represented the opposite of the totalitarian system.
For us, totalitarianism was a denial of freedom, the anti-culture; it was a barbar-
ian negation of our common civilization. 
In the struggle for democracy, the democratic opposition built small out-
posts outside the police state that allowed us to cultivate the values of our com-
mon culture and to live according to democratic values.
Our democracy was thus built from within: in independent seminars, in
uncensored underground magazines and books, in our activities in defense of
human rights. This environment gave birth to ideas that came to fruition in
1989 in the series of velvet revolutions in this part of Europe.
The years of totalitarian dictatorships, both the Nazi and Communist,
have taught us a lot about the barbarian nature of totalitarianism. We learned
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that in these systems man is treated as property of the government – a simple
object of power, which could be bought or intimidated at liberty. We also
understood very well the relationship between violence and lies and therefore
chose to wage the struggle without violence. At the same time, we understand
that there exist such forms of totalitarian oppression that cannot be defeated
without violence. It was impossible to defeat the regimes of Hitler and Stalin
without violence. That is why we could not understand the pacifists of
Western Europe who demonstrated in the streets for a unilateral disarmament
of the West in face of the Soviet threat. Metaphorically speaking, if the German
pacifists could not stand the Americans for having American military bases in
Germany, we Poles could not forgive to Americans for deserting us at the time
of the Yalta conference – which gave us Soviet troops, which guarded Soviet
interests instead of American bases . We felt our own weakness, and even felt
some bitterness for having been left alone in Warsaw in 1944, in Budapest in
1956, in Prague and Bratislava in 1968. How we wished then that the demo-
cratic governments would respond by force to the violence of the totalitarian-
ism.
From this point of view we could call for and support any intervention
whose aim it was to defeat a totalitarian oppressor. For this reason, we accep-
ted responsibility for the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Today, we fully understand that overthrowing a dictatorship does not
mean that freedom is instantly established. Moreover, we know that it is possi-
ble to win the war with a dictatorship and to lose the peace. Because of this,
we think we have to follow through in Iraq. The military intervention will suc-
ceed only if and when we can help the Iraqis to build some form of democrat-
ic government. It is not simple, but neither is it hopeless. The Germans after
the fall of Hitler, the Italians after the fall of Mussolini, and the Japanese after
the military defeat all built well functioning, democratic states with the help
of other democratic countries. This is the reason for hope.
Does it follow from this that democracy is “transportable”? Perhaps yes,
but only to a degree. When I was watching the toppling of the monument to
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, I experienced moments of joy and a moment of
reflection. I remembered in that moment how in the fall of 1989 in Warsaw my
fellow citizens toppled the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the creator of the
Soviet secret police, which had been built in the heart of the town as if a sym-
bol of its humiliation. In the destruction of the monument of the Bolshevik
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commissar, there was also the symbolic act of the parting with the traditions
of the time of oppression. At the same time, after all these years I understand
better the complexity of the problem of parting with the symbols of the past. 
There stands in Gori, Georgia, a giant monument of Josef Stalin. After
the Khrushchev speech at the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956, they wan-
ted to destroy this monument. A task force came from the capital of Tbilisi
and started to dismantle the monument. But then the people of Gori came
out of their homes to defend Stalin, who was born in the town, with their
clubs, knives, broomsticks. And I think that the higher value is to respect the
decision of the citizens of Gori than to topple the monument according to
the wishes of the central government. For democracy also must respect those
who think differently from us, even when they think differently about the
years of dictatorship. The stability of democracy depends on having a place
under the sun also for them. Although we condemn empty pacifism, which is
in principle an act of cowardice and capitulation before a totalitarian dicta-
torship, we are not obli-ged to blindly approve every act conceived under
a democratic government. In the case of Saddam Hussein the use of violence
was justified. But the victory could turn into defeat if it is conceived exclu-
sively as a way of imposing our will on the Iraqis. Democracy in Iraq requires
Iraqi democrats who need our help, without them the process of building
democracy is destined to failure.
Václav Havel
Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, I take a point from Adam Michnik’s mes-
sage and will start from there. A couple of years ago, I read a short article about
an attempt to blow up the Museum of Dimitrov in Bulgaria. The attempt was
not entirely successful, for the building just moved a little bit but remained
more or less intact. I see it as a symbol of the fact that it would be very naive
to think that you can install freedom, rule of law, and democracy overnight
and have democratic institutions in place and functioning from one day to
another.
We are now living amongst the debris of old regimes and we are trying to
build a new and better world, but we should be very sober and very rational
about this. We should understand and come to terms with the fact that this is a
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neverending task that will indeed take a very long time before it is done; we
shall never be able to brush that point away from our agendas. I also believe
that countries that have been fortunate to have enjoyed freedom and democra-
cy for 200 years or several dozens of years should have an understanding of
countries that have been fortunate to enjoy democracy for maybe 10 or 13 years
and that those countries in turn should be full of understanding vis-a-vis the
countries where freedom needs to be established. All this should take place in
an environment of full and very genuine respect for different cultures, for dif-
ferent customs, and for the different beliefs of the peoples around this world. 
I believe that we are now entering a multi-plural world and that every one
of us should realize this and that people should genuinely seek what is joining,
what is common, what is bringing together the different cultures, the different
cultural environments, and not to seek out the differences. Another phenome-
non that I have noticed during my unnaturally long stay in politics is the new
phenomenon, that is gaining more and more in importance, of regional group-
ing or of regional entities. There is nothing bad about this fact and it is only log-
ical and fair that the Western civilization framework or entity, for instance, if
you will, has its own institutions such as the North Atlantic Alliance, but it
seems to me only natural and fair for the other regional entities – here I have in
mind the geographical and entities of civilization – to have their own trans-
national institutions and bodies. In this world that we are in now, it seems only
natural to me. Now in conclusion let me thank you all very much for having
come to this very important and very interesting conference.
I would like to say a word of thanks to the circle of my friends who have
put this event together. It has several types of importance and may I mention
one of them in conclusion. I would like the message to be clear and that is the
fact that I would like to hope that this conference, the Forum 2000 conference
that coincidentally is taking place around the same dates, together with the
Conference on Tibet and the launching of the Institute of Strength here in
Prague would send out a clear message to the outside world that the Czechs are
indeed very much interested and very much concerned about what happens
elsewhere. And I also believe that it is a very important message for the Czechs,
indeed, for the local scene, it should be clear now that it is no longer possible
to close ourselves behind our doors in this “Bohemian basin,” in this cozy Czech
environment and not be concerned about what happens elsewhere. Thank you
very much and I wish you great success in your deliberations. 
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PANEL II: THE ROLE
OF NATO IN PEACE-
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
IN THE GME
Jiří Schneider
Before the panel starts we will have a special presentation. But before that let
me give a floor to Alexandr Vondra to introduce our speaker.
Alexandr Vondra
It is my privilege to introduce another speaker who has a little different status
than the other speakers on the panel. Bruce Jackson is an old friend of mine.
I first met him before I came to the US when he was setting up what later was
called the US Committee on NATO. It was a bi-partisan institution of many dis-
tinguished Americans, some of whom, like Ron Asmus, are here with us today.
The purpose of that committee was to attract the attention of American politi-
cians, the general public, and the media towards NATO’s future, including the
NATO enlargement. Since then, we have been working together because I con-
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sidered the work of this committee as instrumental in gaining support for sub-
sequent consent of the US Senate with enlargement. What’s even more impor-
tant is that during the work I did with those people, I clearly concluded that
they are doing their job not for prestige but because they have this issue in their
hearts. The best evidence of this is that after the first round of NATO enlarge-
ment had been completed and security experts in Europe were more comfort-
able considering another set of enlargement, Bruce continued his mission. His
committee is not as active as it was in the past, however, and is now under an
umbrella institution called the Project on Transitional Democracies, which he
leads.
The purpose of this presentation is simply to show that there are also
other tasks, not only the Greater Middle East, but are somehow related.
Bruce Jackson
About a year ago President Havel spoke to many people in this room and said
there is only one question left in Europe and that is: “What is Europe and who
is a European?” At about that time, we went back to Washington, and they said,
“Well we have one question, which is what the hell do we do in the Greater
Middle East?” So I basically started work on this pitch – maybe by answering
Havel’s question, we will answer Washington’s question. 
We are calling this presentation “The Frontiers of Freedom and the
Greater Middle East.” What you see here are people of the Islamic faith walk-
ing towards Europe over the Accursed Mountains. This briefing covers a range
of things, including one of the reminders that Havel always made; this is a
moral enterprise, not a political or military enterprise. I also want to look back
at where Europe came from, this concept of the third phase of European his-
tory, and these major projects – the Balkan peace, the Black Sea, the
Borderland of Values to see if in their completion in Europe, we can discover
how to do the Greater Middle East. Moreover, although we talk about the adap-
tation of an alliance, it’s a little like a marriage; and people are basically saying,
“rather than talk about the marriage, we are going to reupholster the couch.”
NATO may be the answer, but it is not the question. It’s one of the things we
may do along the way. This is the largest enterprise in change of the political
landscape we’ve seen since the Peace of Westphalia.
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Let’s move to where we began. Obviously the Austro-Hungarian, the
Russian, and what used to be Turkey, were the great empires. In looking at the
archeology, one of the first things that we can all realize is that we cannot
return to the 19th century where we had a weak Turkey that was detached
from Europe. 
Reminding us of where we came from, this is the evolution of NATO. We
have the original post-war alliance, the adaptation in 1952, the adaptation in
1954, Spain in 1982, the modern adaptations of Visegrad, and then what we
call “the big bang” that brought us to Prague and basically gives us Europe
where it is in 2003. It’s been continuously evolving since we began in 1949.
And now the twin events of Prague and Copenhagen set the stage for additio-
nal questions such as the Greater Middle East. 
A couple of days after Havel talked about the notion of one final ques-
tion, Brzezinski was talking about the idea of a third phase of European histo-
ry. I just want to review what’s been happening since 1989, and how we get to
these third phase questions. We’ve been talking about memberships since the
beginning – the re-unification of Germany, Visegrad, Vilnius, and now the
Adriatic Charter and potentially Ukraine. We’ve been arguing about the mis-
sions all the way along beginning with the strategic concepts in Bosnia and
Kosovo and continuing all the way through Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously,
like any good marriage, you argue about money. We have been arguing about
who pays for what all the way along. There are really only three big questions
left. The burden sharing debate ends in the EU relationship; the missions
debate has become the Greater Middle East, and the membership question
obviously ends with the question of what is a completed Europe. One of the
first fundamental differences between US thinking and European thinking is
that we don’t think there is a lot of time left. It’s a general consensus in
Washington that there is a limited amount of time and that’s probably not the
consensus when you to talk to a Prodi or a Solana. So that’s a fundamental
axiom, whether there is a long period of time to adjust or a relatively shorter
period. 
This is the notion of the third phase of European history. The German
unification, with 18 million, was a preambullar phase. The largest phase of
Visegrad was 60 million; followed by Vilnius at 43 million. However, if you go
around and ask, there are 170 million people that think that they’re Europeans
who currently aren’t in all, or any, of the institutions that they would wish to
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be. Also, these phases are different in kind. Throughout the Visegrad period,
all these countries were European democracies that were coherent nation
states. In the Vilnius period you still had issues such as problems in Romania
and Bulgaria, so you had to do democratic transformation and integration. It
was a two stroke process. And in the third phase, we are talking to states like
Macedonia that don’t know their name and like Georgia that don’t know their
borders. And there will be a huge debate as to whether or not they are Euro-
pean. That debate obviously began in Copenhagen. There is an increasing
degree of complexity. If you think about what happened in Europe in the 19th
century, it was the discovery of a nation state in Italy and Germany. And the
great lesson of the 20th century was that you had to be a democracy, and then,
obviously, the great project in the 21st century is European market and politi-
cal integration. So all these countries have to do is accomplish in three years
what their Western neighbors did in three hundred years; this is a pretty
sporty proposition. 
Looking forward, this is where we were in Prague and many people in
the United States said we were completed, but there was no Adriatic system.
The peace in Southeast Europe had not been won. There was no Black Sea
security strategy, and frankly, there was no Mediterranean Dialogue. We are
just now reaching the limits of our ability to integrate countries as we are talk-
ing about progressive engagements with Kiev and Moscow. One thing that you
can already see happening is that this alliance no longer points north and east,
it points southeast. It is already pivoting on its axis, and basically, there is a
new change for Europe, increasingly looking across the Mediterranean and
the Black Sea towards the Greater Middle East. If you analyse this, you find
there are three projects left. The project of the Balkan peace, the project of the
Black Sea security system, and the project of the classical border land. What I
would like to do is just skim through these things and show you what’s hap-
pening and basically suggest some things we might some day apply to the
Middle East. 
We begin with the Balkans and the project of permanent Balkan peace.
Obviously we are not just building something, we also are trying to destroy
something including a profoundly misunderstood experience of Serbian
nationalism. We are also beginning to reject previous political models.
Traditionally in the South, when in doubt you would annex Bosnia as the
Austrians did in 1908. The other alternative was basically to begin to repar-
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tition of the South and move the ethnic population around. The Vienna model
is now what we call Dayton. The Ottoman Displacement Model or the Balkan
war models is what we call Kosovo final status. However, none of these models
worked during the last 100 years; they served to further repress the Balkan peo-
ple and did not resolve the central contradictions. So basically what is happen-
ing instead is that new models are being built. And let’s just take a look at them. 
This is a kindergarten of democracy that was created in this multiethnic
community in the western Balkans; since 1995 all of our institutions have been
engaged there in some manner. These are the Adriatic Charter countries, EU
transitional force, international protectorates, and Belgrade. It is actually very
interesting that all the Euro-Atlantic institutions, not just NATO, are playing a
role in the western Balkans. This may actually be a model for how we use our
institutions to create kindergartens for democracy and to keep pursuing com-
plimentary objectives. Moreover, they are actually building new institutions
inside their country – this is a Catholic Croatia, this is an Orthodox Macedonia,
and this is a secular and Islamic Albania. This is the first time I can think of that
three different creeds and ethnicities have basically built a conjoined security
system to pursue common political objectives. I can’t think of an organization
in European history that has this characteristic. This actually looks like some-
thing new. So models that basically respond to the kinds of challenges we may
encounter as we move towards problems in the Greater Middle East may be
already developing. 
This is actually a summary of where they are today – these are NATO
allies, these are Adriatic Charter countries, and these are basically countries in
pre-accession. Moldova is trying to cross over into a stability pact, and the
Adriatic Charter wishes to expand to include Sarajevo and Belgrade. Croatia,
Romania and Bulgaria are in some near phase of integration into the European
Union. This is a very good sign. 
Frankly, this is what the Baltic region looked like as recently as in 1998,
and this is almost 5 years behind where the Baltics and Nordics are today. This
is the kind of thing you would expect to see in a stabilizing regional security
system. I don’t think it was by accident that at lunch Havel mentioned the
importance of regionality as we think forward. Obviously, in this region the
next step is to bring Belgrade and Sarajevo into the system. 
Looking outward and closer than to the Middle East, this is the question,
can the Black Sea become a second Mediterranean system with shared securi-
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ty and cross-border cooperation like the original? This, as you can see, is the
largest extent of the former Ottoman Empire. Everything we talk about today,
whether it’s European energy security, the reconstruction of Iraq, the Middle
East peace, the Western Balkans, or where is the source of new threats,
emanates from this part of the world and deals with this area. We don’t talk
about the GIUK gap anymore. This is not mentioned. So clearly the attention
of Europe is already preoccupied with this part of the world in a rather pro-
found way. 
This is a CIA map of projected and existing oil and gas pipe lines. Also,
this is the route of sexual trafficking, narcotics, illegal immigration, terror,
and proliferation. Whatever you think the threat to Europe is, you want to
control the Black Sea. Name your poison; make sure you handle this.
However, this is not just a source of dangers, it is a source of great possibili-
ties for both Europe and the Middle East. This region gives us a vehicle to
engage Russia in a meaningful role in energy trade with Europe. Also, it
secures the energy supplies that Europe will need for going forward. Today
Europe imports 50 % of its energy, and in 2020 it will import 70 %. However,
perhaps, more importantly, by stabilizing this region we basically set up
a mature relationship with Russia and lift up the people who were left behind
in 1989. 
This is actually a Shevardnadze chart of the Silk Road, but it also reminds
you that the Black Sea has traditionally been key to this region. This used to
be a route of silk and spice, and potentially it is also the route of democracy. 
This chart, of roughly the northernmost expansion of the Ottoman
Empire, basically talks about some of the issues that we will confront. This
chart shows the southernmost extension of the Russian empire. Every single
conflict to the OSCE runs along that place and then lies to the northwest of the
Black Sea. This is essentially the critical fault line in our civilization and the
interface between the Euro–Atlantic system and the Greater Middle East sys-
tem. This fault line holds the key both to the democratization of Russia and the
Middle East. This is where we should concentrate our efforts. 
The big obstacle in our way is obviously in Nagorno Karabakh, which inci-
dentally, as I recall, is a confrontation between two creeds. So basically the
Caucasus holds the key to Europe’s third Russian policy. The argument being in
1997, we had the NATO founding act, and in 2002, we had the NATO-Russia
council. The question is what are we going do with Russia in 2007 or 2008? Is
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there something we can do for the stability of the South and basically bring in
economic rather than just security interests to this region? And finally, we have
the beginning of the greater Europe’s engagement with the Greater Middle East. 
Today, the Caucasus region is not nearly as advanced as the Balkans.
Recently, we were doing relatively well in the Pankisi Gorge. We have not
gone back to Nagorno Karabakh. There is no such thing as regional coopera-
tion. The border between Turkey and Armenia is still closed, and we really
haven’t engaged the Russians on Chechnya. Obviously, we do not have a poli-
cy, and if we don’t have a policy, that’s what we are going to get. Basically,
what we learned in the Balkans is that if we don’t stop them early on, sooner
or later you get to Srebrenica. That won’t stop unless we find a way to ma-
nage this.
I’ll only show you a little bit about the Borderland issue because it is actu-
ally further away from the Greater Middle East. However, it does show us a
couple of things that are relevant. First, there is a structure. When President
Bush says: “from the Baltic to the Black Sea,” he has things just about right;
although, the standard structure, running parallel to the “fault line,” goes from
the Baltic to the Caspian. These are basically the reasons we would want to tie
northern Europe to the Black Sea and southern Europe. The EU is talking
about the concept of preemptive engagement, and this is one place where you
can see what preemptive engagement means. There are three big areas in the
north to work on. The first, is tying Moldova into a stability pact. Second, we
need to recognize that Kiev and the northern Black Sea are also part of the
security solution because they tie Europe to Moscow and basically allow us
dialog to the Caucasus. Obviously having a dictator separating northern
Europe and Moscow is a huge moral and strategic mistake. Now adding up
what all this means and seeing it in the completion of Europe does help us
understand what’s possible in the Greater Middle East. 
Let’s just look what’s happening around Europe. NATO is basically
looking towards expansion: first in Istanbul and then in the next summit in
2006. The EU is going through its intergovernmental conference and plan-
ning its next big decisions for 2007. The Adriatic group is pretty well organ-
ized and is focusing on a regional security solution as early as 2006. The cen-
tral Balkans are trying to catch up with them and will try, as early as Istanbul,
to move into the Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan. Turkey
is obviously completely focused on the EU and will use the Istanbul Summit
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and other campaigning mechanisms to be there as early as 2007. Ukraine is
trying to find the place to get started and will probably try to go for the
Membership Action Plan. There is basically a thirty-six month period before
any of our institutions will make profound adjustments. Obviously there is a
major project going on in the South and in the East, and Turkey is part of
both of these projects. This basically summarizes where most of the 170 mil-
lion people are. 
This is just so I can show you how we’re talking to these groups. There
are groups of EU candidates largely in the eastern Balkans that are focused on
2007. There are the victims of war in the western Balkans that are focused
on 2006, and the victims of forgetfulness on the far side of the Black Sea that
are just trying to get noticed. Finally, there are the victims of themselves right
on the borders of Europe that are basically trying to find a place.
Looking at these big strategic concepts, this is the argument as a comple-
tion of Europe, which is expressed as a core EU Europe. We define that by say-
ing every country in that group is in every institution it wishes to be.
Countries such as Sweden that are not in an institution like NATO are not
members by choice.
These are the 170 million people that wish to be closer to the European
institutions. This is what we are calling the Greater Europe. We would argue
that the Greater Europe is not only morally but also strategically preferable.
One, it allows you to finally dissolve the ambiguities with Russia and set up a
mature and more modern relationship. Second, if you were to be serious about
the Greater Middle East, this Greater Europe has a far better chance of suc-
ceeding. As you can see, the Greater Europe touches the Greater Middle East
all the way from Morocco to the far side of Iran. So basically the argument is
that the Greater Europe sets the stage for two great endeavors of 21st century
democracy, which are the full integration of a democratic Russia and Euro-
Atlantic community and beginning of democratization and revitalization of
the Greater Middle East. If you think these are worthy projects, this might be
how to do it.
If you were to do this, the capitals of Ankara, Belgrade, and Kiev are key;
without them the Euro–Atlantic Community will be less prosperous, smaller,
less generous, and far less capable of dealing with the challenges that should
be posed in the policies on the Greater Middle East. Also, this is an argument
that the economic use; many of the conditions that exist for successful demo-
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cratic transition are on the immediate borders of Europe. Croatia, Romania,
and Bulgaria have this characteristic, and of the nine countries in the world
that fit this country eight of them are on the border separating the core of
Europe from the Greater Middle East. So if you wish to radiate freedom and
prosperity outward, you should exploit these favorable characteristics that are
meeting you at the doorsteps. 
Interestingly, if we actually go to the EU and say: “How do you see the
world?,” you’ll get something that looks very similar. This is what the news-
papers call the core EU Europe, and it is almost identical. To get their picture,
they add current and future EU states, which gets you to twenty-five plus
three. Interestingly enough, Turkey is in there but Croatia is not. So Turkey is
in a more advanced and conclusive category, at least in the new neighbor con-
cept. Instead of the Greater Europe model, they follow the EU’s new neighbor-
hood, which is quite comprehensive. It’s actually seventeen plus one, the one
being Gaza and the West Bank. However, it leaves out the three Caucasus,
which seems to be a huge oversight, and I expect that they will reverse it
between now and the middle of next year (2004). Theirs is quite a progressive
version, and the shocking thing is that it is very similar to the ideas in
Washington. 
Here are the conclusions of all of this. There are two competing visions
of the future of Europe. There is a core Europe that moves more slowly, and a
larger, completed Europe that is to be established more quickly. Obviously,
because of our axiom, we believe that this revolutionary period matters. We
believe that the decisions we will be taking in the next forty-six months will
not only effect these 170 million people we discussed, but also the strategic
and moral perimeter of the Euro–Atlantic community. This is where all will be
decided. We have to be honest with ourselves; people haven’t actually had suc-
cessful policies in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Ukraine in European history.
The argument, however, is if you were to do this, the huge pay off would be a
successful and final reconciliation with Russia, which would set the stage for
change across the Greater Middle East. Said in another way, without the
Greater Europe, you really can’t hope for the Greater Middle East. The com-
pleted Europe is the prerequisite for transformation beyond Europe. The con-
clusion is that where Europe finds itself five years from now will be where
Europe stands for the next fifty years, and in our view, these are the frontiers
of freedom.
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Jiří Schneider
I think that was a proper after-lunch catalyst of our discussion; it not only
bridged the first two panels, but also it enlarged our perspectives on our topic. 
Before introducing our next panel member, I would like to remark that
there are still people who like grand designs and big perspectives. Also, para-
digms do matter. Now, we have a good example of a clear-cut paradigm,
Washington’s paradigm of the current world. We also have a sense of momen-
tum, which was, I think, the bottom line of the presentation. Our time is lim-
ited, and we have to do something now, before the momentum dissipates. We
do not have luxury to address only the frontiers of Europe and all that they
entail and then focus on the Middle East, we have to do both simultaneously.
And that makes our challenge even greater. 
Before going any further, I should introduce myself. My name is Jiří
Schneider, I am co-author of the paper which is the basis of today’s discus-
sion, and I have the privilege to introduce several speakers. The following
panel is composed similarly to the morning’s panel, but it is different, as you
will see. 
Our first speaker is Günther Altenburg, who is Assistant Secretary
General for Political Affairs and Security Policy at NATO. And he has remark-
able record, including work with the UN. He also has some Middle Eastern
experience. I am not sure in which capacity he is going to speak whether as
a NATO representative, or as a German reacting to some voices from the first
panel.
Günther Altenburg
I will start by saying that the Iraq War may not have yet generated a new polit-
ical dynamic in the Middle East, but it certainly has spiked a new debate about
the future of transatlantic cooperation in the Greater Middle East. The debate
has only just begun, and those who are sitting on the panel don’t have a
monopoly on intelligence. There are a lot people here that I’m looking for-
ward to hearing during the discussion. I’m going to speak as a NATO bureau-
crat, and as a NATO bureaucrat, I have to say I am pretty scared about these
new perspectives that are, for us, uncharted waters. Nevertheless, this is a per-
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fect time for reflection. As someone who has been working in what you could
term “the Smaller Middle East,” and in particular as a NATO bureaucrat, I will
try to sharpen our focus. And will start out with several caveats.
First of all the definitions. The term “the Greater Middle East” is proble-
matic in itself. Some have applied it rather liberally to the region encompass-
ing the whole Mediterranean area as well as Afghanistan. Such definitions
appear to me as too casual. The risk is not only that you imply that one size fits
all when approaching different conflicts, but also, partially in reference to this
morning’s conversation, you are running the risk of lumping all these Arab and
Islamic countries into one big group and into a new north-south conflict with
all those in the south under suspicion of being terrorists. Our definition needs
to be very specific. It is clear that the problems and conflicts in Afghanistan
are different from those in Iraq, and these are different from what is going on
between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and this is again different from what
is going on in the Western Sahara. My point is that if we want to reach solu-
tions, we need to be specific.
I would like to make a note about what NATO has to do in all of this. Yes,
NATO is a community of values, but this does not mean that it is a tool in a
kind of a war of civilizations; to replace Communism with Islam. NATO looks
at issues in military terms, and when speaking about military terms, you look
at operations. Furthermore, when you speak about operations, you look at
concrete geographical theatres where there are problems. In these terms, you
inevitably have to deal with the sources of the conflict, and you need to find a
solution to these conflicts in those respective theatres. The question is: “Do we
have a solution to the problems?” In other words – in terms of the peace sup-
port operations that NATO is currently participating in – before you can have
peace support operations, you must have a peace to support. That is very easy,
we have Dayton, and we have the Petersburg agreement for Afghanistan, so
there is a way here. 
I would also offer another word of caution with respect to the role of
NATO and terrorism and WMD. As mentioned this morning, we have a military
concept to combat terrorism. NATO is not the world’s primary terrorist hunter.
What I mean is that we need to take a much broader look at this. We have a lot
of other national, international, and multilateral institutions that have to come
in here. The same thing is true with respect to WMD and their means of deliv-
ery, we are sharpening the tools that we already have in order to protect against
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this. However, if we are talking about proliferation, we need the whole range of
interlocking institutions cooperating on an international level.
My second point deals with rationale; the notion of NATO in the Greater
Middle East contains a discernable element of transatlantic damage control. I
think that was also a little bit of the intent of all of this. In other words, the need
for a NATO role is acknowledged, first and foremost, as a means to bring Europe
and America back together after Iraq. However, is getting us into the Greater
Middle East really a recipe for restoring transatlantic harmony? To put it bluntly
if the transatlantic marriage is failing, will it really help to have a new baby? 
My next point is the players. Thus far, the debate has largely focused on
NATO alone, but it is clear if we are looking at the areas mentioned in the pre-
vious presentation, other players need to come into the picture. NATO certain-
ly has to play a substantial role in the Greater Middle East in terms of security,
but this situation requires a broader political and economic approach. It is
essential to get groups like the EU, which has money, into the game. Also, Karel
Kovanda asked, what can the Arab countries do for their neighbors and for
NATO? Those that have money can contribute financially. Last, but not least,
the United Nations should be involved. Above all else, these groups have to
sing from the same song sheet. 
My fourth and the most important point, however, is timelines. Anyone
who is to seriously deal with peace support operations in the Middle East must
be clear about the following. Let’s take the Israeli-Palestinian issue as an exam-
ple. This is a long–term, if not a lifetime job. We need to be clear about that. At
this point, NATO forces are already reaching the point of overstretch. Missions
in the Balkans are going to go on; Afghanistan is going to go on, and now we
are supporting the Polish division in Iraq, which is already proving to be quite
difficult, so we need to consider our options and the level of ambition. As a
bureaucrat, I believe that we need to be careful. Now, with these caveats in
mind, where are we heading? 
First, we need to make Afghanistan a success. The extension of ISAF
beyond Kabul is the next crucial step; however, as everybody in this room is
aware, the allies have not yet implemented their troop commitments with
respect to the operation in Kabul itself. We need to be clear about this. The fai-
lure in Afghanistan would mean the end of further and more ambitious think-
ing about the Greater Middle East before we have even begun doing anything.
Again, with respect to Afghanistan, we cannot afford to fail. 
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Second, we must make up our mind about the future of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. As Karel Kovanda has already said in his own way, for
too long this dialogue has been a sort of a step-child of NATO. For too long nei-
ther allies nor dialogue partners seem to agree on what this dialogue should
really be about. We could incorporate elements of the Partnership for Peace
into the dialogue, which could give the dialogue the substance to support a
broader NATO approach to the region. 
Third, we need a closer NATO–EU relationship. Stability for the Greater
Middle East requires both hard and soft security; NATO has much of the for-
mer and the EU has much of the latter. And this fact alone suggests close coor-
dination, but there are other reasons as well. 
Fourth, before we endow NATO with even more difficult jobs, we must
first find a new transatlantic understanding on the importance we attach to
this organization, and its role in the future. Throughout the Iraq crisis NATO
was seriously underutilized as a consultative framework. Only if both sides of
the Atlantic come to appreciate again the centrality of this organization can
we confidently debate the widening of NATO’s reality.
Fifth, and last, we need a much broader transatlantic debate on new
threats. Much of the transatlantic disagreement over Iraq was the result of diver-
ging threat perception. In the approach to the problems of the Greater Middle
East, without having achieved a broader transatlantic agreement, things will
not work. We would simply project our disagreements onto an even bigger
canvas.
Jiří Schneider
Following our first, more visionary in scope, presentation, we are now
anchored to reality thanks to the second presentation. Thank you, Mr. Alten-
burg, for briefing us on your pragmatic, bottom-up bureaucratic perspective.
The topic of this panel is peace management operations. It is not a nice
road, but we should try to keep that in mind even without having mentioned
any specific terms related to peace building. In any case, this panel should deal
more with the practical possibilities of engagement.
The second speaker is Ron Asmus. He needs no introduction. Ten years
ago, he wrote an article with Steve Larrabee that really opened the debate on
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NATO enlargement. He also recently wrote an article on rebuilding NATO. I
hope he will open another important debate, and that this debate will succeed
as well as the first one did.
Ron Asmus
First, let me just say congratulations to you for holding this conference. It is
fair to say that this is the first major conference on this issue in Europe, and
the fact that it is taking place in Prague and not in another European capital is
a testimony to your vision and leadership. 
We are here today discussing this issue due to a combination of good
news and bad news. The good news is that in the 1990s we were successful in
building a peaceful, democratic, and secure Europe after the great conflicts
earlier in the 20th century. We Americans used to believe that Europe was the
source of the greatest potential threat to America, but those conflicts are gone,
and for the first time in almost a century the American president no longer
goes into the office worrying about the dangers of war in Europe.
On the other hand, the bad news is that September 11th has opened our
eyes to a set of threats. While the threats were out there beforehand, the con-
cept that if Europe was the potential source of the greatest conflict of the 20th
century, that the Greater Middle East is the greatest source of potential con-
flict of the 21st century had not yet crystallized. This has lead to a paradigm
shift in the way Americans view the world as well as Europe. Some summarize
it by saying that the threat of Washington’s being hit by a weapon of mass
destruction today by a terrorist group from the Greater Middle East is greater
than the threat of Washington’s being attacked by the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. I think that’s a true statement. As a consequence to that, with all due
respect, if we are enemy number one, then Europe is enemy number two.
Actually, perhaps, Israel is one, we are two, and Europe is three. Although this
idea may not have sunken in yet, it is creeping in. Thus, we are debating
whether we can reorganize America and Europe to face these new sets of
threats. I don’t disagree with Bruce and the ideas he presented; we need to
focus on his issues as well. However, those issues are not going to produce
threats that are going to kill Americans. I worry more about the Greater Middle
East because if you ask me where my countrymen are most likely to put their
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lives at risk, it is going to be in the Greater Middle East. So the question we are
facing is: “Can we organize ourselves as Americans and Europeans to face this
challenge?”
This is not the first time we have faced this question; we also faced it at
the end of the Cold War. I am sure you all remember twelve years ago when a
good many Americans said NATO’s job is over, pack up, go home, and declare
victory and that the collapse of communism was the fulfillment of our mis-
sion. A very small group of people, including a number of Czechs we’ve heard
speak today, said: “Wait a second, that wasn’t what that was all about, this was
about building a continent whole and free so that Europe would never again
go to war. Your job isn’t done and won’t be done until the eastern half of the
continent is as secure as the western half of the continent.” A number of Ame-
ricans came along and said: “You’re right.” In the past when I pushed for NATO
enlargement, intervening in the Balkans, NATO–Russia cooperation, and
NATO out of area operations, I was told that I was crazy and would ruin my
career by advocating such things, but look where we are today. It has only
been in the past year and a half that people in Washington, including myself,
have been calling for the Great Middle East to be the next transatlantic project.
Again, people said, you are crazy; this will never happen. Today, I would have
a hard time explaining why I don’t completely agree with the National
Security Advisor to the President of the United States. When the President of
the United States speaks you can see the same views that a number of us have
been advocating. We are winning the intellectual battle in the United States.
Others agree that if this great Alliance is going to have a purpose and deal with
the most immediate, direct, and permanent threats to its members, it has to
tackle the problems of the Greater Middle East. Even in Europe, where a year
ago we would have been hard pressed to fill this room with people who agree
with this thesis, today people come up to me and say: “Okay, basically you are
right.”
How do we do this? How do you take this big idea and break it down into
bite–size pieces so you don’t overwhelm my friend Günther Altenburg? How do
we give him an agenda he can start to work with? If we recognize the problem,
do we necessarily have an answer to the question of how? The answer is no, or
at least not yet. You don’t need to be a genius to understand the list of problems.
If we put any group of smart people into a room and asked them to list the prob-
lems, they could do that. Their list would be get Iraq right, the Middle East peace
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process, Iran – potentially the greatest danger as well as the country that poten-
tially could change in the right direction – Afghanistan, Northern Africa, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia. They would also talk about some new regional security structure
for the region like Prince Hassan suggested. A while ago, I was at the American
Enterprise Institute sitting in the back row listening to a meeting with the Iraqi
opposition. Someone suggested imagining a world in which we succeed in
building this quasi-democratic, pro-western Iraq. Basi-cally, this Iraq is trying to
be like Turkey. And so, what is the one thing Turkey has that this fragile democ-
racy in a bad neighborhood, surrounded by predatory states with only one
democracy, Israel, who is not going help, does not? It doesn’t have an anchor
like. The Turks have NATO, they have an EU perspective, and this Iraq would
have nothing. Everyone looked at me and said don’t you dare start advocating
Iraqi membership in NATO. I said: “No, I won’t.” But the point was this: you need
to create an anchor for the countries in this region. If we succeed in helping
them to change, they can lock on to, and build something bigger and better. 
So, how do we take that big agenda and start moving forward? We have a
NATO summit in eight months. What would be a bold but still realistic agenda?
We could aim towards setting a new course. I would say first the summit has to
be a reconciliation summit. We are never going to be able to tackle problems
unless we have a greater degree of political cohesion with regards to what we
are about. Second, I think we need a political statement. Some people are say-
ing we need to rewrite NATO’s strategic concept, and other people are saying
we need a new Harmel Report. I think we should be more modest and say we
need a political statement recognizing that the great tanker of NATO is shifting
course and that we recognize that is the GME part of the world and that sorting
out its problems has to be one of our top priorities. We can follow that up with
the appropriate documents later; anyone who has been in NATO knows some-
times you change the reality first and then you update the theories. Third, if it
is true that getting Iraq right is so crucial and if the European leaders are right
when they say that the success of Iraq is as important to them as it is for us, then
it has to be true that NATO should have a role in Iraq. And I think that role
should be NATO support for one of the sectors and eventually taking over one
of the sectors. 
We have not come far enough, and if we set out the goal of moving for-
ward, Istanbul could be an important step. What about the missile defense the-
ater? What do we do with these new threats? Sometimes we talk about the
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Harmel Report and the sort of mythological success we had because we came
up with the grand strategy, not only to defend ourselves against the Soviet
Union, but to beat it politically, to transform it. Again, we need this combina-
tion of defense, transatlantic security, missile defense, and an offense by way
of political strategy. We know that NATO has a NATO response for us. If you
were in Washington today, participating in this debate, you would hear people
talking about a Partnership for Peace or the functional equivalent thereof for
the Arab world. This is something we should think about.
Regarding Iran: I’m willing to bet today that Iran is going to be a major
issue by the time we hit the Istanbul Summit. We need to be talking and have
something to say about it. As for the whole issue of WMD, we tried to make
weapons of mass destruction the major focal point of the Washington Summit
in 1999, and we need to come back to it. However, as many of you would agree,
NATO is not going to win that battle. Our basic political message should be
based on transforming the Greater Middle East into a different set of societies
that doesn’t produce people who want to kill us and have the capacity to do
that. NATO has a role in working to contain WMD, but the idea of political
transformation is going to be as critical to winning the larger battle as it was
to winning the Cold War. We need to send a message that the West is shifting
course and is putting its soft and hard power into a strategy to help change the
region for the better. 
Can we do it? Even I have to admit that sometimes my wife looks at me
and says: “Couldn’t you pick a slightly easier project?” This is a really hard pro-
ject, but the reality is that I don’t think we have much choice. And when we
ask whether the level of ambition isn’t too great, I ask the following questions.
What are the real problems that we are going to confront? If we don’t confront
these what’s going to happen? I was in the White House recently talking to
a colleague of mine and he said to me: “Look, the reality is that Americans and
Europeans are going to end up on the ground of the Greater Middle East
because the problems of the region are going to pull us in.” That’s already pret-
ty obvious. The only question that’s open is: “Are we going to be capable of get-
ting our act together in advance in order to have a common framework and
strategy, in which case we will have a greater chance of succeeding, or are we
going to be pulled in willy–nilly, crisis by crisis, making it up on an ad-hoc
basis?” That’s the choice we face. Not whether or not we get involved, but how
we get involved. And it’s really a test of our leadership on both sides as to
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whether or not we are up to this challenge. Imagine if the Truman generation
came back and joined us at this conference. What would they be advising us to
do? Would they be saying, “No, this is a little bit too hard; you might fail; be cau-
tious.” No, that’s not how that generation created NATO. They didn’t have a
common view of the Soviet Union when they created NATO, but they knew
they needed one. And they ordered the smartest people into the room and
said, “don’t you dare come out until you start to lay a foundation for a common
strategy across the Atlantic to deal with this problem.” And frankly at the end
of the day, if we were in Las Vegas and Ishak looked at me and said, “Ron, put
your money on the table. Do you think we are able to do this?” I would have to
say that I am not sure, but I know we have to try to do it. If we wait to have this
conversation a year from now, and we have another major terrorist that fur-
ther destabilizes the region, we are all going to look back and wish that we had
acted earlier and were more ambitious rather than less ambitious. So I am
going to fight for the ambitious route. 
Jiří Schneider
Thank you Ron, you made a long list of ambitious tasks, but you were concrete
and that is appreciated. Next speaker is from Paris, Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut; we will have a chance to hear another strategic voice from Paris.
Mark has a remarkable record in multilateral diplomacy and strategic thinking
and a long record of thinking about transatlantic relations, so it is our pleasure
to have him here.
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut
Let me start by saying I am squarely on the side of Ron’s wife. Through her
questions, he has already expressed the questions I have on my mind.
Nevertheless, it is fascinating to have just now heard two members of the win-
ning team. Five years ago both Bruce and Ron began the project of convincing
the administration and the US Senate that a broad enlargement of NATO was
the right answer. They were brilliantly successful, so they should be praised
for that. Indeed, they should be thanked for coming out with a new challenge
100
NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
in view of the threats which our countries are addressing, many of which
come from the Greater Middle East. Is this the time to have a new grand strat-
egy, and at the same time, is NATO the right body to implement it? It is a cen-
tral question, and it is good to have a discussion about it in Prague. Günther
Altenburg has already mentioned many of the questions that are on the minds
of NATO members, and since France is usually one of its most demanding step-
mothers, I am grateful to him for having taken that line. In taking up all the
arguments, we have to have a spectral analysis of what we expect from NATO
in confronting the threats emanating from the Greater Middle East, which
have been identified with great talent this morning. 
NATO is first a military alliance in charge of the territorial defense of its
members. And in view of what is happening in the Greater Middle East, there
is at least one member who is directly on the frontlines, Turkey. There is anoth-
er set of members who are pretty close and directly affected in many ways: the
Mediterranean members of NATO. And, there is a new set of members who are
particularly keen on territorial defense because they have had some rather
recent experience in this area: the Central and Eastern European countries.
The new European countries loved the old Alliance, the one that insured phys-
ical security. Now, if these territorial threats come at the alliance quickly, this
will be very high on its list of concerns. Indeed, the Iranian issue has been
raised. If the Iranians are not persuaded to stop their ballistic missile and other
weapons programs, they will become a direct threat to a significant number of
NATO countries, forcing all of us to look very squarely at the issue of ballistic
missile defense – an issue which NATO has been very slow to address. Russia
is equally concerned about this threat, but we don’t speak very much about
the Russians here. They are also concerned by the threats emanating from the
Greater Middle East, and are not the only ones to utilize them for their own
ends. In terms of territorial defense, NATO will have to address those threats
whether is has already recognized them or not as they will be imposed on it
very quickly.
The second function of NATO, which is a success story of the last decade,
is providing military force to help stabilize and reconstruct countries. This is
a job that NATO has been doing in the Balkans and is just taking up in
Afghanistan. In fact, NATO only went to war in Kosovo; the rest of its history
of military involvement is in this business of providing a framework for its
members to ensure stability with, as Günther reminded us, a UN mandate, and
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a very clear requirement for a majority of NATO members, which are keen to
have the deployment of their forces involved within a framework which puts
them at ease within their democratic and legal traditions. There is, of course,
as the support for the Polish contingent reminds us, no shortage of likely chal-
lenges in the Middle East where there will be a need to deploy reconstruction
forces and where it would be useful to have NATO provide a framework of
support. In fact, NATO is in the process of becoming a sort of stabilization
management agency. This is a perfectly respectable job that it does very well.
It will probably not become a crises management agency, and I will come back
to that. This means that NATO could possibly be called on to get involved in a
bigger way in Iraq. Other members have mentioned the idea of NATO being
called upon at some stage to provide a framework for forces involved in the
stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
There is one thing we have so far ignored at this conference. NATO mem-
bers, as individual countries, are already greatly involved in the Greater Middle
East. Since the first Gulf War, they have ensured the strategic stability in the
Gulf region. They intervened against Saddam Hussein, and through the bigger
countries, they have direct links with the key oil producing countries in the
Gulf. Regardless of whether we want it or not, NATO is involved in the balance
of power, in helping to maintain the stability of the Gulf region, and in ensur-
ing that neither Iran nor a resurgent Iraq is a threat to the major oil reserves in
the world. And this is, of course, the source of permanent tension for many
NATO members. There is not only the state of Israel in the Middle East, but
there is also plenty of oil, and the requirements of ensuring the security of
those two entities sometimes do conflict. 
Which leads me to the third function of NATO: NATO is also a political
alliance. It is a place where partners meet, debate, and try to find common
ground for action. It is a continuous, living place for transatlantic exchange
and togetherness. Of course, the recent record in this area is not terribly
encouraging because on both sides there have been actions which have led to
the question whether or not NATO is still relevant. We have already heard in
great detail about whether NATO is relevant to the US in the post 9/11 world
and on the Iraq issue, so I won’t go into that. Now, we are hearing questions
coming from the US as to whether or not NATO is relevant to the EU when it
sets up its own institutions. NATO Secretary General complained to several EU
defense ministers, some of which happen to be members of NATO, that the
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EU is not respecting NATO. One of them reacted by saying that perhaps NATO
was not respecting the EU. This sort of exchange is not the most felicitous, and
indeed one may wonder whether the Greater Middle East is a very promising
topic for NATO political debate. There has already been one interesting crisis
in which two NATO members, with the State of Israel, led a preemptive attack
on an Arab country in order to change the regime because a guy in charge was
doing things that were disturbing. It didn’t turn out very well because key
NATO members said, “Will you please stop? If you don’t stop, we may use a
pretty big stick on you.” This was the Suez crisis. So NATO and the Greater
Middle East are not entirely new to each other, and we have just gone through
a number of fairly unpromising sequences of political events in regard to that
area. NATO members have spent seven or eight years drifting apart on the Iraq
issue, which is still far from being resolved. Also, there is an increasingly dif-
ferent chemistry, which is very much reflected in the polls, among NATO
members regarding the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Clearly, the sensitivity
is not the same in the US as it is for some of its European partners. We’ve just
heard that the Mediterranean Dialogue, although worthy, is not the greatest
success story. So is it a wise choice to ask Europe and the US to be partners in
a great new plan under a NATO framework? If it is not a NATO framework,
what part can NATO play in a broader framework, which involves other insti-
tutions? I think this is the question we are trying to address. 
The EU clearly has the tools for soft power. It has money, the commercial
elements, the physical contact with immigrant populations – which is a very
important part of national thinking – and the prospect of including one mem-
ber of the region, Turkey, which is going to change its way of looking at its
dynamic. Therefore, it is a full partner in this, and it is also in the process of
putting together its strategic perspective in a broad way that is very relevant
to what is coming out of the region. The second Solana Paper includes
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the need for a mix of soft and
hard power to deal with them. This is an ongoing project.
The second question of course is, “Is the United States really willing to
entrust to NATO its own Greater Middle East strategy, or is it willing to share
it with the EU?” That’s a big question, and I do not entirely take Ron’s word that
the answer will be yes. The good thing about the new liberals is that they pay
more attention to working with Europeans and the neo-conservatives, but that
doest not mean that it will be easier or that the neo-liberals will be willing to
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make more concessions to the European view of things or European sensitivi-
ties in order to reach a real common strategy. During Bruce Jackson’s presen-
tation I was struck that he is not lobbying the US Senate anymore, he is lobby-
ing the European Council. Good luck to you. I hope they will listen to you; in
many ways they are an even tougher body to convince. 
To conclude, a practical guide for what we need to do – prioritize, take
problems as we can address them, recognize that the modernization of the
Middle East is a very complicated process and that the forces at work, Arab
nationalism, Arab radicalism, and various strands of Islamic fundamentalism,
are very tough, much tougher than the countries of Eastern Europe which
were coming back to democracy after a pause. Unfortunately, we will muddle
through, we will not come through it with a big plan, but let’s keep trying.
Jiří Schneider
I thought it was nice that you were the first to mention the Suez incident. I was
surprised that it hadn’t come up yet.
The next speaker has been a prominent a member of the Israeli journal-
ism community for the past fifty years. His focus has been on security. It is my
pleasure to introduce Mr. Ze’ev Schiff, who can offer us his own view of the
big picture.
Ze’ev Schiff
NATO peace management operations is not an easy topic to discuss, but I have
some experience here, and have two points that I would like to make.
As the first speaker already referred to this, my first point which will be
the shorter one, and has to do with the question of the borderlines of the
Greater Middle East. What does the term “the Greater Middle East” mean?
What is the difference between the Middle East and the Greater Middle East?
Is Pakistan in the region; is Pakistan in the Greater Middle East? I understand
that NATO is looking for new missions and that it’s quite easy to look in the
direction of the Middle East for several reasons. First, it is very close to Europe,
only a two or three hours flight away. Second, the conflicts there attract a lot
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of attention. I fully agree that an unstable Middle East might endanger not just
NATO but also Europe and that a spillover of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or
the spread of WMD might endanger the world beyond Europe. I fully agree
that there are problems here, and I would even say it is an over simplification
of these problems to start defining the Middle East with even more simple
words such as the Greater Middle East. 
My first point is that the problem is not a territorial problem. The best
example here is North Korea, not Pakistan. The proliferation of missiles and
other weapons is not just an issue for South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia in
the Far East. If the international community is slow in dealing with North Korea,
the Middle East and Israel will be affected. While we are discussing the question
of how to provide food to North Korea, the North Koreans sell not only missiles,
but also nuclear know-how. So it is not just a territorial issue, it is an internation-
al terror issue. Terror is not just a suicide bombing in Tel-Aviv or in Jerusalem; it
is international problem whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Bali. If you want to
fight Al-Qaeda, the answer is not just a question of talking to the Palestinians, it
is much broader. It is a real problem when you are saying NATO and the GME;
you have to take a different approach here that recognizes that this is a global
issue. It is NATO and a number of global problems that the Middle East is facing
immediately; tomorrow, unfortunately, they may be facing even more. 
Now my second point relates to the peace management operations. Let me
tell you, we, meaning Israel and its Arab neighbors, have a lot of experience with
this issue. We already have international involvement in this area in several ways.
Looking back to the beginnings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the estab-
lishment of the state of Israel, we had at least seven international forces or
groups of observers, two of whom were involved from the beginning of the con-
flict in 1948 and 1949. They are still there, and they are still not sure what they
should do. There are a few observers from the UN sitting in Sinai and Egypt, and
I don’t know why they get their salaries. We had UN international forces in 1956
and 1957. We had UNDOF between Israel and Syria and UNIFIL in Lebanon. We
also had international forces there which were not sent by the UN. On the con-
trary, in one case, the UN was against sending in an international force after the
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. 
To draw lessons from our prior experience in the Middle East in order to
have more effective peace management operations in the future, you also have
to ask what the reasons were for these forces to withdraw or to fail – and most
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of them did actually fail. Some of them were even expelled; let me remind you
that the US, England, France, and Italy were pushed out of Beirut in 1983. Also,
one day the French suddenly withdrew two battalions from UNIFIL because two
soldiers were killed and these were either NATO or American soldiers. Finally,
there was UNIFIL, which, despite its force of five to six thousand people, could-
n’t even lift a finger to stop the terror or the shelling in the war of 1982. 
Now to conclude this sad history, I have a few suggestions to make for
future peacekeeping operations. First, there is no chance for an international
force to succeed if both sides of the conflict will not agree to the deployment of
an international force beforehand. Also, both sides need to see a purpose in hav-
ing an international force present in order to at least lessen the conflict. We
don’t need them for crisis management or even necessarily for keeping peace
agreements. For example, there is no peace between Syria and Israel, but the sit-
uation in the Golan Heights remains quiet because both sides have a mutual
interest in keeping things quiet. This is a good example of why UNIFIL is not
a good example. Second, an international force cannot succeed in a place where
you have too many groups involved. In Lebanon we had the Lebanese govern-
ment, Hezbollah, the Syrian Army, the Israeli Army, and the Revolutionary
Guards from Iran. The same problems will happen between the Israelis and
Palestinians if the PA entity is sent in; at the same time, the PA would say we can-
not fight Hamas, we cannot fight Islamic Jihadi, and so on – so too many groups
means no chance for an international force from any entity, the UN, the EU, or
NATO, to succeed. The Americans are very smart to understand this, and they
haven’t moved in. 
To conclude, in the past, personally I was extremely against any interna-
tional involvement. Now, I have a strong feeling that we will have real difficul-
ties solving our problems without international assistance. We do not need
intervention; we need assistance. If NATO were to jump in, it would have to be
very careful not to become part of the problem but instead a part of the solu-
tion.
Jiří Schneider
Thank you very much, Mr. Schiff, for presenting us with the complexity of
the situation and for cooling our enthusiasm to seek a new mission for
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NATO a little bit. We have two views here. One is that NATO is seeking a new
mission in order to save itself, which is not true. The opposite might be true.
There are some urgent challenges that we have to face with or without
NATO. In any case, we should be aware of the complexity of any kind of
involvement in this area. For this reason it is healthy to present Israeli skep-
ticism regarding any international involvement here. 
Now, the last speaker is the Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech
Republic, Mr. Mareš. Mr. Mareš is an academician turned politician and the
head of one of the coalition parties of the Czech government. We are proud
to have a representative of the Czech government here, although I am not
sure in which capacity he is going to speak. We saw many nice maps in
Bruce Jackson’s presentation maybe you noticed that the Czech Republic is
located somewhat inland in all of these maps. It might be tempting for a
country like this not to look beyond its borders and to maintain an illusion
of security. It will be very useful for us to hear the views of a member of the
government of a country in this position, the second Luxembourg of Europe
so to speak.
Petr Mareš
I have to start with saying that I am speaking for myself and not for the Czech
government. I don’t think anybody in this room expected Israel to speak with
enthusiasm about international involvement in the conflicts. Everybody
knows that it is very difficult for Israel to even think about international
involvement. Nevertheless, the fact that assistance is needed, is a key message
for us. As is typical for the issue that we are dealing with at this conference, we
have a long list of questions. I am afraid, though, that there are more questions
than answers. We can, however, put these questions into three crucial groups,
and I will try to comment on them from the Prague view. 
The first question is whether there is any role for NATO in the Greater
Middle East, and my answer to this question is yes, there is. If not for any other
reason, I believe this because of the fact that NATO is the most experienced,
most sufficient, and most powerful international organization prepared, at
least to some extent, to deal with such problems. We, the Czechs, have never
considered NATO to be a defense oriented organization only. We also very
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much appreciate NATO’s other roles, as mentioned earlier, including the sta-
bilization roles and the political mission of NATO: in other words, NATO’s
democratization role, with which we, along with Spain, Portugal, and Turkey,
have some experience. All three roles of NATO can be applied in the region
we are discussing now. 
So yes, there is a role for NATO, but is NATO prepared to play this role?
My answer is, “I don’t know.” I answer this way not because of the situation
in the Greater Middle East, but because of the situation inside NATO. The EU-
NATO relationship has been touched on many times in previous contribu-
tions, and this is the key to this problem. I am afraid that NATO and the EU
are still tempted to play good cop, bad cop. It’s a good approach in certain sit-
uations, but it’s not a good approach if the good cop is trying to win over the
subject of the investigation. It is my feeling that in their approach to the
Greater Middle East, Europeans and Americans, are, in many cases, trying to
do just that. I must confess that the Europeans are trying to play this role
more frequently than the Americans. 
The third question is directly related to the second, “Does NATO want
to play this role?” Again, my answer is, “I don’t know.” We, the Czechs, are
already involved in the region, but we are not involved as NATO members. We
participated in the Gulf War even before we became members of NATO.
Many other countries did this as well. I am afraid we are not using the possi-
bilities that NATO offers to us. I am not saying that we are not using it in its
defense capacity, but we are not using it as a political alliance, a platform for
discussion, coordination, decision making. Decisions about what we should
do in the Greater Middle East are still being made in national capitals and not
on the NATO level.
Only when NATO decides, “Yes, we want to play this role,” we can
achieve greater security of the North Atlantic area as well as greater stability
and the future democratic development of the Middle East. I know that this
challenge is enormous; we have heard about all the organizational, political
and other difficulties that we now face. Nevertheless, after deciding that in
future, NATO should not be purely focused on the physical defense of the
North Atlantic area, the only logical next step is to be involved in this new
challenge. We have to be involved as NATO, as a political alliance with one
common language that is able to prepare a plan and behave according to that
one plan.
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Jiří Schneider
The presentations are over. Looking around at you, I think you really do
deserve a coffee break. Please, keep your questions, comments and disagree-
ments for the following discussion.
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Jiří Schneider
As all those who want to participate are here, we will begin. I am not sure who
asked to speak first, and because the right wing of the room seems less active,
we will start on the left side and move right.
Shlomo Brom
In his presentation, Ron Asmus highlighted a key concept and that is the idea
of having an anchor. He referred to Turkey and said that Turkey has an anchor
through its membership in NATO. But I believe that Turkey has two anchors:
NATO membership and the possibility of joining the European Union. Also, I
had the opportunity, rare for an Israeli, to visit the Balkans and there I found
two similar anchors. One of them is the presence of peace-keeping forces,
most of them belonging to NATO. The other is the wish to join the EU, which
unites everyone in the Balkans. 
The problem in the Middle East is that we don’t have any such anchors.
And I envision the creation of two similar anchors. One of them is security
guarantees by a third party of every real peace agreement in the Middle East.
They can have different forms from bilateral agreements and multilateral
agreements to peacekeeping forces, monitoring mechanisms and so on. There
will be a need in any future agreement in the Middle East for similar security
guarantees. In the past, the security guarantees were provided only by
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America, and the classic example of that is the Israeli-Egyptian peace agree-
ment. Due to the changing nature of NATO, it can play a similar role, along
with both the US and Europe, in future agreements. 
However, we also should think about a second anchor. The second
anchor is not membership in the EU; I don’t think it is feasible to integrate
the Middle East in the EU. However, it could be a stronger economic relation-
ship between the Middle East and Europe. The difference between the Middle
East and Europe is that in Europe, the economic inter-relations were the basis
for the unification of Europe. In the Middle East, the situation is quite differ-
ent. There are no economic inter-relations. The real economic inter-relations
are between the different Middle Eastern states and the outside world, mostly
Europe. So, the economic anchor should be based more on the relationship
with Europe than on inter-relationships in the Middle East. 
Mark Heller
I would like to try to provoke the panelists to elaborate a little more on some
of the references that were made to the non-military security functions of
NATO. In particular, the suggestions that it might be possible for NATO to con-
tribute to the social and political transformation of the Greater Middle East. At
one point, it was even suggested that NATO had helped to democratize
Eastern Europe. The reason I want to try to stimulate this reflection may be
based on misunderstanding of mine, because to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, NATO did nothing to democratize Eastern Europe. To go even
further, it did nothing to democratize or re-democratize authoritarian coun-
tries in southern Europe, which either had always belonged to NATO or were
subsequently admitted. In fact, my understanding is precisely the opposite:
that the processes of democratization had come first after which came associ-
ation with, then partnership with and ultimately integration into NATO. By
extension, one might also say the same thing about the European Union. 
The point is that these processes of transformation, including political
transformation or democratization, were primarily generated from within and
that the roles of NATO and the European Union involved a post-factum contri-
bution that helped to consolidate processes that had already been self-gener-
ated. Now, if my understanding is correct, by extrapolating from past experi-
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ences, we can say that neither NATO nor the EU can really do much in terms
of transforming societies in the Greater Middle East except to wait until they
transform themselves. I’m going back to the point raised in Adam Michnik’s
letter that the democracies have to be there in the first place, and only in that
case can others come around from the outside and help them. If that very brief
and superficial overview is at all correct, does it mean that there is not really
any kind of political and social transformational role for NATO or the EU in the
Greater Middle East and that there is nothing constructive that can be done in
this regard unless and until they transform themselves?
Jiří Schneider
Let me just refer to tomorrow’s panel which is named “The Role of NATO in
Democracy Building” and does not include a reference to what is first and
what must follow. You were absolutely right in expressing that NATO’s role is
in the consolidation of something that is already somewhat there. It is a very
pointed question, and I am looking forward to the answers of the panelists, as
well as to the answers we will hear tomorrow. I appreciate that your question
gives us the opportunity to expand the number of reactions we will hear on
this topic.
Eran Lerman
I feel a little bit self-conscious about being the third Israeli in a row to raise
a point here, but I am not necessarily speaking as an Israeli or even as a rep-
resentative of the American Jewish Committee, but as a former intelligence
officer. Some of the issues, including general concerns, the pathologies of
the management of the Iraq crisis and the future, reflect the absence of an
independent NATO capacity to generate and integrate intelligence beyond
what is provided by the member states. The current mechanisms, at least
those I have seen, are very rudimentary. The creation of a more extensive
capacity for forming views about terrorism, proliferation, and the underly-
ing political, ideological and social conditions that give rise to the threat as
well as the creation of a common threat assessment has to be driven by the
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creation of an integra-ted intelligence framework. This framework would
also provide players in the Middle East with the first and most important
building block for a dialogue. This is a practical suggestion that should come
out of this conference.
Amin Tarzi
I’m going to go all the way back to the eastern front of the Greater Middle East,
and the first question is to Mr. Altenburg. I agree with you totally that Afgha-
nistan is a crucial test for NATO involvement in the Greater Middle East. I also
assume that there is some kind of a concept, a geographical door, but I do have
a problem specifically when it comes to Pakistan. Where does Pakistan fit in
that picture? Having said that, the NATO led ISAF is soon to expand into
Kunduz with the Germans and possibly the Belgians and the Finns. My ques-
tion is whether there is a negotiated structure for how the NATO controlled
ISAF will deal with the US led operation, Enduring Freedom. This is crucial
because if it doesn’t exist, there may be potential problems. If not, the blue-
print is not yet in place, why not?
The second question has to do with time assessments within NATO. Is
the NATO commitment to Afghanistan only going to be good until the Bonn
Agreement is in place and Afghanistan has a constitution and president next
June, or will NATO stay beyond that? Unless some miracle happens, and I don’t
believe in miracles, things are not going to get “good” by June 2004. Is there
a commitment beyond any possible future government in Afghanistan? 
I also have a question to Ron Asmus. When you mentioned priorities, you
focused more on Iraq and Afghanistan was secondary. Do you share Mr. Alten-
burg’s belief that Afghanistan is crucial? If so, although I don’t believe in mod-
els, can Iraq be somewhere that you can work with in a framework and then
put that into the play in Afghanistan? Or is Iraq more crucial because of its
importance as a country and that has to come first?
Lastly, we discussed the issue of Russia in NATO and that it is threatened
by proliferation. As somebody who worked on Iranian missile proliferation, I
think yes, Russia is threatened, but without Russian help, Iran would not have
any of the capabilities that they have right now. This includes nuclear capabil-
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ities. So, yes, Russia is a partner, but at the same time, up until now, they have
also been a contributor to proliferation. What will NATO do about this?
Jiří Schneider
Thank you, Mr. Tarzi, for your very concrete questions. We will address all
these questions at the end of the session. Mr. Schueftan, please.
Dan Schueftan
When we speak about the role of NATO in the Middle East, we actually mean
Europe’s contribution, because United States already has a major role there.
The United States would like to have European partners as long as they are
responsible and effective. Having said that, it is a bit difficult for Europeans
to have a role in the Greater Middle East as they have failed in the Smaller
Middle East, more specifically in the Arab-Israeli context. Before Europe
learns the lessons of this failure, it is very difficult to see that they might have
any broader success in the region. If you look at what is happening right at
this moment in the Middle East, you will find that there are only three minor
problems that the Europeans have – the Israelis don’t trust them, the Arabs
don’t respect them, and the Americans don’t take them seriously. Other than
that, the situation is fine. The problem is that if the Europeans want to
become involved, they will need a completely different approach to the
Middle East, which might be provided to some extent by the European
enlargement. Perhaps the best indication of Europe’s coming at age with
regards to understanding the Middle East will be when it disengages itself
from the assumption that the Middle East is about to perform some kind of
quantum leap from national and Islamic radicalism to post nationalism fol-
lowing the European example. Perhaps the best example of this belief, heard
here this afternoon, is the notion that in the Middle East you can have solu-
tions. Unfortunately, I meet this term in many European analyses of the
Middle East. I don’t know why they use this term. It seems to me that solu-
tions are fine when you speak about crossword puzzles, but this is about the
only place where I think solutions can be found. To conclude, I am remind-
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ed of a quote from the movie Shirley Valentine, where the frustrated wife
says, “marriage is like the Middle East, there is no solution.” I would say that
the Middle East is like marriage, there is no solution. Once we start from this
assumption the rest will be easy.
Jiří Schneider
I remember a couple of years ago someone rudely told me that there is no
such thing as a peace process. First, there is no peace, and second, it is not
a process: it is a state of war rather than a peace process. You made a very
good point, we also discovered that NATO is also comprised of Europeans,
and when you talk about NATO, you also talk about Europeans. Sometimes, it
looks as if there are two kinds of Europeans, NATO Europeans and EU
Europeans. Hopefully, we will overcome this schizophrenia. Now, Mr. Polenz.
Ruprecht Polenz 
I would like to come back to Bruce Jackson’s presentation and his breathtak-
ing view of EU enlargement including not only the Balkans but also the Black
Sea region and the border states. I would like to leave aside what this would
mean for decision-making processes within this future European Union,
which is still designed to be a political union and not free trade zone – even in
the decades to come. I would like to go back to Bruce Jackson’s idea that the
European Union establish peace-enhancing transformation processes, as in
the case of the stability pact for the Balkans in which they promised that if
things go well, the Balkan states can be members of the European Union. The
thought behind all this is that security cannot be one against the other instead
it must be one whith each other. If we try to apply this idea to the Greater
Middle East, we have a basis for the road map. Unfortunately, as far, as I have
heard this evening, we won’t discuss the Road Map, but I would like to raise
the following question. This Road Map was designed by the United States, the
Europeans, the Russians, and the United Nations as well as the Israelis and the
Palestinians, who, in my opinion, agreed with crossed fingers behind their
back. My question to all the panelists is: “What is your assessment of this
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approach?” Coming back to Jeff’s comments this morning, we have not only a
similar assessment of the situation, but also a very elaborate plan to address
this long lasting conflict with the possibility to solve it in the foreseeable
future. 
We have many Israelis here on the floor, but I wish we had more Arab
voices because my impression is that we are discussing the Middle East. We
should ask ourselves what kind of initiatives would also be welcome in this
area. We should try to take the opinions of the Arab countries which are rep-
resented by Prince Hassan seriously. I would also like to hear your assessment
about whether we are going to balance this discussion.
Jiří Schneider
Thank you very much, speaking for the organizers I have to assure you that we
tried hard to get some Arab voices but we obviously didn’t succeed in the end.
Rouzbeh Pirouz
Rouzbeh Pirouz from the Foreign Policy Centre in London. While I’m not one
of the Arab voices, I’m originally Iranian so I think that’s close. 
I only have one issue to bring up and that is whether NATO is a produc-
tive instrument of change. It seems to me that the very nature of the military
threat in the region is not really a state versus state threat, but more of an
unconventional threat similar to terrorism. Of course as we’ve realized, our
ability to deal with terrorism through military means is limited. We’ve discov-
ered that eradicating terrorists through military means can only go so far,
when terrorist go and hide in caves and basements and so on. Thus, the issue
very quickly moves to the political agenda and bringing about political change.
It seems to me that there are very different understandings in Europe as
opposed to the US of the need for political change. While the US may have
come to the game relatively late in the day, it underwent a fundamental trans-
formation on September 11 and now believes in the need to bring about a
pretty substantial transformation in the political order of the region. Whereas
with the Europeans, any approach they advocate would be for change, based
on issues, such as human rights, that are much more incremental in nature. I
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wonder if the panel would agree that this gap exists, and if so, then how can
that gap be bridged? Can Europe and the US work together effectively on
pushing for that political change? Moreover, can NATO really be an effective
instrument given the fact that it requires a certain degree of consensus on
what needs to be done, how it needs to be done and how quickly it needs to
be done?
Joshua Muravchik
I want to dispute the argument that Mark Heller made and my argument
might actually pair well with the comments we’ve just heard from Mr. Pirouz
and might be something that the panelists want to comment on. It’s true that
NATO, as a body, became involved in the democratization of central and
southern Europe via the process of linking NATO enlargement to the meet-
ing of certain democratic-oriented criteria by the candidates for member-
ship. This involvement came after a long history of the NATO members as
individuals having worked to undermine communism in the communist
countries of Europe. These activities by the United States and various
Western European countries involved intelligence activities, international
broadcasting, and a variety of kinds of support for the democrats and dissi-
dents within those countries. For example, an allusion was made last night
to the role of the residence of the US Ambassador in Czechoslovakia when
there was so little space for free meetings and speech. The point is that the
western nations viewed the existence of totalitarian regimes in Eastern
Europe as something ultimately unacceptable, something unnatural. While
there might have been the feeling that we did too little – there were severe
limitations on what means we could use – there is no question that western
policy included the goal of changing the form of governments in those coun-
tries to something more normal, namely democratic governments. But our
view towards the Middle East has never been that. Our view towards the
Middle East has always been it is what it is and that’s because of its culture.
It’s strange to us and it sits on a lot of petroleum and as long as we can buy
the petroleum we don’t want to poke any sticks in this hornets’ nest. I think
this is what Mr. Pirouz was referring to when he said that there has been a
very recent change in that view at the US since 9/11. Perhaps, it’s typically
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unfair and impatient of us Americans to be chastising our European allies for
not having instantaneously made the same change along with us. However,
the question of how NATO itself can be an instrument of change in this area
remains open. We also have the question of whether the western states will
adopt the view toward the Middle East that is somehow analogous to the
view that we used to have toward Central Europe when it was under com-
munist rule. 
Onur Öymen
We have listened with great interest to all the panelists. We have discussed
what role NATO could play in the Middle East and in peace management.
What we have not discussed so far, as far as I understand it, is the gist of the
matter. The discussions that we have had today and yesterday need to take
place in NATO so that we can coordinate our policies. What we lack in NATO
is a political discussion on the Middle East. I don’t remember any meeting of
NATO where we discussed the political aspect of the developments and the
problems of the Middle East. So, to put the horses in front of carts, we need
to start to talk in NATO. I understand that some European countries in NATO
are not very comfortable discussing such matters within the Alliance
because they believe that it is the exclusive duty of the European Union to
discuss these matters. If we want NATO to play a role we first need to nego-
tiate not only what we can do together, but also what we should not do in
regards to these regions, particularly on the issue of countries supporting
terrorism. If we give a unified and coordinated message to these countries
we could play, as NATO, a role of political deterrence even before interven-
ing in a military way. I will give you an example. When Syria was the center-
piece of terrorism against Turkey, Israel, and many other countries, the
Secretary of State of the United States visited Damascus twenty-two times,
but he did not visit Turkey once. Why? Because they needed to have the back-
ing of Syria for the Middle East peace process. Shall we sacrifice our princi-
ples in favor of political advantages? This is the main problem to address. If
we have a policy to hold a firm line against countries supporting terrorism,
then we have to coordinate our policies and act accordingly. This is what I
see as one of the main problems. 
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Ivan Gabal
I feel such a tension on the panel between the belief that there are growing prob-
lems in the Middle East that we will have to deal with on one side and on the
other side, the feeling that NATO currently is involved in enlargement to such an
extent that it isn’t able to accept any new mission. This is my first question: “Is
there any idea in NATO of what it means to successfully complete the mission in
Afghanistan? If so, what does it mean?” I don’t think anybody can expect that we
will be able to restore Afghanistan back to the country which it was before the
Soviet invasion. Looking at Kosovo, we are escorting buses from Belgrade to
Pristina, and we are fighting smugglers from Serbia and Albania; the only serious
thing that we do is bringing back Serbian families for resettlement. Is there any
idea of when we will withdraw from the Balkans? At this point we are mostly
policing the area. If we include the criteria of when we will be released from one
agenda to go on to the next, we could better plan for our next “baby.” While it
rarely happens, sometimes having another baby saves the marriage. 
My second remark is on our poor national perspective. If we are to have
NATO in the Middle East in its military capacity, then we shouldn’t have to do so
against public opinion. As NATO members, we are not neutral, and we need to
use NATO membership as a legitimizing political instrument to show that there
is certain underlying meaning to the missions on which we are sending soldiers. 
My last question is to Ron Asmus. You mentioned the success of NATO-
Russia cooperation. We are in a new situation. If there is any danger of prolifer-
ation, it comes from Russia being unable to control its internal security. This is
not even speaking about how much tension Chechnya generates for Islamic rad-
icalism. The question of Russia is contributing to the spread of WMD and not
being able to control its own internal organized crime is an issue. Do you think
this is a new agenda to put in front of Russia? I believe it is. On one side, we see
very interesting options for Russian cooperation in Iraq, and on the other side, we
constantly read news about weaponry and technology sales and proliferation.
Jiří Schneider
Thank you, it’s a nice circle; we started with completion of Europe and you ask
about completion of Afghanistan. It’s enlarging our agenda. 
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Petr Luňák
I have a question for Mr. de Brichambaut and for Ron Asmus.
Mr. de Brichambaut, you suggested a clear distinction between NATO
and the EU. You said that NATO has a hard-military-power and that the EU has
a soft power. Indeed, you seem to suggest that the EU is better equipped to
deal with some of the challenges of the Greater Middle East. In my view, the
problems in the GME are as complex as the Middle East itself is, so you need
both hard and soft power. In fact, in order to apply some sort of pressure
through soft power, you very often need military hard-power. Indeed, some of
my Balkan friends say that NATO is very successful in applying pressure pre-
cisely because it utilizes diplomacy backed by military force. So my question
is: “Instead of the European Union acquiring hard military power, why not
have NATO acquire soft power?” At the Prague Summit, the Alliance did an
excellent job in acquiring new military capabilities and the ability to deploy
military forces out of area. The question now is whether it shouldn’t also be
able to deploy not only military forces but also nation-building capabilities. 
Mr. Asmus, in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, you seem to argue for
a new Harmel Report, which helped to mobilize NATO when it was neither
intellectually nor conceptually equipped to deal with the challenges of déten-
te in the 60s. In fact, you rightly point out that the Harmel Report was a strat-
egy for regime change in Eastern Europe that allowed military capabilities to
be kept. What do you think must happen within NATO to start a new strategic
debate?
Barry Rubin
As I was listening, I began making list of specific questions and scenarios.
While covering these ideas may require a second stage of this discussion, I
would at least like to raise a few of them here. 
Among the notes I took are the following questions. Under what condi-
tions do people foresee NATO using force in the Greater Middle East? Here is
a quick rundown of a list of areas that I came up with; I don’t expect you to
address them all. First, we know that Libya has been involved in the destruc-
tion of two civilian airliners, and that France is demanding compensation.
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Should NATO power be used to back France’s demand? Second, we know that
there are something like twenty-two Al-Qaeda leaders in Iran. Iran first said
that they restrain them, and now, they say they can’t find them. Is this a situ-
ation where NATO should put pressure on Iran to turn over Al-Qaeda opera-
tives? Third, US Secretary of State Colin Powell met with the Foreign Minister
of Syria who said that the terrorists’ offices were closed. A week later he gave
an interview saying that they weren’t closed. Is this an issue for NATO? Fourth,
Iranians cross borders for the subversion of the Afghan government and of the
Iraqi government, probably including the assassination of two key clerical
leaders. Is this something for NATO? Fifth, Syria and its support for cross-bor-
der terrorism against coalition forces in Iraq. Sixth, Iran and WMD, as well as
its sponsorship of terrorism in Europe and the PKK. Also, North Korean,
Chinese, and Russian WMD technology help Iran’s weapon programs. Lastly,
the Algerian civil war and GIA’s activities in Europe and other places. These are
a number of specific cases and only one touches on Arab-Israeli issues. These
are actual issues that exist at present. At some point one has to discuss what is
the appropriate NATO role in these situations, what issues we are going to take
up, and what are we going to do about it? Obviously, this is a very preliminary
list of issues, but it would be worth hearing some thoughts about the criteria
of such issues. Under what conditions do people see NATO military forces
becoming involved in fighting in the Middle East?
Petr Mareš
The question most related to what I said before coffee break was a question
about the potential of NATO for playing a democratization role. There are two
ways to answer the question. The first one is connected with what happened
in Central and Eastern Europe and what’s currently happening in the Balkans
and other Eastern European countries. I cannot agree completely that NATO
simply waited until countries became democratic and then entered the field.
I have my personal experience with some countries, such as Georgia, which
are now on the waiting list for possible NATO membership. My experience is
that such tools as PfP or MAP are very efficient and the simple idea that they
are going to become the members of the Alliance makes it possible for certain
political forces in those countries to convince their partners to behave a bit
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differently. Simply the fact that in NATO there is an article declaring that
NATO wants to contribute to peaceful and friendly international relations by
strengthening the framework of institutions is helpful. For example, I sincere-
ly believe that even as far as our neighbor Slovakia goes, the fact that NATO
expected something from this country in the way that it develops some of its
institutions played an important role in the way the country developed during
the last five years. But there is a problem here: in all those cases I mentioned,
there was a prize at the end or there is a prize at the end – if you will agree
with the principle of NATO, we will help you to strengthen your new institu-
tions. But what is the prize for the countries in the Greater Middle East? That’s
a very difficult question to answer. Nevertheless, if NATO is able to decide to
play a role in this area, the simple fact that it is an institution based on sharing
common values will be an important factor. There is a difference between
NATO involvement and involvement of a single nation. As an organization
based on democratic principles whose success is based upon the success of
democratic principles, it might have an important role in spite of the great
challenge of the situation. 
One more question on your comparison of the Cold War and the Post-
Cold War periods. Of course, the importance of common defense up to the
end of the 80s was more important for NATO as an organization than, well, at
least it seems so, common values. However, since the beginning of the 90s,
common values are more important to NATO than they used to be, for mem-
ber states, for the future member states and, maybe, for the future allies. If the
prize is no longer the membership, why couldn’t it be a sort of alliance, a sort
of support, a sort of continuing help from NATO?
Ze’ev Schiff 
I counted 12–15 questions which were raised here, I would like to touch two,
three points, mainly because of the time and I am not sure I have an answer to
all the points. 
I am afraid that the tendency here is to see each of the major conflicts sepa-
rately, and it is wrong to approach the situation in this way. We cannot take the
Iraqi crises separately and saying, let’s deal with Iraq and take the proliferation
issue separately, period, and then the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All of them
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are actually interconnected. If the United States and the international commu-
nity fail in Iraq, it will immediately affect and accelerate proliferation and ter-
rorism in the Middle East. If the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran goes
on we shall immediately see more countries in the Middle East gain nuclear
capabilities. It is not just Iraq either. If America loses its fight against terrorism,
we shall see an immediate increase in terrorist activities throughout the
region. This situation involves one major issue with other components and
should be treated as such.
Another question – someone asked, I think it was Mark Heller: “What is
the non-military role of NATO?” My feeling is that NATO cannot just wait to
make certain decisions. Yes, they cannot come if they are not invited, but they
can play a role even if they are not directly invited. They have to be more active
in the Road Map and not just to say in major headlines “Yes, we are supporting
the Road Map.” They have to be involved in the first stage, which is fighting ter-
ror, and then we shall move to the second stage, that is, building a two-stage
solution. NATO has a non-military role to play here by pushing the parties to
take a more active role in anchors and in multilateral security cooperation in
the Middle East and by being involved in better intelligence sharing. 
Finally, the most difficult mission is fighting terror in the Middle East. I
am afraid of the possibility of an international force being deployed anywhere
in the Middle East, not just in Israel. I don’t want to think about the possibility
of a German force within NATO, for example, being deployed on the Israeli-
Palestinian boarder. Can you imagine a situation like that? What if an interna-
tional force is deployed there, and behind their back someone goes on with
the terror activities? Falling into this trap would be a disaster. What I mean to
say here is that we have to keep in mind what we as peace loving people, not
just as NATO, have to do in order to prevent the spillover of the conflict to
other places. This is something which can be on the agenda of NATO.
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut
We should pause to think about what made the last exercise a success, which
is what has brought us together today. It is a spirit of mutual respect, of faith
that things can be improved, and of hope that democracy and common values
can work. If we want any other exercise to have any chance of achieving any
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goal we have to keep those values. I am sorry to say I do not see this spirit pres-
ent in some of the speakers we have heard today. We should avoid any attitude
of nihilism. There is sort of implicit belief that only brutal force runs the
world; this is not how Europeans see the world. Those who believe that only
brute force runs the world are making a big mistake, and they are completely
against the spirit of this continent and the way it is built. I very much regret
that they do not have a sense for this and that they do not see any future for
the region along those lines because it means that indeed we are drifting very
far apart. Europeans are present in the Greater Middle East. They do have
a relationship with three hundred million Arabs. They are present in the
human point of view, in the economic point of view, and in the cultural point
of view. They are present militarily along with Americans in Iraq, not all of
them but some of them, and why not? They are actively involved in many other
countries, and they try to maintain a relationship of respect for many Arabs
that feel a sense of resentment and hatred towards the United States. So I think
this is something we should take seriously and not lightly. 
The second thing I would like to say is that modernization is indeed a
very difficult process, that it has to be done within society, and that assistance
can be provided throughout this process. Furthermore, there are encouraging
moves happening in many Arab and Islamic countries towards modernization;
we should all hope that they are successful. The neo-conservatives have clear-
ly told us not to be complacent about authoritarian regimes in this area and to
look at all the possibilities for improvements and to be actively involved. 
NATO, of course, cannot duplicate what the EU is doing. You should
know better. Indeed, the EU has a structure, it has a budget; it has capabilities,
and there is no reason that NATO should try to grasp 1.8 % of the GNP from its
members. It would not be very successful in achieving this. In fact, as you may
know, the military forces available to the EU, which are the same as those that
are available to NATO, are coming from the same countries and are not – as
one speaker said in a very patronizing way – miniscule operations acting on
the assumption that they will be using NATO assets to avoid duplicity. There is
no reason we should start from the assumption that there is no potential for
cooperation. When the time is right for NATO to become a forum, a serious
forum, for dealing with the Middle East, when everybody is willing to put their
assets on the table and share them, then I am sure that NATO will again
become a political forum in these things. Mr. Ambassador, you told us with
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a great deal of eloquence about the difficulties you have had in handling the
terrorism issue in the past, so I am sure you understand what I mean. 
Regarding Russia, we all know that Russia is a multiple and, in fact, unre-
liable entity, but there is only one Russia right now that we have to deal with,
and I guess everybody is convinced that it has to be dealt with and engaged.
This is the work of NATO, individual European nations, and the United States.
Europeans who are involved in the Great Middle are handling the issue of Iran
in a straightforward way and this includes trying to change the attitudes of
Iran.
Ron Asmus
Let me start with Mark Heller’s question. A majority acclaims the consolidation
and democracy of Central and Eastern Europeans. That said, NATO played
a critical role in two regards. One of which could be relevant to the Middle
East and one of which not. The two regards are the following. First, the whole
theory was that NATO would create the context in which it would be easier to
build democracy by extending a security umbrella, thereby removing security
issues from the table. Secondly, there are a large number of issues that we
directly linked to NATO membership. And I could mention dozens of treaties
and agreements that would not have taken place among Central and East
European countries if NATO and the United States had not been together in
saying unless you do the following things you will not get in. However, Shlomo
has the right question. They wanted an anchor; we called membership the
golden carrot. Membership was the carrot that Central and Eastern Europe
wanted and we could link it to so many issues and leverages in so many suc-
cessful ways. We don’t have the golden carrot in the Middle East. We don’t have
the anchor. But we need to create anchors that would help us build something
in the Middle East. There are a couple of other ideas in addition to the two very
good ones Shlomo put on the table, and we need to think about them. 
To Mr. Pirouz’s question, we are exuberant, enthusiastic, idealistic Ame-
ricans who’ve been attacked and have undergone a paradigm shift like Josh
said, however, we’ll have a better strategy if we add a little bit of European wis-
dom, history and culture to it because we will never be able to do this part by
ourselves. If we are going to be able to do this, it’s going to be by learning from
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each other. I sometimes wish I could give Europeans a major dose of American
enthusiasm and some of my American friends a little dose of European histor-
ical perspective. 
The hardest question is how to organize the soft power and the hard
power of the West to use it towards accomplishing some of these goals. The
hardest piece in this challenge is not NATO, but how you organize the soft
power of the West for this agenda over years or decades. In theory, you could
do it through the US and the EU, but we can’t. Today, the EU is not a strategic
actor that is capable of having that dialogue, and we don’t treat the EU as one
either. So you have to figure a different way of dealing with it, which takes me
briefly to the Harmel Report idea. 
The Harmel Report was written by eight people who were sent off by a
bunch of heads of state who had a big problem in order to write a paper that
would allow us to kiss and make up after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
when the Alliance was in serious trouble of breaking down. These eight peo-
ple wrote a report that was basically common sense. They said NATO has to be
a defense shield in a policy of deterrence, and it needs a positive policy of
engagement that opens up the perspective of eventual transformation of com-
munist countries. They managed to marry these goals in such a way that the
Alliance came back together, not only across the Atlantic, but also within
Europe. 
It wouldn’t be a bad idea if a group of people were allowed to go off and
write another such straightforward report based upon the ideas that people
are currently considering, including the fact that NATO, as a metaphor for the
West, needs a defense posture to defend itself against these new threats as well
as a policy that’s a combination of defense and offense. Now, that report may
be done either in or outside of NATO, but something has to be done to put this
framework together and to put us on a new course. This is a good time for
such a task, although the tactics of this course are a little bit tricky.
Referring to Afghanistan, while I am a Democrat, I do not believe this
administration is making more serious efforts in Afghanistan because of prob-
lems in Iraq. We are doing what we are doing because we have got to make
progress, put pieces together, and connect them together. 
Finally, what is NATO going to do? We talked about NATO having a spec-
trum covering stability operations, force packaging, and war fighting. For the
foreseeable future, if we can get the capability to produce forces for stability
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operations, that’s Afghanistan, that’s a role in Iraq, and the force packaging, the
future of NATO is not going to be necessarily in warfare. However, the next time
we have a job to do in Iraq, for example, if NATO could say “we can put a divi-
sion in and sustain it for operation, we can put together little countries and
medium countries,” then we look at the problem from different perspective. The
problem NATO has today is that there are over 1.2 million European men in the
armed forces and only three percent of those forces are actually deployable and
sustainable. In America, the military is about fifty percent deployable. So we’ve
got to expand the European portion to about 20–25–30 % over the next ten
years in order to have a pool of forces that is available for stability operations and
packaging. Then we’ve got to deal with the command structure issues, but if we
get half way through that agenda I’m going to claim the victory.
Günther Altenburg 
First of all, I would say one needs to bear in mind that NATO doesn’t have a life
of its own, it does what the members want it to do. This is very much true for
all things you have just been saying with respect to the Middle East and the
Harmel Report. At this point in time I don’t see anything like that happening,
not even with the prospect of the Istanbul Summit. All these things need to be
agreed upon the consensus of the allies. They need to settle on a direction for
all these things and acts. At this point in time, let me say we are just in a phase
of consolidation and implementation, and the kind of perspective and vision
you were talking about, Ron, is more behind the horizon than on this side of it. 
With respect to the non-military functions of NATO, one needs to be clear
about what we are talking about. The Membership Action Plan, with respect to
what we did in Central and Eastern Europe, pre-supposed that these countries
were committed to democracy and that this is what gave us the leverage over
them. There are others with whom, for quite some, time we have good relations
in terms of Partnership for Peace and so on and so forth who are not moving
towards democracy. We try to tell them all sorts of things about how to control
the military by civil and political power, and they go and elect the son of the
President. We see this all through Central Asia, in the Caucasus, and even in
those countries who pretend that they want to become members of NATO very
soon. We need to see that there are probably some historical and political
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obstacles we have to overcome. Comparisons between Central Asia and the
Middle East are very difficult. We have done these comparisons in Germany,
and it is easy. We are definitely going to make them in Iraq as well, and this is
really far off the mark. First, we liberated Kuwait and the plan was to democra-
tize it. Where are we? Frankly speaking, we are back to square one. When we
talk about changes in the Middle East, we need to talk about changes in the soci-
eties. Where did all these 9/11 terrorists come from? They came out of Saudi
Arabia. So we probably have a problem with the Saudi society.
My next point would be about Europe’s role in the Middle East and
whether there is a solution and can we find it? Frankly speaking, I have a prob-
lem with that sentence saying there is no solution to the Middle East problem
and to these Palestinian questions. If we want to hit and have a perspective, it
will be through common security. It needs to be something where both parts
find their way: this is how I read the Road Map. 
My last point: Afghanistan, indeed, is a test of NATO’s ability to go ahead.
As for that practical question of coordination between ISAF and Enduring
Freedom, indeed there are arrangements so that the US forces will assure
extraction of ISAF if need be. Other than that, however, I think it is very much
the responsibility of the commanders on ground to do business there. As for
when we will leave Afghanistan, as I said in my introductory remarks, once you
are in, you are in for quite a while. We have not yet ended our Balkan opera-
tions, and Afghanistan is another long-term project. In order to maintain our
presence, we need patience and stamina.
Ariel Cohen
I am wondering how the French comment about not using raw power, applies
to the forty-seven French interventions in Africa without the Security
Council’s sanction. 
Jiří Schneider
This is not a good comment for the end of the debate; you should have made
it at the beginning as it would have helped us to spark discussion. If there is
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anyone who wishes to comment on these remarks please keep in mind that
I still have Bruce Jackson who asked to have a chance to wrap up. 
Bruce Jackson
I found myself listening to this debate and exchange between Ron Asmus and
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, and as a conservative Republican, it’s very
uncomfortable to be half way between the Democrats and the French Ministry
of Defense, but I think there is a broad agreement here. When Ron, others, and
I were talking about the expansion in the 90s, the catchword was not if but
when. When you listen to this debate about the Middle East it is not if but how.
And all these things are basically tactical questions, and I have emphases on
three different points, which I hope came out in that presentation after lunch. 
One is the question of sequencing – when do you do what. The military
takeover of Europe in World War II was preceded by the military consolidation
of North Africa. It would seem to me that the political makeover of the Middle
East during the war that we are currently in must be preceded by political con-
solidation of Europe. History is littered with the corpses of well-intentioned
empires wandering around the Middle East before they consolidated their
political base and came up with the resolve and a plan. Now, Ron may be right
we can tolerate a high degree of concurrency, but I still think we should be
cautious of not finishing what we’ve started along the way. 
The second question is the question of instrumentality. I agree with
Günther that sending NATO alone is fool hardly. Frankly, if NATO were flanked
by the EU and the host of wide range of newly created institutions mentioned
by Josh Muravchik and others, including Black Sea charters, a Caucasus securi-
ty system, the four freedoms of a wider Europe in the EU mechanisms, an addi-
tional Russian partnership, Partnership for Peace, and had the tools for the
longer job then it would be appropriate to put NATO in the center of that
force. NATO should not be there alone. 
Finally, there is a question of speed. There is basically a school that says
we should do the Middle East fast, and we should do the new democracies
slowly. There are persons who would say we should hand the command of
Iraq over to the new Iraqi government in 14 weeks. If you ask them about
Ukraine, they would say 40 years. I think that’s reversed. I would prefer to do
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the new democracies along with Serbia, where we have opportunities, more
sprightly, and do the Middle East more deliberately, basically recognizing that
we are dealing in generational or historical time. 
So those are basically questions of emphasis, which are questions of strat-
egy. Finally, I owe the panel an apology for having to step out for so long but
there is good news, which I think reflects on our discussion here today. For
the first time I was called out to defend our French and German allies from the
attacks of the British press. This basically bodes well for us. With the United
States as peacekeepers in Europe, we must be sure that we can handle the
Greater Middle East.
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THE ROAD MAP:
IS IT FOR REAL?
Introduction
Cyril Svoboda
Your Royal Highness, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have been given the difficult task of briefly introducing someone with a par-
ticularly remarkable background. Fortunately enough for me, this task has
been made somewhat easier by the fact that it comes at a rather opportune
moment in that the memoirs of tonight’s speaker were very recently published
and that the Czech translation is due to appear on Prague’s bookshelves in just
a few days. Let me assure you that we are all eagerly awaiting this book 
I will also take this opportunity to remind us of the prominent role
tonight’s speaker played in bringing about an end to the atrocities and enforc-
ing the peace in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was our [Czech] participation in
the peacemaking activities in the Balkans that paved our way to NATO in 1999.
She has always been tough on dictators and strong promoter of democracy.
Finally, with the help of NATO, Milosevic and Saddam Hussein are out of
power, and the Serbian and Iraqi people have begun to be free; we all think
about their future and are willing to assist them as they progress through the
difficult stages of transition. 
The topic of this conference, “NATO and the Greater Middle East,” links
together two important priorities of Czech foreign policy – our interest in
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keeping NATO in business, effective, and involved, and our active policy in the
Middle East – I was therefore glad to provide the auspices for this important
conference. 
Symbolically, both NATO and the Middle East were two major areas of
your activities in the U.S. government, Madame Secretary. For your significant
contribution to opening NATO’s door to the Czech Republic and other former
Warsaw Pact countries is undeniable and for that, we shall always remain
grateful to you. Your relentless efforts to bring peace to the Middle East – high-
lighted by your attempts to broker a final deal between the Israelis and
Palestinians in the summer of 2002. Unfortunately, the historical momentum
of the work has been lost to rejections of far reaching compromises. 
As we all well know, there have been many peace plans, but good inten-
tions and plans are insufficient. Without sufficient political courage and deter-
mination – consistent characteristics of your remarkable political career – dif-
ficult initiatives can never succeed. Tonight, it is my honor and pleasure to
welcome our speaker, Madeleine Albright.
The Road Map: Is it For Real?
Madeleine Albright
Good evening, it is wonderful to be back here in Prague and to see so many
friends and familiar faces. It is an honor to be present amidst such a distin-
guished gathering in such a magnificent setting. 
Michael Žantovský is a dear friend and a person I deeply admire. I was
delighted to accept his invitation to participate in this conference. Of course, I
didn’t know then that I would be expected to follow Václav Havel to the podi-
um or that my assignment would be to say something new and interesting
about the Middle East. These tasks are not difficult, they are impossible. Even
saying that, however, does not give me a way out, since a collection of President
Havel’s speeches s entitled “The Art of Impossible.” In other words, just because
something cannot be done is no excuse for failing to try. President Havel sets
a standard far above my grasp, but I can refuse him nothing. So I will do my best.
The topic of my remarks, as listed in the program, is “The Road Map: Is it
for Real?” This title was selected by the conference organizers several months
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ago in hopes that the answer would be plainly positive. At the time, there were
many who believed the ouster of Saddam Hussein would open the door to
rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement between the Palestinians and
Israel. According to the theory, anti-Israeli terrorists would be shocked by
American resolve, so disheartened by the ouster of Saddam, and so impressed
by the creation of a democratic and stable Iraq, they would rapidly shrivel up.
The support of other Arabs for Palestinian extremists would cease, reform-
minded Palestinians would take charge, and the peace process could go for-
ward.
This optimistic thinking has shaped U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East for
at least the past year and a half. With this attention centered on Iraq, the Bush
administration has limited its involvement in Middle East diplomacy, ignored
Chairman Arafat, and placed great faith in the short-lived appointment of
Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian prime minister.
Less than two moths ago, the President’s National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice said that all was going according to plan: “We have seen real
progress toward peace for Israelis and Palestinians,” she said in a speech.
“Israeli leaders increasingly understand that this is in Israel’s interest for
Palestinians to govern themselves, in a state that is viable, peaceful, democratic,
and committed to fighting terror. [And] a new Palestinian leadership is emerg-
ing that understands – and says, in Arabic and English – that terror is not a
means to Palestinian statehood, but rather the greatest obstacle to statehood.”
Unfortunately, between then and now, not much has gone right. Caught
between the hammer of Ariel Sharon and the anvil of Yasser Arafat, Prime
Minister Abbas resigned despite backing from the United States, Europe and
the UN. The new government, handpicked by Arafat, has neither the inclination
nor the clout to confront Hamas and other terrorist groups, at least not now.
Meanwhile, terrorist attacks have continued and the Israelis have struck
back not only on the West Bank but also against symbolic targets in Syria. Israeli
leaders are one more talking about removing Arafat from the scene. Work is
proceeding on a security fence that is already provoking a new round of Arab
and Palestinian outrage. There is little evidence that the war in Iraq has altered
Arab thinking about the Middle East and no sign that the ability of Hamas and
other terrorist groups to recruit volunteers has diminished. As for Arafat, his
health may be weak, but his support among Palestinians appears as strong now
as it has ever been. It is, all in all, a dismal picture.
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A decade ago, the world was focused on a different picture, that of Yitzhak
Rabin and Yasser Arafat shaking hands on the White House lawn, launching the
Oslo peace process. I will never forget that moment. For the first time, Israelis
and Palestinians pledged to become partners in peace, to acknowledge the
legitimate rights of the other, and to find a way to live as neighbors.
President Clinton called it a brave gamble that the future could be made
better than the past. Chairman Arafat talked about the courage required to
build coexistence and peace. And Prime Minister Rabin spoke directly to the
Palestinian people, “We are destined to live together on the same soil in the
same land,” he declared. “We, the soldiers who have returned from battle
stained with blood; we who have seen our relatives and friends killed before
their eyes;...we who come from a land where parents bury their children; we
who have fought against you, the Palestinians – we say to you today, in a loud
and clear voice, enough of blood and tears, enough.”
Within a year, Israel and Jordan has made peace. Some form of negotia-
tion or promising contact was opened between Israel and every Arab state
except Iraq and Libya. Regional economic conferences were convened during
which Israelis and Arabs cordially discussed plans for creating jobs, luring
investment and expanding trade. The momentum toward peace was stringer
than at any time since the founding of the state of Israel. 
Unfortunately, the Oslo process was designed for Yitzhak Rabin.
Although Middle East negotiations are never easy, Rabin’s character and large-
ness of spirit served as a kind of lubricant to discussion. Unlike some Israeli
leaders, he refused to let terrorists dictate the ebb and flow of the peace
process. We must negotiate a peace as if there were no terror, he said. And
ewe must fight terror as if there were no negotiations. Domestically, Rabin
had the military credentials required to survive politically as a champion of
peace. He did not, however, survive literally. Israel has its own terrorists and
on November 4, 1995, one of them murdered this good man whose wife fell
in love with him because he had, she said, “the eyes of David.”
When I became Secretary of State in 1997, the Israeli prime minister
was Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu did not believe in the Oslo approach.
He did not believe Israel could be secure in the presence of a Palestinian
state encompassing more than a fraction of the West Bank. He told me quite
frankly that, in the absence of peace, Israelis expected to fight, and pre-
ferred to do so when the Palestinians were relatively weak. His views were
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reinforced when Palestinian terrorists struck twice during the summer of
1997.
During this period, the Israelis and Palestinians essentially ceased talking
to each other. Instead, they spent their time yelling at us. This was when I
learned how frustrating it could be trying to deal with Chairman Arafat.
Arafat’s entire life has been dedicated to the Palestinian cause. That is both his
strength and his problem. The Oslo Process required that he transform himself
from professional victim to partner in peace. It also required him to settle
down on the West Bank and administer a government, instead of traveling
around the Arab world being treated like a prince. 
He never made the transition. His government was riddled with corrup-
tion; he locked the emergence of democratic leaders. He did nothing to prepare
his constituency for the compromises needed to achieve peace. Instead of try-
ing to defeat Palestinian terrorist groups, he sought simply to coopt. And three
years ago at Camp David, he turned down the best deal Palestinians are ever
likely to be offered. 
The only way out of this mess is if both sides think honestly about how
they got into it. If the Palestinians had firmly and decisively rejected terror
when the Oslo process began, they would have their state today and it would
be both viable and contiguous.
They would have their seat in the United Nations, their airport, their abil-
ity to travel freely and reason to look forward to the future with hope. Nothing
has done more to discredit Palestinian aspirations than terror.
There is, of course, no moral equivalence between bulldozers and bombs.
But if the Israelis had only built settlements truly needed for security, they
might or might not live in peace today, but they would surely have more inter-
national friends on whom they could count. Nothing has done more than
expanding settlements to gratify Palestinian terrorists and deprive Israel of
diplomatic strength. The question now is whether the two sides will ever come
to a point where they can agree on the terms of peace.
Last summer, the Pew Global attitudes survey found that eighty percent
of Palestinians believe the answer to that question is no. They simply do not
think Israel’s right to exist is consistent with the realization of their own
rights. And given their definition of those rights, they are correct. No Israeli
government is going to return every inch of lands taken during the 1967 war,
or recognize the unfettered right of Palestinian refugees to return to their
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home. Unless those expectations are modified, or the issues somehow side-
stepped, the vision of a viable Palestinian state and Israel existing side by side
is indeed a pipedream.
During my years as Secretary of State, I believed Palestinians would
indeed settle for less; now I am not so sure. Arafat told me at Camp David that
if he accepted what Israel was offering, he would be killed by his own people.
Israeli Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Barak both told me they could not sur-
vive politically if they made further concessions to the Palestinians. No one was
more skilled at finding words to bridge differences than our chief negotiator,
Dennis Ross. But even he could not conjure up language that would make fun-
damental differences go away.
And since the Clinton team left office, the Israelis and Palestinians have
grown steadily further apart. Dislike has been replaced by loathing. Lack of con-
fidence has grown into a total absence of trust. The desperate nature of the situ-
ation has prompted calls by some for an international peacekeeping presence in
the region. Some speak of a NATO force moving in to prevent terrorists from
operating in Gaza and the West Bank. Some envision a United Nations force that
would shield Palestinians from Israeli strikes. Some see an American force that
would patrol borders and keep the peace, while preventing a new Palestinian
state from receiving prohibited arms. Some propose a combination of all of the
above.
When it comes to the Middle East, I would never say “never” to anything.
Nothing has worked, so everything should be considered. But it is difficult at
this moment to envision an international deployment without the consent of
both parties. And hard to envision both parties agreeing on what the purpose
of such deployment might be.
The Middle East Road map was produced seventeen moths ago by the
quartet of Russia, the EU, the UN and the United States. Is it for real? 
Yes, of course, as a statement of goals, it is for real. But as a statement of
genuine intent, it is not. Neither of the parties has taken it seriously and the
White House has done little to push it. Brief bursts of high-level attention fol-
lowed by long periods of drifts are not sufficient. 
I know from experience that progress in the Middle East, even under the
best of circumstances, requires constant, painstaking diplomacy. It demands
a willingness to take the heat, to confront obstacles head-on, and to endure the
endless posturing and gamesmanship masterfully practiced by both sides.
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During the past two and three-quarter years, we have not seen that kind of com-
mitment.
Yes, the development of the Road Map was a constructive step, but the dif-
ference between words and actions in that part of the world is like the differ-
ence between a human being and its shadow. The truth is we are witnessing a
massive failure of leadership in the Middle East by Palestinians, Israelis and
Americans. Part of this is a failure of analysis. The idea that ousting Saddam
Hussein was a necessary precursor and likely to spur the progress toward an
Israeli-Palestinian peace is highly questionable. a stable and democratic govern-
ment in Iraq would provide many benefits to the region, but resolving the
issues that divide Palestinians from Israelis is not one of them. In fact, this is a
picture that might make more sense if turned upside down.
According to a recent report commissioned by the US State Department,
opposition to American policies has reached “shocking levels” in the Arab and
Muslim worlds. This hostility is making it harder for the U.S. to make progress
in Iraq. And the biggest cause of this hostility is the perception that the White
House does not care enough about what happens in the Middle East. 
Mostly, however, this has been a failure of vision. Unlike Yitzhak Rabin
and Jordan’s late King Hussein, there is no regional leader of stature who
understands that current modes of thinking on both sides have to change not
to benefit one or the other, but to realize the core aspirations of both. Two
groups of people are clashing for control of this tiny area between the Jordan
River and the Mediterranean Sea. For reasons of history, geography and
demography, the clash is intense, bitter and prolonged. But what does this
mean?
I fear that, to those currently in charge, it means that for either to survive,
one side must destroy the viability of the other. I believe it means the reverse –
that neither side can survive trying to destroy the other. 
President Havel has sometimes cited the example of a Hindu legend con-
cerning a mythical bird called Berunda. The bird has a single body, but two
heads and two minds. After an eternity together, the two heads begin to hate
one another. In their eagerness to inflict harm upon their enemy, they swallow
pebbles and drink poison. Naturally, the whole bird lapses into convulsions and
dies. Krishna restores it to life as a reminder that hatred is not only destructive
but self-destructive, as well. That is an important lesson, but not always easy to
bear in mind.
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During my years as Secretary of State, there were half a dozen suicide
bombings on Israeli soil. Each was an occasion for shock, capturing the
world’s attention, as families mourned and victims were buried. I thought it
horrible, but it was nothing compared to the anguish we have felt since as
new bombings and retaliatory killings have been reported nearly every
week. Many people say now there is no hope; and that Israelis and
Palestinians can never live together, unless one side is crushed or the other
pushed into the sea. 
Despite all the bloodshed, or perhaps because of it, I still do not believe
that. And we should not accept it. Because the truth is there is nothing
inevitable about murder and mayhem in the Middle East. To strap a bomb
around your waist and blow yourself up amidst a crowd of civilians – that is
a choice. To glorify murderers as martyrs is a choice. To teach children to hate
is a choice. To dehumanize and disrespect the dignity of others is a choice. To
refuse to negotiate seriously and in good faith is a choice.
These are all choices, and what people have the capacity to choose, they
have the ability to change. We cannot make the choices for those who live in
the Middle East. But we can confront and rebut those who rationalize and
make excuses for terror, who say that targeting and murdering innocent peo-
ple is a legitimate form of armed struggle.
It is not. Like genocide, ethnic cleansing, slavery and racism, terrorism is
illegitimate and wrong not sometimes but always! Those who draw a distinc-
tion between terrorism as practiced by Al-Qaeda and terrorism as practiced by
Hamas or the Al-Aqsa brigades are moral cowards and intellectual hypocrites.
The murder of civilians in the name of a political cause is still murder. Changing
the name of the act does not change its repugnant nature. That is why Europe
did the right thing when it agreed to place Hamas on its terrorism blacklist, not
because Hamas lacks a social dimension, but because having a social dimension
does not redeem a terrorist organization. 
In this era, we have to draw clear lines, because we cannot afford the lux-
ury of fine lines. There can be no excuse for knowingly providing money sup-
port or sanctuary to any organization that engages in terrorism. The plain fact
is that the Palestinians must reject terror not because outsiders want them to,
but because terror far more than Israel is the enemy of the Palestinian people
– destructive not only of its economy and territorial hopes, but also its very
soul.
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America, Europe, the Arab world and Palestinian moderates must all work
to create a Palestinian consensus that excludes and excoriates terror. As long as
murders are hailed as heroes, there can be no real peace, nor any Palestinian
state is worthy of the name. 
The Israelis, too, must be wary of the impact of their own policies of
aggressive self-defense. Golda Meir said once she blamed Arabs less for killing
Israelis than for making it necessary for Israelis to kill. Israel has a right to pro-
tect itself against terror, and the need at times to take – yes – preemptive
actions. But it should never forget that it is destined to live next door to the
Palestinians forever, sharing the same land. It is a dangerous illusion to believe
there is a military solution to that.
So even while defending itself, Israel must hold open the door to peace.
a strategy designed to demoralize and drive Palestinians to despair will only
backfire. Creating facts on the ground that are incompatible with a realistic
peace undermines Israel’s claim to global sympathy and support. Progress
toward peace depends on each side helping the other show the benefits of
cooperation. The reason Mahmoud Abbas resigned is that he had little to show
his people and certainly not enough to outmaneuver Arafat. His departure was
a defeat for Israelis and Palestinians alike.
The Middle East Road Map is supposed to lead to an independent, demo-
cratic and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with
Israel and its other neighbors. Like the Oslo process, the Road Map depends on
both sides agreeing that there is no military solution to this conflict. Like Oslo,
it is based on the principle of land for peace, enshrined in the UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Like Oslo, it hinges on the growth of trust
between the two sides, on the evolution of confidence that promises made
will become promises kept. Like Oslo, it calls upon the world community to
support peace and to help alleviate the dire economic conditions in Gaza and
the West Bank. As the similarities suggest, the general shape of a viable Israeli-
Palestinian peace is no great mystery. 
The Road Map resembles in many ways outline of a peace plan put for-
ward in 2001 by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah. It is compatible with
recommendations produced earlier that year by a team headed by former U.S.
Senator George Mitchell and EU Secretary General Javier Solana. It is similar in
many respects to the proposal offered by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David
in 2000. It is even consistent in form with a plan presented by American
141
THE ROAD MAP: IS IT FOR REAL?
President Ronald Reagan in 1982. There is a reason why proposals for Middle
East peace do not go away even in the face of terror and violence. The human
desire for peace is a durable thing. It can be pounded and crushed and kicked
and set on fire, but like the Old Testament’s Burning Bush, it is not consumed.
I am convinced, even now, that the vast majority of Israelis and Palesti-
nians yearn to move in the direction of peace, if only they had leaders with the
guts required to reach out to the populations of the other, and the wisdom to
guide their own people in the only direction that will ever make either side
secure.
Eight years ago next week, in Jerusalem, Yitzhak Rabin was buried.
Visiting the Holy City for the first time since he was a little boy, Jordan’s King
Hussein spoke at the funeral of his friend. “Let us not keep silent,” he said. “Let
our voices rise high to speak of our commitment to peace for all times to come,
and let us tell those who live in darkness and who are the enemies of life, that
this is where we stand. This is our camp.”
It has been said that if you begin by doing what is necessary, and then pro-
ceed to do what is possible, you may suddenly find that you have accomplished
the impossible. After what we have witnessed these past few years, a compre-
hensive Middle East peace is clearly impossible. Which is all the more reason to
raise our voices high so that those with good will on both sides will hear and
understand that they are not alone. We will stand with those who stand for
peace because this is our camp and because we have all seen enough of blood
and tears, enough.
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PANEL III: THE ROLE
OF NATO IN DEMOCRACY
BUILDING IN THE GME
Michael Žantovský
The subject of this session is Democracy and NATO and the potential role of
NATO in democracy building. As far as I’m concerned, the subject can be
broken down into two questions. The first is whether democracy is desirable
everywhere in the Middle East. This might sound trivial, but I’m sure we
have all noticed that there are some people who point out that hasty democ-
racy building carries risks with it. The sub-questions to that are as follows: is
the Western model of democracy the only possible democratic model? Is this
model inseparably linked to Western civilization? Is there a danger of a
Huntingtonian clash of civilizations if we try to impose this model on other
regions and other civilizations, and is it inseparably linked to culture and his-
tory, or is it transportable? Furthermore, is it compatible with other ideolog-
ical systems, above all, religious ideological systems? Is democracy possible
without the separation of church and state, which had preceded the devel-
opment of democracy in Europe? We often forget that the wars of reforma-
tion, which made the separation of state and church possible in Europe, did
so at a very high price of perhaps one quarter of the population in this part
of the world. 
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The second question is: does the effort to build democracy in areas like
the Greater Middle East increase security or decrease security? Some say these
efforts increase security because, as has been often said, “democratic nations”
do not wage war against each other. Others suggest that efforts to build
democracy in these areas decrease security because they create the clashes of
identities and cultures. Also, they bring about the possibility of a democratic
ascent of Islamist regimes that may not be totally committed to democratic
ideas. Sitting in this place it may be wise to remember that after World War II
the communists came to power in this country through a democratic election
in 1946, and there was hell to pay for the next 40 years. 
Now, as to the role of NATO, I think it was Mark Heller who said yester-
day that NATO has no role in democracy building, and I would beg to differ
with him on this point. In our experience at least, countries that associate
themselves with NATO as full members, part of the Membership Action
Program, or within the Partnership for Peace framework invariably did so to
increase their own security. Security in this part of the world is a very much
valued commodity and it is the net benefit for those countries. In exchange for
security, they had to accept some restrictions on their behavior and these
restrictions, while not necessarily connected with democracy building, are
generally conducive to more, not less, democracy. They include civilian over-
sight of the armed forces, which makes the democratic transition easier, shar-
ing of information between NATO member countries or PfP countries, which
leads to more transparency, and managing their border and ethnic disputes.
I believe that were it not for the wish to join NATO, there would be no ethnic
Hungarians in the Romanian government and some of the disputes between
neighboring countries would still be more acute than they are today. There is
also the secularizing influence of NATO. It is hard to imagine a NATO member
country without the separation of the army from the church, and the separa-
tion of the army from the church is impossible without the separation of the
state from the church. Lastly, not only does democracy increase security
because “democracies do not go to war against each other,” but also diminish-
ing external threats to security enables governments to be more liberal domes-
tically. While this is not always the case, in this sense, democracy, or increased
democracy, is also a byproduct of security. It is also possible to argue the oppo-
site: that security is a byproduct of democracy. There is an empirical body of
evidence on the points about which I have been talking. All we have to do is
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look at the fifty years of NATO’s history starting with Germany, then countries
like Spain or Portugal, and obviously, countries like Turkey or Greece, and the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and most recently Romania, Bulgaria
and Slovakia, the countries of the next round of NATO enlargement. While
there is no direct link, there is a beneficial influence of NATO on democracy
building, and I hope that the debate that will ensue does not entirely disprove
that point. 
I have a very distinguished panel of experts, friends, and scholars, and
we will start with Arial Cohen. From his biography it is clear that he was once
a member of very large and profitable industry called Kremlinology. Also, he
has been a research fellow in Russian and Euro-Asian studies at the Davis
Studies Institute of the Heritage Foundation. He is also a policy advisor to the
National Institute of Public Policy, and a consultant advising USAID, the World
Bank, the US government, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He is the
author of a number of very interesting essays and articles, has frequently testi-
fied before committees of the US Congress, and regularly has pieces on major
news networks. 
Arial Cohen
Thank you, Ambassador Žantovský, for aptly reading the self-promoting bio
that I wrote about myself. I asked to be first because this is the second night in
a row that I have only slept for four hours; this is bad jet lag. I am afraid that
either I will fall asleep, or you will fall asleep; it is Sunday after all. Thank you
all very much for being here, and thank you, Ambassador Žantovský, for invit-
ing me. This is a wonderful city and a wonderful building; we are all privileged
to be here. 
As I was fighting my jet leg I was thinking about the symbolism of
Prague to the topic I am going to talk about and that’s fighting for hearts and
minds in the war against radical Islamic terrorism. Prague is an example of
how a city and a people in a time and place can trigger a chain of events that
lead to tremendous historic results. In 1968 when the Soviets invaded after
the Prague Spring, a very small group of Soviet dissidents came out to the
Red Square before the Kremlin, and this was the first demonstration of dis-
sent in the Soviet Union and that movement eventually led to the deteriora-
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tion of the Soviet ideology that held the empire together. Then, here in
Prague in 1977, a bunch of Czech dissidents signed Charter 77 and again,
that was a historic event that triggered another chain of events that led to
ascendancy of power to the man who gave the luncheon address yesterday,
President Vaclav Havel. President Havel fought in the realm of ideas and won
in the realm of ideas. The Russian dissidents including people like Andrei
Sakharov, Anatoly Sharansky, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn fought one of the most
inhuman ideologies of the 20th century, and there was a very interesting
interaction between the people who articulated the ideology over there and
we in the West who provided an echo chamber for the Sakharovs and the
Solzhenitsyns. For months now I have been saying to my wife and to any-
body who would listen, when will the Sakharovs and the Solzhenitsyns of
the Islamic world be celebrated by the West? Well, God heard my prayers. a
brave Iranian Islamic lawyer, a woman, was given a Nobel Peace Prize, and
we are in the beginning of the process that hopefully will lead to changes as
fundamental as the changes the dissidents who were demonstrating against
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did. I hope these changes will hap-
pen during my lifetime, and having lived through the collapse of the USSR,
there will be another event I feel privileged to witness – the dissolution of
the radical, anti-Western, human-hating ideology that drives the terrorism
that we are facing today. 
To get to the ideological sources of the terrorism that we are facing today,
you really have to go back to earlier chapters of Islamic history. One of the
problems of this community, or the majority of people in this community,
who come out of European security studies, Russian studies, etc. is our lack of
familiarity with Islamic history, with the Arabic language, and with Islam. The
ideological roots of terrorism are deep – the sect in the 8th century, the Hasha-
shin group, who created the term of assassin from Hashashin, those who
smoked hashish and then in the state of narcotic trance attacked and killed
people, and the writings of those, such as Ibn Tamiya, who delegitimize rulers
in Islam. These are the predecessors of the two or three main ideological
trends that spawned radical terrorism. The three main trends are the Islamic
Brotherhood, the second would be the Salafi, or as we know them the Wahabi
sect, and the third is radical interpretation of Shiism. The terrorism, putting
aside secular types, we are facing comes from either one of these three sects.
If it is Hezbollah, it’s Shia; if it is Al-Qaeda, it’s Wahabi, and if it is Hamas, it is
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the Islamic Brotherhood. The main common denominator of these sects is the
negation of the West, of non-believers, the kuffar, as well as those Arab rulers
who are not seen as true Islamic rulers, and the extremists believe that the
blood of these rulers is permitted. Two examples, His Royal Highness Prince
Hassan’s grandfather, King Abdullah of Jordan, was assassinated in the mosque
in Jerusalem in 1952 by an assassin from the Muslim brotherhood. And Presi-
dent Sadat was assassinated by the group that Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama
bin Laden’s number two man, was in charge of, and then, Gamaa Islamiya
merged with Al-Qaeda. The sources of funding for these groups are numerous;
they primarily come out of the Gulf, but they also come from the diaspora,
from the Umma, including Europe and the United States. The United States is
working with the governments of European allies and other countries to try to
intercept the sources of funding, but it is a very difficult proposition. More-
over, the ideology of Jihad is a pretty consistent ideology; it is anti-Western,
negates democracy, women’s rights, human rights, and ethnic and religious
minority rights. For example, the Wahabis don’t really recognize a number of
other Islamic sects, such as the Sufi, and in some cases, the Shia, as legitimate
sects.
But this is far from being the only voice in the Islamic world. The moder-
ate Muslims from Arab countries, from Pakistan, and Indonesia are an under-
represented minority, possibly even a silent majority – of the Islamic world.
But they are with the exception of Turkey very weak in formulating an agenda
of moderate Islam which is compatible with the West. In many places it is a
combination of deficiencies of state, control of the media and an education
system that tends to allow radical preachers to preside over madrassas. Madras-
sas are Islamic academies which, in some cases, brainwash kids – sometimes
as young as five. Of course, the extreme case was the Taliban regime in Afgha-
nistan, but there are similar examples from Pakistan and from the Gulf. The
translation of the first great Pashtu textbook demonstrates what I am talking
about. Here are a few sample sentences. “Ahmad has a sword. He performs
Jihad with his sword.” To teach the word weapon the author used: “My uncle
has a weapon. He performs Jihad with his weapon.” The book says Jihad is obli-
gation for everyone and that growing a beard is mandatory. The Palestinian
Authority K to 12 (kindergarten to twelve) Guerilla training summer camps
are another example of a combination of radical ideology and a perversion of
religion that is used to create a generation of suicide bombers and fighters. 
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What can be done? I think that the instrumentality of the Cold War has
to be rethought, reinvented, and deployed in the battle of hearts and minds.
The reports from the US State Department are negative, but this is done
against the base line of government propaganda in the Muslim world that
blames the West for structural and social failures that have to be addressed
through reform from within the Muslim society. In addition to that there is a
lack of the political action component in the intelligence community in the
United States. That political action component was abandoned in the 70s
under Congressional investigations and some failures. This was a long time
ago; we have to rethink not just international broadcasting, exchanges, and
education, but also political action. This can be done overtly where possible
and covertly where necessary. 
Let me just tie this to NATO because the security and ideological compo-
nent are closely tied with it. NATO has the Partnership for Peace program in
Central Asia. Although, we have spoken very little about Central Asia here, I
would be very happy to answer any questions about Central Asian dilemmas
on the authoritarian governments that do not allow either a modern Islamic
alternative or secular alternative for themselves. NATO has effective officer
training and officer exchange programs that are possibly under–utilized vis-a-
vis Islamic countries. Also, to some extent, NATO has a voice and influence
with the foreign ministries, the defense ministries, and the security services,
and thus, with the governments. The prevention of radical Islamic terrorism is
a good investment so that less budgetary allocations will be needed in the
future to fight terrorism on the battlefield.
Michael Žantovský
The next speaker is Olivier Roy, a well-known name in debates and discus-
sions about the Middle East. He is the Research Director of the Humanities
and Social Sciences sector of the French National Center for Scientific
Research in Paris and has been a consultant for the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs since 1984. He undertook a number of trips to Afghanistan
during the times of the Russian invasion and the Mujaheddin. He was a spe-
cial representative of the OSCE in Tadjikistan in 1993 and 1994. He is a well-
known author, lecturer and speaker.
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Olivier Roy
We’ve just spoken about the background of routing democracy in the Middle
East. What does this mean? First, I would say forget comparisons. Forget about
the idea that we can look at the German paradigm in 1945, the Latin American
paradigm, and the examples of Kosovo and Bosnia and so on. We have a very
specific situation in the Middle East, and there are three problems that are tied
with the issue of democracy. The first problem is nationalism. The second is
the social fabric, and the third is Islam. Of course, people would like to have
democracy. If you conducted an opinion poll in Iraq, Nigeria, Morocco, or any-
where else, people would say, “yes, we love democracy, we want democracy.”
The issue is not democracy in some abstract sense; the third issue is how to
teach people to work for democracy and to do this we have to address these
three issues. 
The first issue is nationalism. There will be no possibility for democracy
to take root if some basic nationalistic requests are not granted. We have to
take nationalism into consideration. It is very clear with the Palestinians.
Arafat is not popular; he is corrupt and all the Palestinians know this. However,
they want to keep him as their last symbol of nationalism. The Palestinian peo-
ple are a sophisticated people and are ready for democracy, but not until natio-
nalism has been addressed. Nationalism in Iraq is also very important; it is the
main issue for Arab Iraqis who want to have some sort of Arab Iraqi national
state. The Kurdish Iraqis wish to have some sort of Kurdistan. If we don’t
address nationalism, forget about rooting democracy. 
The second issue is the social fabric of the area, often called tribalism.
I don’t like to use this term because “tribe” is a very specific concept, but let’s
use the term tribalism in a loose meaning. People used to stick to their primary
group for loyalty, solidarity, political action; this primary group could be
a clan, a tribe a small ethnic group, an extended family, or the work of a
patron/client relationship. We have some sort of a linkage between tribalism
and dictatorship. The mistake about the Middle East is to consider, for exam-
ple, that Saddam Hussein had a totalitarian state. No, it was a bloody dictator-
ship, not a totalitarian state. Ideology didn’t play a role in Iraq. Saddam Hussein
was very clever to play on tribalism. When you have a dictatorship, you usual-
ly have a reinforcement of traditional solidarities. It is both a way to protect
the family against dictatorship and a way to try to find its way through the dic-
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tatorship by trying to connect one’s own group with the state apparatus. This
is how it is now in Nigeria. The army is playing on the segmentation of the
society, and the people are playing on networks to connect themselves to the
army. The problem is how to break this link between the authoritarian state
and tribalism. The right way to do this is not to suddenly institute a democra-
cy tomorrow morning, but to start the process of opening the political scene
through freedom of expression, the freedom to have political parties, and
legitimate elections. The idea is to let a class of political leaders who are not
working just to enhance the interests of their primary group over time. But to
do that we need legitimacy, and there is no legitimacy without taking nation-
alism into account. So we are back to nationalism. 
The third issue is Islam and democracy. I may be in the minority, but I do
not believe that political Islam is still a challenge in the Middle East. It was a
challenge 20 years ago when the idea was that Islam is the solution. “Let’s have
an Islamic state and everything will be okay.” It didn’t work; it doesn’t work; it
will not work, and people know it. It is an absolute failure in Iran. In Algeria
the opposition to the regime is not an Islamic opposition; demonstrators on
the street of Algiers are not shouting “Islam, Koran,” they are shouting demo-
cracy and freedom. What we see now in Egypt and Palestine, and what we will
see in Iraq, is a mix of Islamism and nationalism. In Egypt when you read an
article it is very difficult to know if the guy who wrote the article is a conser-
vative Islamist or a leftist nationalist – you have the same anti-American mood
and occasionally the same anti-Semitic mood. You only know whether the guy
is the Islamist only when you see him; if he wears the beard, he is an Islamist.
When Professor Ibn Ibrahim was jailed sometime ago for promoting freedom
and democracy in Egypt, he was not supported by his fellow secular, leftist
intellectuals because most of them felt that because he got some money from
the Americans he was a traitor. So for them, nationalism, not democracy, was
the main issue. 
If we look at the Islamic movements, they are going in two different
directions. The first direction is assimilation into the political process. We
have Islamic parties who are now accepting democracy not as an ideology, but
as the rules of the game. In Morocco, in Jordan, in Kuwait, and if they were
allowed to do so, in Egypt, most of the Muslim brothers would be slowly con-
verting to what they would call a Muslim-Christian democracy. They are not
ideological democrats, but if we wait to build democracy, until everyone is
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a democrat, we will never have a democracy. Democracy is not made of
democrats. In France, we have lived for one century with more than a third of
the electorate voting for non-democratic parties, from the Communist Party to
some extre-mist parties. We have to work with non-democrats; the idea that
one should exclude the radical Islamists is nonsense. If we exclude them, then
the political scene will never be open. Iran is a good example of this. Who are
the democrats in Iran? They are former revolutionaries; the so-called liberals
in Iran are the same people who incited the revolution. And when they speak
about the failure of the revolution, they know what they are speaking about.
Of course, it took 20 years to get to this point, but it is also something we have
to take into consideration. All these processes need time. As I said, the
Islamists are going in two directions, and one is this integration of the politi-
cal process. I don’t speak about democratization; it is the integration of the
political systems that we have to push for. 
The second direction is radical internationalism. It is interesting to see
that Islamic political violence has decreased in the Middle East when it has
increased outside the Middle East. I don’t consider Hamas to be Islamic politi-
cal violence – Hamas and Jihad in Palestine are Shia nationalists. However, it is
also difficult to differentiate between an Islamic suicide bomber and a secular
bomber. The result is the same, and the motivation is the same. Most of the
Islamic political violence happens outside the Middle East by people, many of
whom, including Mr. bin Laden, come from the Middle East, but who stay away
from Middle-Eastern politics. International Islamic terrorism is not an issue in
the Middle East; it’s an issue outside the Middle East. We have to address the
human actors, the political actors of the Middle East. How to do that?
Fortunately enough, my time is running out because I do not have ready-made
recipes. 
There is one danger. The danger is the mistake we made, meaning the
West or everybody, in Egypt with Ibn Ibrahim. That is to say, focusing on one
sort of liberal, democratic, intellectuals and making these people the only sup-
porters of democracy, which may come sooner or later. In doing that we are
creating some sort of nature reserve for the protection of an endangered
species: the democratic intellectual. We are not helping the true process. The
idea is to root democratization into the social fabric, into the real society. For
that we have to take into account what is moving the people. What do they
want? We have to address the human concerns.
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Finally, we have to begin with taking into consideration nationalism
and legitimacy. It’s a big issue in Iraq. The American position is that we
need some time to establish security and to bring the economy back, and
then, when everything is okay in the society, then yes, of course, we’ll let
the true Iraqi government emerge. In my opinion, this is not the right way.
The Iraqi people want a legitimate government now. The policemen are wil-
ling to die for some legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is absolutely essen-
tial. The central issue is not improving the economy or opening the market.
It’s good to improve the economy, I have nothing against improving the
economy, but there is no automatic linkage with democratization and
improving the economy. 
Michael Žantovský
Joshua Muravchik is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
and a specialist in US foreign policy and international relations. He has written
extensively about subjects like democracy, the role of ideas and ideologies in
international politics, America’s role in the post-Cold War world, etc. His most
recent book, my favorite, is a history of socialism, called “The Heaven on
Earth.” Joshua is also a member of our advisory board and has been a friend of
mine for many years.
Joshua Muravchik
First let me say thanks to you Michael and to Sasha, Olda and Jiří, for having
created this new organization which may play a tremendously important role
in holding, or re-stitching, together the Atlantic Community that has come
under enormous strains in this last year. And thanks for putting on this very
interesting conference and for honoring me with a place on the program. I
thank you somewhat less warmly for making me the twenty-fourth speaker, if
my count is right, and which inclines me to want to begin my remarks with a
kind of apology, which is to say that it may be true that everything that needs
to be said at this conference has already been said, but not everyone has yet
had the opportunity to say it. 
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The germaneness of the topic this morning is that the efforts and hope
for democratization in the Middle East is a central piece of the overall
American strategy in the war against terrorism. It is the central part of that
strategy and it is based on the idea that we not just have to confront the terror-
ist groups militarily, but also that we have to try to attack the root causes of ter-
rorism. In contrast to the view articulated by Kofi Annan, among others, soon
after 9/11 that terrorism arises from poverty, as was manifestly demonstrated
in the case of the very rich spoiled boy, Osama bin Laden, and the nineteen
killers who carried out the 9/11 attacks, the American strategy is based on the
belief that the root cause of terrorism is the poisonous political culture of the
Middle East which is entirely based on fanaticism, violence, and fantasy.
Moreover, the best way to change that political culture is to try to bring “the
bomb of democracy” to the region. 
Whether we can succeed in that, nobody knows. It’s a startling fact that
out of the twenty-two Arab states, there are no democracies; whereas out of
the one hundred and seventy other states in the world today, one hundred and
twenty one, over 70 %, are democracies with democratically elected govern-
ments. On the other hand, the skepticism that one can hear expressed today
about the possibilities of the Arabs establishing democracy has been expres-
sed elsewhere. Skeptical evaluations could have been heard a generation or
two ago about all kinds of other countries, cultures, and parts of the world
which today, we take for granted as democratic. For example, it was the offi-
cial assessment of the US Department of State during the Second World War
that it would be impossible to introduce democracy to Japan after the war
because historical experience in Japan had showed that democracy could not
work there. So we get at least some hope that the cogent reasons for skepti-
cism about prospects of Arab democracy will turn out to be no less well-found-
ed than the cogent reasons for skepticism about Japanese democracy. 
The program of trying to bring democracy to the Middle East is a prom-
ising basis for a reinvigoration or renewal of Atlantic cooperation. It’s a task
that gets us around or away from so many of the problems that have beset US-
European relations in these earlier phases of the war on terrorism. For starters,
it’s primarily a program which is non-military and non-violent in nature, and
therefore, we get away from the argument about whether the Americans are
too prone to resort to force quickly. Secondly, it is an area in which the defer-
ential of capabilities disappears. There is the political work that would go into
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trying to spread democracy in this region. It is not expensive, and it does not
require high-tech weaponry. In fact, the European partners bring special
assets to the table that the Americans don’t have; they have larger Muslim po-
pulations, which ought to be an asset in this process. The Europeans of this
part of the world, Central Europe, have recently made a transition to democra-
cy and so have the asset of that recent experience of democratization. This is
also a kind of naturally multilateral activity where the coordination is easy
because it doesn’t require much; if there is agreement on goals, you don’t get
into issues of inter-operability. Everyone’s activities can be complimentary to
everyone else’s. 
What does this project consist of? I think it consists of a handful of ele-
ments, and the cornerstone has to be the success of the project of democratiz-
ing Iraq as a kind of model for the rest of the Arab world. This is a project to
which the new democracies of formerly communist Europe have an opportuni-
ty to bring their recent experiences and knowledge, which is greater than our
own. Beyond that it should entail a campaign to try to support opposition in Iran
and to undermine the most tyrannical and pro-terrorist regimes in the region,
particularly those of Syria and Libya. We should also work to support opposition
movements in exile or however they might be organized. Also, this project inclu-
des working to challenge Syria’s domination of Lebanon, which is illegitimate
and stifles the one country in the Arab world that has had a peculiar kind of
functioning democracy for a period of time. It also should entail a collaborative
relationship with the monarchical regimes of the region, beginning with Jordan,
Kuwait and smaller Gulf sheikdoms who are already cooperating with the West
in other ways and in the war against terrorism. These countries have, in varying
degrees, expressed openness to some liberal reforms. There is a European expe-
rience that the Americans don’t have with monarchical democracy and with the
gradual transition from monarchy to monarchical democracy. There are others,
the difficult cases, which are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These are not only coun-
tries badly in need of democratization, but they are also countries where we
don’t want to just destabilize them and see where the chips fall. However, impor-
tant work can be done in those countries by supporting democrats and finding,
nurturing, encouraging democrats through the creation of, if I understood what
Olivier called them, nature preserves for liberals. 
The overall idea is to create a weight of diplomatic and psychological
pressures on this region on behalf of demands for liberalization and democra-
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tization. Bringing to bear, psychologically, the idea that the only kind of legiti-
macy for governments in the modern world is legitimacy that flows from a
democratic basis. There are also many practical things that can and should be
done both by Americans and Europeans in terms of broadcasting. We all do
radio broadcasting, but none of us, as far as I am aware, have begun to catch-
up with the Al Jazeera revolution which has made television a much more
potent and interesting political communication medium in the region.
Technologically speaking it is not difficult for us to get into that game.
Similarly, the rapid increase in the use of Internet, particularly by young peo-
ple in the region, presents new ways of communicating, even in societies
where the regimes try to restrict communications. Above all else, the key work
of sponsoring democracy in this region or in any region was pointed out to us
by Adam Michnik in the letter that Michael read out at lunch yesterday, and this
is, contrary to what Olivier said, to support democrats. It’s the human capital,
and there are democrats in this region who need and deserve our help. 
I am sure that everyone here is familiar with the Arab Human
Development Report that was published about a year ago by the UN Human
Development Commission which pointed to three deficits in Arab world: free-
dom, information, and women’s participation. It was written by a team of sev-
eral dozen Arabian intellectuals, some living in exile, some in their home coun-
tries. You may not be aware of this, but there is a second Arab Human
Development Report that is going to be issued tomorrow. And that will be fol-
lowed up by a third and fourth report; they are taking up each of their three
recommendations in greater detail. The one issued tomorrow is about the
deficit in knowledge, and what they need to do to correct it. Last week, I
attended a briefing by the authors, and it’s a very interesting and impressive
group of Arab intellectuals who are, no doubt – perhaps because some of them
are in the safety of exile – eager to fight for liberal and democratic ideas in
their region. There are few things more valuable that we can do than to find
ways to support them and the ideas they are proposing, such as a massive pro-
gram of translations of Western books into Arabic. 
Finally, the question that is put to us by the title of this panel, is this a job
for NATO? And the answer to that is I don’t know. It possibly could be, but it
certainly doesn’t fit neatly into NATO’s traditional missions or institutions.
However, whether or not it can be or should be done under a NATO umbrella,
it’s a job for the Atlantic Community. Also it’s a job on which the Atlantic
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Community can be more united than we have been this last year. And there are
very few tasks ahead of us that are more important. 
Michael Žantovský
Steven Everts is a member of the Centre for European Reform, a relatively
young but increasingly influential think tank based in London. He is the direc-
tor of the CER’s transatlantic program which covers the full range of
US/European relations, foreign and security policy, trade issues, financial, and
economic cooperation. His own research focuses on trends in EU foreign pol-
icy both in terms of the policies the EU should pursue and the institutional
reforms that are necessary to make the EU a more influential global actor. He
is also working on how to maintain a close and constructive partnership with
the US.
Steven Everts
Now, the exam question that we are discussing today is: can the United States
and Europe join forces in a common strategy to promote a more liberal, demo-
cratic, and transparent political order in the Greater Middle East? Can we,
together, promote the rule of law, political pluralism, and religious tolerance?
We have to acknowledge that the starting position for such a joint strategy is
not particularly great. In some respects this question reminds me of the famous
story where a gentleman is walking in the Irish countryside, and after a while
he gets sort of thirsty. So he walks up to the farmer and asks him to point him
in the direction of a pub so that he can get a drink. The farmer looks around and
sees hills in every direction, so the farmer says, “If you want to get to a pub, I
wouldn’t start from here.” In some respects, this is also true of the United States
and Europe forging a joint strategy. We have got to do it, and Ron and others,
have laid out the case for doing so in a very compelling manner. However, it’s
an ambitious project. Yet, as Josh has indicated, it can also have a therapeutic
value because this is something that we should be able to agree upon more eas-
ily than some of the sharp ended issues, such as WMD, that we discussed yester-
day. I will structure my thoughts under three headings. The first is very briefly
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recapitulating why we need to do this. Secondly, I will discuss the roles that the
United States and Europe should play. Lastly, I will end with some dos and
don’ts for making a very practical and concrete agenda for moving forward. 
Why do we need to do this? It’s now becoming accepted across the polit-
ical spectrum in the United States, in Europe, and in the region as well that
without a change in the underlining political dynamics that pertain to the
region, the names of the terrorist groups will change from one day to the next
and the rogue states that represent the crisis of the day will change in name. But
we’re dealing with symptoms. We have to be more ambitious and accept that
without a change to the sclerotic political systems, the persisting human rights
violations, and the absence of the rule of law and due process, we are not going
to advance very much. There is, as the Arab Human Development Report has
catalogued, a real crisis of governance that we have to tackle. The good news is
that there is this new consensus emerging not only in this crowd but also
among regional specialists that the status quo of stagnation is untenable, unsus-
tainable and unacceptable because it produces neither security, nor develop-
ment, nor stability. We are in the process of witnessing a paradigm shift. We are
moving from the situation where we privilege political stability, oil supplies,
and markets for arms exports, to a new situation, whereby we privilege politi-
cal pluralism, independent media, and the rule of law. So we at least try to tran-
scend that devil’s choice that we have always faced – either support the sclerot-
ic and authoritarian political order set as it exists or let in radical Islamic
groups. We have got to transcend, and from Britain it might sound slightly tired,
but there has to be a third way. That’s what we have to seek to achieve. Now, the
bad news is that despite this new consensus, we don’t really know how to pro-
mote democracy. We pay lip service to it; we organize conferences about it, but
we don’t really know how to do this. And this brings me to the roles of the
United States and Europe as outsiders. 
There is a danger of a sort of Greek tragedy playing itself out in front of our
eyes. The tragedy might run as follows. The Europeans should be able to play a
leadership role in this exercise, but its also true that within Europe’s political
class there is still a huge amount of ambivalence and skepticism as to whether
this is really doable. On the American side, there is, at least on a level of political
rhetoric, far greater emphasis on democracy as a strategic goal in the context of
the global war on terror. However, from a European point of view, there are two
counterpoints that need to be made. Does the United States realize that it has an
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image problem in the region? The United States has a massive image problem in
the Greater Middle East, and it has to tackle it. That image problem is linked very
directly to a history whereby the United States and also the Europeans, but more
in the perception of the region, the United States, of supporting corrupt but pro-
Western regimes. It’s the Faustian pact that we had. Secondly, America talks a
good game about spreading democracy, but in terms of financial resources it’s
still woefully inadequate. So we could in a caricature say that the Europeans have
the resources and the political base but lack the sense of urgency and the sense
of will for changing the political dynamics of the region. The United States is
ahead of us in strategic vision but may not realize their lack in political standing
and capital as well as resources to some respect.
Lastly, some dos and don’ts. The first dos are primarily aimed at the
Europeans. Do you see politics as changing things, not just managing the status
quo? Europeans particularly need to reacquire the will to initiate and follow
through with policies that seek to bring about political change in the region.
Second: both of us, but particularly the United States, need to spend much more
on civil society projects. The existing programs are far too focused on capital
investment instead of human capital and are far too focused on government-to-
government relationships. We need far better targeting of our existing pro-
grams. I have some limited experience in trying to shift some EU programs
towards those objectives, and it’s very hard to make that case. We also have to
grapple with the vexed question of conditionality. Positive and negative condi-
tionality, whereby we benchmark countries and reward those who make
progress, such as Morocco, must be implemented, but we also have to have the
guts to withdraw support from Lagos, Egypt, and others. Some people say yes,
but that’s deserting the poor. Not so, because there are other delivery mecha-
nisms that we can use the traditional government-to-government mechanisms
that we currently use. Third: support democratic processes, not just individuals.
Avoid the sort of Yeltsin syndrome that we had in the 90s. Also, support out-
comes of democratic processes even if they are unpalatable to you in the short
term. This is particularly true with the Europeans when they grapple with the
Algerian dilemma. The Americans have their Turkish dilemma and the troop
access to Iraq scenario. Fourth: this project needs some sort of institutional
anchoring and expression. Now, NATO will be part of that, but I am sort of with
those who say, “we also need something else.” There are worse places to start
than with these ideas that are floating around of an Arab BFP or some sort of
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OECD for the Middle East. I am sympathetic to that. Nothing, as the famous
European will say, is possible without individuals, but nothing lasts without insti-
tutions. I think we need to set up some sort of institution to give a firmer foot-
ing to this. 
Now some don’ts, they are three. First: avoid the temptation of a rigid divi-
sion of labor where Europe does the Maghreb and America does the Gulf, or
Europe does the Palestinians and America does Israel. There are some inevitable
priorities that both sides have; however, even with a functional division of labor
of hard power, soft power can get out of hand. Second: avoid patronizing atti-
tudes; the sort of approach that “We are going to sort you out, and we know
what’s good for you.” Work with people that are from the region, local reform-
ers, domestic groups, and give them support as Josh and others have said. Avoid
gimmicks such as some sort of a nice magazine that gives the impression that we
talk to Arabs, but are not interested in what they have to say. People in the region
are quite experienced with exposure to propaganda, so they see right through
this. That’s not going work; we’ve got to be slightly more sophisticated in our
public diplomacy, and also make sure that our public diplomacy is aligned with
our actual policies. If you listen to people from the region as to what Europe
offers them, they will say that it offers agriculture protectionism and stringent
visa regimes. Similarly, they have a perception that the United States offers a sort
of iron fist and military interventions, but no stringent visa regimes. Now, we
may think that this is a very incomplete picture, but it suggests the size of the
task ahead. Lastly, don’t despair and become defeatist. This is going to take a gen-
eration or more. There is no quick fix, but we have to start now. I would like to
think that Americans and Europeans don’t just walk away from something
because it”s in the “too-hard-to-do” category. I would argue that even more so
than managing Iraq or forging joint strategies on WMD, necessary as these
things are, a project of promoting political and economic reforms in the region
is both necessary in and of itself and it can also have a beneficial effect on
transatlantic relations.
Michael Žantovský
Amin Tarzi is an analyst for Afghanistan and Iraq and compiles the weekly
Afghanistan report and writes the Afghanistan sections for the Radio Free
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Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Tarzi worked as a
Senior Research Associate for the Middle East at the Center for Nonpro-lifera-
tion Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he
taught a graduate seminar on Middle East security policies and threat percep-
tions. He was also a US marine. 
Amin Tarzi
I want to thank Ron Asmus, as he is the reason I am here. I will talk about
NATO specific issues, and I actually created the title “The Role of NATO and
Democracy Building in Afghanistan: the First Real Test.” I will not talk about
theories and what is possible and what could be done; I will talk about
specifics.
Afghanistan is the very first test of NATO expanding beyond its original,
mandated, or envisioned area. People thought that Kosovo was too much out
of area, but this is way out of area. However, if we look at what we have dis-
cussed, the so called conceptual Greater Middle East, wherever you put the
border, Afghanistan is way out to the east of it. It is not an Arab country as most
of the Middle East is. Yes, it is an Islamic country, but it’s way out in the corner
of it. It’s a very good test case to see what happens.
That stated, just a few peculiars about the Afghanistan mandate where
NATO is now involved. First, Afghanistan has a very clear UN mandate as to
what’s happening there. Second, even without the UN, the coalition called
Operation Enduring Freedom, led by the United States of America, has enor-
mous support. At the time it began, there were eighty-seven countries with a
liaison or some kind of a force structure within the operational aid structure
of the central command in Tampa, Florida before the bombing started on
October 2001. Most of them were volunteers, so Operation Enduring Freedom
was extremely collective, which is not the case in Iraq. Another issue is a clear
road map towards democracy and state building in Afghanistan. Some people
could say that this is too short-sighted or that it puts too many things on the
same table, but there is a very clear statement. The constitution should be writ-
ten by December of this year, general elections should be held by June of 2004,
and then you have democracy. This is all very dandy and good, but the ques-
tion is whether it’s working or not. 
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The second question is, “What is the role of NATO there?” NATO is in
Afghanistan as we speak, and while I’m sure you all know this, I’d like to go
over the list of forces that are in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom is
about 11,500 troops led by the United States, but as we speak, there are many
other nations, some openly, some not so openly, who are working as members
of this coalition. This does include non-NATO members. Then you have ISAF –
the International Security Assistance Force, which until August, was basically
led by three: Turkey, the United Kingdom and Germany. Germany, along with
the Netherlands, joined with about 5,000 people, and they are based in Kabul.
Their area of responsibility does not go beyond what I call Greater Kabul. As
of August, when NATO took over, Canada will be taking over from Germany
very soon. Then you have what is called the ANA, the Afghan National Army,
which is envisaged to be about 75,000 people by 2007. Every expert you can
talk to will say that this will never happen. Right now they have between 4,000
to 4,500 people, most of them in the desert, and nobody knows where their
loyalties are. The national army does not exist as we speak. It is envisaged, but
it does not exist. 
And than you have the old armies. Remnants of the communists are
there. What I call the Old Taliban, the Taliban regime remnants are there. Al-
Qaeda is there. And then something else, it’s a term I coined, the Neo-taliban
are there, too. Who are the Neo-talibans? The Neo-talibans are some Taliban
members, and as Olivier said we cannot look at these things with very clear
divisions, the Neo-talibans also include drug dealers. a lot of these fights are
over drugs. However, because whether they want US cover, or they want
money, they will say the Taliban did this. Also, there is another important part
of the fabric of the society, the disenchanted Pashtuns. I use that word because
the Pasthoons in Afghanistan feel that they are not part of the main political
process. They also go under the name of the Taliban. The Afghan president, or
the chairman of the Afghan transition administration, Hamid Karzai, has made
repeated efforts to get his own people not to call all of them Taliban. He is try-
ing to distinguish between the good and the bad Taliban. He knows that’s what
should be done, but it’s not working because right now the Taliban has a bad
name.
So you have all of these forces, and a drug issue. I want to emphasize the
drug issue in Afghanistan. Last year Afghanistan produced more drugs, than in
any other year. There was a 94 % increase from 2001 to 2002. This is not my
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number, it is from Vienna, from the UN. Those drugs will end up on the streets
of Paris, London, and even Prague, and eventually, maybe immediately in the
United States. That’s another aspect and there is a lot of money being
exchanged there. 
Terrorism and drugs usually go together; then you get money. This is
where NATO is coming in. However, as we look at NATO’s situation right
now, NATO is not coming to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. As I said yester-
day during one of my responses, six ISAF members have been killed by terror-
ist bombs – one was a suicide bomber hitting a bus, which killed four
Germans, and then two Canadians died two weeks ago when a freshly laid
land mine blew up their vehicle. However, Kabul itself is not a hotbed of ter-
rorism. In Kabul things are pretty much going well. People are not being shot,
there are restaurants, and people are functioning. The first expansion of
NATO beyond Kabul is Kunduz – the so-called safe island. If I were a German
soldier, I would take that name very negatively. It’s not a very safe place to
send your troops without much of a notion about what’s going to happen. So
NATO will be going to Kunduz, which sits to the north. It is not a drug pro-
ducing place. There are no major Al-Qaeda, Neo-taliban or Taliban there, so it
is safe relatively. 
The questions that are still unanswered, which I asked some of the pane-
lists, especially Mr. Altenburg, is what the full structure is. What is the com-
mand/control decision on how to integrate the expanding NATO forces with
Operation Enduring Freedom? I don’t think there are answers. What we
heard specifically is that there is a search and rescue system put in place, but
beyond that we don’t know what’s happening. So NATO is facing a real test,
in a real place with a real and very clear mandate, but without a very clear
blueprint. 
What I also want to say about Afghanistan and the situation with
Islamic terrorism or Islamic radical terrorism is that it is not the only enemy.
NATO and most states talk about state structures; they like to have defined
enemies or defined problems. NATO is a very structured, defined organiza-
tion. It needs to have a defined enemy. The Soviet Union was very defined.
We knew exactly where they were, and we even knew where their missile
silos were. It used to be my job to calculate how these things would come in,
where would they hit, and what is their area. While there are some clearly
defined situations like that in Iran, a relatively small country in comparison
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to its neighbor, there are a lot of blurred lines in the region. From day one
when we, meaning the United States and the world, went into Afghanistan,
there were a lot of lines that were blurred. Some of them were blurred by
design; some of them were blurred because people were annoyed about
what was happening in Afghanistan. Today, the allies we have are fighting
against us. I give you a very clear example, and I will go into some recom-
mendations that I have. 
Take the event in Mazare Sharif last week. Mazare Sharif is the third lar-
gest city in Afghanistan; it sits in the north of Afghan country. There is a PRT
there. For those of who you don’t know, PRT stands for Prevention
Reconstruction Team and NATO is expanding within these systems. This are
is a US designed idea that came about to bring security, peace, and recon-
struction to specific places. The teams are about fifty to eighty people at spe-
cific places supported by military. Now, NATO will be supporting one of
them in Kunduz and maybe more elsewhere. There is a PRT in Mazare Sharif
with sixty-five British soldiers on the in the ground here. Last week’s inci-
dent involved two people and two major parties. The parties were the group
that people normally call the Northern Alliance, but it is actually Jamiat-i
Islami Party and the Junbish-i Milli-yi IslamParty. Jamiat-i Islami Party’s
leader is Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the defense minister of Afghan
Interim Administration. Junbish-i Milli-yi IslamParty’s leader is General
Abdul Rashid Dostum, who is a former Communist and now a special advi-
sor to president Karzai on security matters. I just want to highlight that these
two are major people in the government, and last week they had a tank bat-
tle in the middle of Marzare Sharif. I don’t know in what estimate you are
interested, but forty dead is the least, eighty is the most. US sources say
about forty-five were killed in this tank battle in the city full of civilians.
Guess where the PRT was? In their barracks! The British did not even come
out to see what was going on. When the cease-fire was being negotiated, the
British ambassador and the PRT came and said okay we are here to solve this
situation. Now my question to NATO is: if this happens in Kunduz what
would NATO do? Would it intervene? Does it have a clear–cut blueprint
about what to do in cases like that? We are talking about a tank battle.
Afghanistan is not a war area, yet there is a little war zone there. Moreover,
who are we fighting with and are we going towards democracy? Mr. Karzai
is a very good person. He is a legitimate person, and he is a person who
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could win an election. He does not have a military; his defense minister has
a military that is illegitimate in Kabul and under the Bonn agreement there
should not be any Afghan forces in Kabul. 
Lastly, some thoughts for you to take with you. Is NATO important? That
question has been answered here. They are in Afghanistan and from what we
heard, they will be there past June 2004. To the United States, Europe, all NATO
members, and those of you sitting here today, I urge you to study Afghanistan.
Get to know who we are dealing with and what the plans are, not only on paper
but also in reality. I understand that you do not want to share all your military
options with the world to see, but at least talk about them within your formal
structures and your allies, so they understand what is going happen. Are you
going to call the US to come in and bomb? The US is part of NATO, but is it the
US and NATO’s ISAF together? These are questions that are immediately impor-
tant as Germany, followed by Finland and Belgium will be there soon. Please
ponder that before we will think about NATO creating a safe heaven throughout
the GME. We have to look at specifics, and Afghanistan is a specific case.
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PANEL III: DISCUSSION
Michael Žantovský
There are already a number of people asking to speak on my two questions from
the start of the session. We have already gotten some answers from our speakers.
Can NATO play a role in democracy building in the Middle East? I think the
answer is “we are not sure.” Maybe we are to blame for not posing the question
in exactly the right manner. We were never sure of NATO being involved in
democracy building, as it plans military operations, but just the same, we believe
that NATO has a sort accidental democratizing effect. So far it’s been empirical-
ly true that whenever or wherever NATO steps in, democracy follows sooner or
later. Whether or not this would be the case for the Middle East is another ques-
tion. As to the second question: “Is more democracy the answer to the problems
of the Middle East?” – I think the answer is probably yes; but we are not quite in
agreement as to whether we have in mind democracy as a process, or democra-
cy as a value–based system. In the latter case, we should probably speak about
liberty rather than democracy. As a countryman of Olivier’s and a well remem-
bered visitor to Josh’s country noted about one hundred and fifty years ago,
democracy and liberty are not exactly the same thing. I will start with Mr. Alaton. 
Ishak Alaton
Can we build democracy while the house is burning? This is a question I want
to underline, because for the time being, the house is burning. Amin Tarzi told
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us about the mini–war in Kunduz with forty dead between the two fractions.
So now I transpose this scenario to Iraq where the house is also burning. I have
a question for Olivier Roy. You very briefly touched on the social tendencies
in post-Saddam Iraq. You also very briefly touched on what you called Kurdish
aspirations; you probably meant aspirations to autonomy or eventual inde-
pendence. You then mentioned the Iraqi Shiites, the Arabic Shiites, who have
another agenda. You didn’t touch on the Sunnis, who are an extension of the
Saddam regime. These groups have started fighting among themselves. Now, I
want to bring in an additional element and ask you a very specific question, so
that you may peer into your crystal ball and make some predictions. The
Turkish government has made the decision to sending troops into Iraq. It is a
limited number of troops, 10,000, so it is not an imposing force, it is more a
token force. Knowing the conditions there, what is your assessment? What are,
provided Turkey goes in with 10,000 troops, the best and the worst case sce-
narios for Turkey? In the end, should we, Turkey, send troops to Iraq or not? 
Dan Schueftan
When it comes to democratizing or democracy building in the Middle East, it
seems to me that the question is: “What we are really after?” If we want to feel
good, it’s a great idea. We try to work for democracy, it makes us feel good, and
it’s a major gratification. But if we expect results, I suggest that we should be
very modest. Taking the new definition you have given here, that where NATO
goes, democracy follows sooner or later, I would add: much later, and perhaps
to a very marginal extent, at least for this generation. The reason I have to
adopt this very pessimistic opinion is that we are looking at two hundred years
of failed attempts to export democracy and modernity into the Middle East. 
I agree with Josh Muravchik that it is not working on the human develop-
ment scale. If the notion is to let us help export democracy to the Middle East,
two hundred years of failure is not something accidental. We need to see why
it has failed. 
To repeat something that has already been mentioned, we need to look at
the question of why the only place in the world where democracies are con-
spicuously missing is the Arab world. Let me be very specific, I am not saying
the Middle East or the Muslim world, I am saying the Arab world. If you look at
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the Middle East, the only countries which are either democratic, democratic to
a considerable extent, democratizing or have the potential of democratizing
are non-Arab states. Of course, I am speaking about Israel, Turkey, and Iran. In
Israel you have democracy. In Turkey you have a version of it that is now under-
going a fascinating experience of the marriage between Muslim fundamental-
ist party – or with its roots – and a pluralistic society. In Iran, where, in spite of
very totalitarian regime, you have two–thirds of the population committed to a
more pluralistic society. We can learn a lot from Iran. Not only that it is an Arab
problem, not a Muslim problem, but also that totalitarian regimes don’t prevent
the emergence of democratic structures that can later be used to build a demo-
cratic regime. The totalitarian regime there is much more oppressive than that
of many other countries in the Arab world, but the popular demand is for more
pluralism and that is different from what we have in many other countries in
the Arab world. Look at the two cases in the Arab world where there were
almost free elections. In both cases it was an accident, and people don’t pay
attention to what happened in Algeria and Jordan. In both of these cases, the
populations decided that the authoritarian regimes were not authoritarian
enough. They wanted to have Islamic totalitarianism, which is even worse than
what they had before. Of course, these people are speaking in terms of, “Let’s
have free elections.” This is what Bernard Lewis called the system of one man,
one vote; once they establish themselves in power, it’s too late for anything
else to emerge.
Can things change? Of course they can, but not necessarily for the better.
The notion that if you have change, it inevitably must be for the better, reminds
me of an old story. One day I was very gloomy, and a voice came out of the dark-
ness and said, “Cheer up! Things could get worse.” So I cheered up and sure
enough, things did get worse. Things are getting worse in the Middle East; look
at what is happening in Egypt. It is really depressing for a person who has fol-
lowed the cultural trends in the Arab world for so long. Cairo used to be a place
with more pluralism than many other places. Now, not only is there a strong
anti-Semitic element, but there is also a society that is becoming less and less
tolerant to anything that is not according to dogma. Things are getting worse in
many places.
Finally, what can we do? We should support people who promote a more
pluralistic approach. Ibn Ibrahim is a very good example. We should reward
regimes that are opening up and condemn those who don’t. More than anything
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else, we should have very little hope. We will leave something for our grandchil-
dren to deal with because there is not much hope in the immediate future.
Günther Altenburg
First of all, I would once again recall that no religion has a monopoly on terro-
rism. Look at Europe – ETA, IRA, Red Brigades, Red Army Faction, railway
bombings. I don’t think we are really helped in a political way by knowing
who has been with whom together in a terrorist training camp. This does not
open the prospects for political solutions. We need to deal with conflicts.We
have called it asymmetric warfare. This is what it is about, and we need to deal
with the conflicts rather than with modalities. 
My second point is about democracy, and I have to say that Dan Schuef-
tan stole most of my lines. Democracy is indeed a challenge for all countries in
the Middle East, including Israel. I would subscribe to differentiating some of
the Arab countries: Iran, Turkey, and so on. One needs to be very specific. The
experiences that we have had in Central Asian states indicate to me that we
have a long way to go before we can achieve good results.
My last point will be to thank Amin Tarzi for his excellent briefing on
Afghanistan. He gave us an idea of the problems ahead. Having NATO involved
in the extended mandate in Afghanistan and face situations like the ones in
Mazare Sharif will be a real challenge for us all.
Michael Žantovský
My friend Arthur Avnon, the Israeli Ambassador to Prague, asked me for the
floor last night, and I was waiting for him to give me the sign, and now I can
see it.
Arthur Avnon
I would say right at the outset that I am a representative of the government of
a country that is not a member of NATO. I am not even an academician, so
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I don’t feel as though I am in a position to give advice. Nevertheless, I would
like to express some thoughts. I will start with what Dr. Cohen said, when he
referred to democracies as historically not being engaged in fights among
themselves. I would like to extend that and say that democracies are not spon-
sors of terrorism either. If we all accept the notion that one of, if not the major,
problem for the free world in the beginning of the 21st century is terrorism,
then no doubt this makes tackling the issue of how to promote democracy in
the Middle East even more important. What can we do about it? On Friday, I
had the great honor and pleasure to attend a ceremony held by the Prague
Society for International Cooperation and the Forum 2000 Foundation, in
which President Havel was awarded a prize. He immediately turned this prize
over to a young man, Mr. Dinko, who is the Editor–in–Chief of a newspaper in
Belarus for the work that he is doing there. Maybe Mr. Dinko is not branded as
a dissident, but he is working for democracy. The thought that crossed my
mind during this ceremony was: “Isn’t it about time that such prizes are turned
over to dissidents in the Arab world?” However, I then thought to myself: “Are
there any dissidents in the Arab world?” Yes, there are some, but most of them
live overseas. Could anybody imagine a dissident in Syria, or for that matter in
Saudi Arabia? They would probably not live for very long. This does not mean
that the free world should ignore what is going on in these countries, not only
from the angle of their own national interests but also in the interests of the
free world and of human rights. It’s about time for the world, and for that mat-
ter Europe; I’m not mentioning the United States here because they are already
doing it, to start talking about democracy and how important it is for the pro-
motion of stability in the world and in the Middle East. 
The other facet of this issue is how not to take those democracies that
exist for granted. My country is sometimes taken for granted. As an example,
I would like to mention the speech made by Madeleine Albright last night, in
which she said that it may not be very fair to criticize someone who is not pres-
ent. Most of it was eloquent, and I could agree with most of what she said. Her
denunciation of terrorism was very clear, but when an equation is made
between a leader of Israel, Mr. Sharon, and Mr. Arafat, and ignores where these
people come from, that is a failure to recognize the political surroundings in
which democracies operate. If one would take, not to speak about the history
of these two people, the assumption that if more democracies existed in the
Arab world, maybe the Road Map would have a better chance. Mr. Arafat would
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be under more pressure to do more about terrorism, which is the main reason
why the Road Map was devised. Maybe if this democratic atmosphere, which
does exist in Israel, existed in the Arab world, it would give us a better chance
at success. Even the comparison of the current Prime Minister of Israel and the
late Prime Minister Rabin, who was admired by many in the world for what he
did, did not recognize the existing democracy of Israel. If one makes this com-
parison, one erases the years that passed between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Sharon.
Something happened in the Middle East since Mr. Rabin died. The analysis,
which is not my own, and the public opinion polls state that, of course, Mr. Sha-
ron was elected democratically. If Mr. Rabin were to run for election today,
there is a chance that he would not win this election because of what has hap-
pened since the year he was murdered. What to do? 
Before sending in NATO or any other international organization, the free
world has to be much more specific and vocal in expressing dissatisfaction
with the Arab regimes for not having freedom in their countries. I know that
this sounds naive. In 1974, I was a young diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. International terrorism as we know it started at the beginning of the
70s. Messages were sent from our foreign minister to the foreign ministers of
other countries in Europe asking for cooperation in combating international
terrorism. The response was that they could not do anything about it. Every-
body knows why, there was oil and other interests, some of which exist even
today. We should not give up, and the voice must be loud and clear. 
For the record, as far as the purpose of this conference is concerned,
NATO as a participant in the Middle East, there is experience in having for-
eign forces on Middle Eastern soil, and by and large, it has been a positive
experience. It has been positive only because the sides agreed to have these
foreign forces standing between the belligerent sides, and this should be rec-
ognized. It’s recognized by many in this room, but it should be said, for the
record, by an official of the government of Israel that if there is agreement
between the sides to have NATO there, it can probably happen.
Gunduz Aktan
Yesterday, we understood that because of a transatlantic dispute over Iraq,
over terrorism and so forth, NATO cannot take up the issues of the Greater
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Middle East and that without discussing it thoroughly, NATO cannot really
develop a strategy towards the Greater Middle East. First things first, they
should embark on discussing this issue. 
My second point has to do with our working assumption that democra-
cies do not breed terrorists. This is not true. In Europe there are many terro-
rists in many democratic countries. Indeed, throughout the democratization
process, terrorists, historically speaking, become very active. The speakers
who had contributions are wonderful, but they have neglected two topics.
One is secularism. This is one of the crucial matters; you cannot have demo-
cracy without secularism. The second is economic development. You cannot
have a sustainable democracy without sustainable economic development. 
The most costly enterprise would be to stop terrorism through trans-
forming the Greater Middle East. How could you do it? As Mr. Olivier Roy said,
without a nation state you cannot have democracy and without a nation you
cannot have a nation state. Iraq is not a nation state and doesn’t have a nation.
Now, how to create a nation? You have a dilemma here. Either you have to wait
decades, if not centuries, so that a given ruling elite can create some nation or
you have to break the country down into smaller units where the ethnic alle-
giance will replace the national allegiance.
Lastly: terrorism consists of terrorist acts. If you reduce this to terrorism,
then it is easier to understand. However, terrorist acts are committed in the
war between Palestinians and Israel. And Palestinian suicide bombers are
killing themselves as part and parcel of a war, which falls under the interna-
tional humanitarian law. As some people asked, how can we, in this case, sepa-
rate the terrorist nature of this warfare from the political solution of the
Palestinian question?
Rouzbeh Pirouz
I wanted to take the topic and look at it a little bit more broadly, not just at the
role of NATO but at the whole Western project of democratization in the Mid-
dle East. There are two main areas of risk that we need to look at and mitigate.
One area is that an attempt at liberation will be perceived as colonization or
occupation, which would be terribly unfortunate as we have found in Iraq. We
can go in with the best of intentions, but people will interpret our actions differ-
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ently, which makes the whole thing backfire. The second area is that in trying to
do this quickly, as Josh Muravchik pointed out, we are potentially opening a can
of worms, and we don’t quite know what the outcome will be. As somebody
said, the situation might get worse rather than better. These are two areas of risk
that should be addressed, and I have just a few thoughts on how we can do that.
In terms of regional perceptions of our actions and our motives, it’s very
important that we listen to people from the region even when we don’t neces-
sarily agree with them. It’s a great shame that Arab representatives did not
accept invitations to come to this conference because while we may not agree
with many of the things that they say, how these things are perceived in the
region is very important. It can mean the difference between success and fai-
lure. We can incorporate that into the nature of the policies we execute. For
example, if the project in Iraq had been more multilateral or designed some-
what differently, we could potentially have avoided some of the issues that we
have right now with people perceiving it as an occupation despite the fact that
it’s intended as a liberation. We need to adopt an approach which is both top
down and bottom up, combining it with what Olivier Roy and Ariel Cohen said.
You have to strengthen the forces of reform, but you also have to make sure that
the environment is one that allows them to operate and that the institutions are
there for them to develop. I was really glad that Ariel Cohen mentioned Sharin
Ebadi, the Nobel Prize winner; she is exactly the kind of figure that can be
instrumental. Her selection produced an enormous amount of excitement in
Iran. The outpouring expression of excitement, especially on the part of
Iranian women was exhilarating. This is just the kind of thing that we should be
looking into, but we also need to put pressure on states to give people like her
the chance to operate. She, for example, spent some time in prison. 
The role of Western information sources such as the BBC World Service
and Voice of America, are very instrumental. It is a battle of ideas, and people are
thirsty for information. These services, even Radio Israel, have a huge audience
in these countries. This is a fantastic tool, not just for struggle, but also for sha-
ping public opinion. By the way, I was told that Ebadi granted an interview to an
Israeli newspaper, which I think took a lot of courage, and is an omen of the
potential changes that can come about. Furthermore, we need an alliance with
the middle class in these regions. The middle class in the Middle East is probably
like the middle class everywhere and looks above all for economic security.
These people will likely place economic security above Jihad. They could be a
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fantastic ally in this. We underestimate the role of opinion polls in understand-
ing the middle class; as Olivier Roy mentioned, all the opinion polls indicate
broad support for democratization and relatively limited support for fundamen-
talism. My fourth recommendation is that we don’t need to see it as an all or
nothing deal; we can approach this in an evolutionary way. We should hold
states to making progress in certain areas that eventually will lead to full demo-
cracy; that itself is progress. The Turkish example is very interesting in the sense
that the prospect of EU membership has brought consistent change in Turkey
over period of time. This approach requires real conditionality which means
consistently rewarding people when they perform and punishing them when
they don’t. 
Finally, a unified approach between Europe and the US is absolutely cri-
tical. The example of the pressure on the Iranians on the nuclear issue is a clas-
sic example of that. The Iranians really reacted seriously only when they rea-
lized that the EU and the US were on the same page because otherwise they
could always play the two against each other. The Europeans have a great deal
of nuance to add to the strategies, but if the approach is unified, the impact will
be much more effective.
Ruprecht Polenz
If you are discussing the difficulties of promoting democracy in the Middle
East, you should also take into account the problems with globalization in this
region. Globalization and modernization put all those societies under tremen-
dous stress; people feel themselves cut off from their cultural roots, and per-
ceive democracy as an additional stress. It is much more difficult than we might
think. I agree with my Israeli friend that first we should try to promote more
pluralism, the rule of law, and gradual change, otherwise we might fail.
Experience with promoting democracy in Latin America in the 70s and 80s
supports this approach. The political foundations of the German parties have
worked there for decades to improve trade unions and the development of
political parities. They were quite successful, and in Latin America democracies
are now firmly established. There are other parts of the world where democra-
tization was a success. A democratic Iraq probably will mean, besides a balance
in the constitution among Kurds, Sunnites, and Shiites, a Shiite majority. This
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Shiite majority will probably be not as pro-American and pro-Israeli as we all
would like it to be, but nevertheless, if it’s democracy, we have to accept it. 
Roger Robinson
We haven’t, as yet, talked much about the economic and financial dimensions of
democracy building in the region or, for that matter, the war on terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Here
again, we see rather serious differences among NATO members concerning the
pursuit of a policy of engagement, for example, versus, isolation. To underscore
this point, if you look at Iran, which is quickly approaching the October 31 IAEA
deadline, whereby they have to prove that they are not pursuing a nuclear
weapons program – something difficult to do as they are – the question is: “Will
the UN Security Council go forward with new economic sanctions?” Is this
something that we’ll support? Europe traditionally has a different view on that
than the United States. Syria is facing a new round of unilateral US sanctions in
the coming weeks and months from our Congress that are going to prohibit
duel–use equipment and technologies from American firms. You can be confi-
dent that those kinds of duel use equipment and technology will be forthcom-
ing elsewhere. The Iran–Libya sanctions act of 1996 is something that has been
waited by Presidents including the current President, but the Congress is seek-
ing to tighten it, even though it has an extra territorial reach. There is also the
North Korean crisis, where we are going to see a system being put together that
can fabricate one nuclear weapon a month over the next eight months – some-
thing the US will probably find intolerable The Europeans and others may feel
that a policy of engagement and dialogue is indicated there. Cutting to the ques-
tion, the strains created by these differences on the economic and financial poli-
cies in the greater Middle East aren’t trivial. I am curious as to how one or more
of our panelists believe these growing disconnects will play out. 
Hirsh Goodman
I have been sitting here wondering whether NATO involvement in the Greater
Middle East might not enhance the view of a “War of the West” against Islam –
174
NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
another western organization positioning itself against the Middle East. The
other thing I was wondering was whether it would be helpful to clarify which
NATO we are speaking about in this regard. Are we speaking about NATO the
military, or NATO and it’s non-military aspects? I found it a little bit confusing
over the past day and a half because it has been like a porridge. Instead of sort-
ing out which arm of this organization you want to do which job, we have
been speaking in generalities. 
I am not sure if democracy is really the goal. Some people want kings,
some people want queens, and some people want democracy. The goal
should be civil society, non-rogue states. We should modify the goals and
bring them down to the doable, rather than trying to impose theoretical sys-
tems that may not be endemic. I am not a religious person, or I would have
been in the synagogue yesterday, but a quote from the Talmud keeps rever-
berating in my head. “It takes a fool to throw a pebble in a pond, and a thou-
sand geniuses can’t stop the ripples.” When one comes along with ideas like
this, we have to be very surgical and specific, otherwise we may end-up with
another Afghanistan or Iraq.
Onur Öymen
I would like to add my voice to Günther Altenburg when he spoke about terro-
rism outside the Middle East and outside the Islamic countries. I will also stress
the fact that some of the terrorist organizations in the Middle East are spon-
sored by non-Islamic countries. We have detained some terrorist leaders carry-
ing non-Islamic country passports. They have openly revealed the support
they received from non-Islamic countries, so you should consider this as an
important element while evaluating terrorism in the Middle East. 
My second point is that you, Michael, ask yourself the question whether
democracy is desirable in the Middle East. I believe it was a rhetorical ques-
tion. We do not have the right to deny some people democratic societies
because of the geographical region where they live or because of their faith.
All people of the Middle East deserve democracy just as the rest of the world
does. Research shows that in the last twenty years, democracy has developed
everywhere in the world except the Middle East. Is this the fault of the people
of the Middle East? This is my question. 
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With regards to Iraq, it would be a big mistake to try to build an Iraqi
democracy on a sort of compromise, or a coalition of different ethnicities and
religious groups. Democracy should be built on citizenship, just as it is in the
rest of the world. It would be a mistake to put all sorts of religious leaders, eth-
nic leaders, and war lords into the basket and hope that at the end we will
have, as a by-product, a democratic society. It will not work. The composition
of the transitional council is not the best model for democracy. 
The main question is whether we are willing to have a democratic socie-
ty in Iraq or not. In case that we are for democracy, we may pay a price for that.
The output of a democratic society may not always make decisions in favor of
our own interests. While working for democracy, we should be aware that the
end product should be good for their people but not always good for our soci-
eties. 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, democratization is not a taboo in NATO, the
Middle East is. We have experience in NATO with democratization. We have
pressed candidate and PfP countries hard for democracy. What we have not
been able to discuss in NATO is the Middle East.
Eran Lerman
I want to answer a challenge raised by Olivier Roy regarding the question of
comparisons. I think the only relevant comparison is of Arab societies and the
Arab world to itself in the first part of the 20th century. In the 30s, the level of
evolution of politics and civil society in the southern Mediterranean was, to
a large extent, more advanced and more dynamic and interesting than in the
northern Mediterranean. What happened? It is my suggestion that the experi-
ment with Arab liberalism did not to die a natural death; I suspect it was mur-
dered by the needs of Cold War players on both sides: the communists under-
mining it on one side, and the assumption that a powerful colonist was better
than a soft Pasha in countering communism undermining it on the other side.
Here I go to directly to Mr. Polenz’s comment about Latin America – what has
enabled the transformation of Latin America was the demise of Communism
as a world system side–by–side with the demise of the colonists who present-
ed themselves as protectors of the bourgeoisie against Communism, which
made democracy possible. The role of NATO is not, in this case, to directly pro-
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mote democracy, which institutionally it is not capable of doing, but to defeat
those powers harming the Arab world. The reversal of Egypt in the late 90s
away from democratization and possible liberalization, the NGO law and other
decisions made by the Mubarak regime is a direct reflection of Islamism as
a threat. If Islamism as a threat is defeated decisively, then what happened in
Latin America can happen in the Middle East. 
And the point about Shia, I am not sure that our assessment of the future
of the Shiite politics should be colored by the Iranian example. I think that the
Iranian example essentially, or the Khomeini example has been, as his grand-
son now admits, a perversion of the Shiite faith. In many ways the Shiite exper-
iment and experience is more amenable to some of the principles of civil soci-
ety than even the Sunnis’ respect of authority. Therefore, what is happening in
Iraq is of tremendous importance, not only for the future of Iraq but also for
the future of Iran, of the Gulf, of Lebanon, and of the entire region. 
Ely Karmon
I strongly agree with the analysis of Olivier Roy, but there is one point about
which I wonder if there is a good solution, and that is the integration of the
Islamist movements in the political game. They have learned to play the polit-
ical game very well, but the moment they are in power, this leads generally to
a theocratic and autocratic state. This is not only happening in Iran and Afgha-
nistan, but it is also happening today in the north-western border provinces of
Pakistan, where they have long–awaited elections, and in northern Algeria.
The good case is Turkey, as Turkey has an eighty year history of secular ideo-
logy and a strong army to defend this ideology. My question is: “How can we
really integrate these movements without ending up with theocratic or auto-
cratic regimes?”
Jeff Gedmin
I would like to ask Josh Muravchik a question as well. Josh, it seems to me that
in all this Iraq may well be crucial. Could you give us a six–month early report
card on the United States in terms of what we are doing right what we are
177
PANEL III: THE ROLE OF NATO IN DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN THE GME
doing wrong and what would you do differently in terms of democracy assis-
tance? 
Steven, I want to ask you for the European piece of that. If these things are
to be a transatlantic project, it seems to me that thus far in Iraq the Europeans
are not rushing in with enthusiasm to provide non-military aid and build trade
unions and free media and that there is still a lot of reluctance and ambiva-
lence. If that’s true, how do we overcome it?
Amin Tarzi
First, about the perception of NATO – that’s a very crucial question. Yesterday,
somebody mentioned NATO as a Western power. There’s no question about
it’s being a Western power. It is very crucial and the test, again, I point to the
Afghanistan test, is that when NATO goes in, it not only goes in with its mili-
tary force, but it brings with some sort of an understanding of the ideology.
Moreover, they must make sure that everybody knows what NATO is and that
it acts as a more impartial and more understanding force. I mention Afgha-
nistan specifically because the vast majority of Afghans actually welcome for-
eign forces. When you have a situation like that, and you have a test case where
they are seen as provider of something better, it will be a good step forward.
However, it is crucial to make sure that NATO understands its position. NATO
is no longer a force against communism or expansion of the former Soviet
Union; they have to redefine themselves, but until, and this is my crucial point,
they redefine themselves, it’s like they are diving into water without knowing
how deep it is or if there are some weird animals in there. 
A question was raised about the Pashtuns not being in Afghanistan, and
that we have to make sure their political order is established. Karzai is
a Pashtun. Yes, as I said, the Pashtuns are disenchanted, but what is happen-
ing in the case of Afghanistan specifically, and this is very NATO oriented, is
that there is a short term and a long term. The short term is to make sure that
terrorists, Al-Qaeda, specifically, and then the Taliban, the real and old
Taliban are eliminated, caught, or killed as soon as possible with the least
amount of damage both collateral and to the US and allies. This is the main
objective; the other objective is democracy. And, as somebody mentioned,
you cannot have democracy without a state. I absolutely agree with that.
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Afghanistan is not a state according to Political Science 101, so you have to
build the state and NATO is doing just that. Just make sure that when you
build a state you take into account the fact that you have some nasty people
you have to kill here and there. In the long run, you have to make sure that
you also stabilize the democratic aspects in order to have some kind of
a base. As someone said, you cannot be in a burning house and build democ-
racy. You have to find a balance, and again, that is a job for NATO. We are
talking about an abstract, and I am talking about very specifics. NATO has to
come out and say, “This is our mandate, we will go in, and this is how we are
going do it.”
Somebody mentioned all the radios, and then we mentioned our radio I
have to take this chance to point out that RFE/RL is the only radio station in
Afghanistan, which broadcasts twenty-four hours, and it is the most listened
to. We have 6,5 million listeners. 
About Iran, yes, there are a lot of good things happening there, but let’s
not count our chickens right now. Iran has not given up yet.
Steven Everts
On Iran: Lots of people spoke somewhat encouragingly and approvingly about
Iran as a possible example of some good news. I share the comments that have
been just made. This is sort of relevant to our discussion about whether
democracy promotes security benefits to us. I remain to be convinced that if
it was democratic, Iran would not seek nuclear weapons. This is often an assum-
ption that underlies a lot of debate and while Iranian domestic politics are def-
initely in flux, when it comes to the nucleation a consensus they want them –
for security reasons. 
Secondly, somebody asked about dissidents in Syria – do they exist? Well,
very few of them, but a friend of mine has an illegal press, on which he prints
lots of books. Also, he is desperate for support. So if somebody wants to do
a good thing, either from the EU or from the USA, I will be happy to act as faci-
litator there. 
Somebody raised questions about economic development and its link to
democracy. It is probably true that it is difficult to sustain democracy in the
absence of economic success and stability, but the point is that, at the moment,
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the authoritarian regimes have not delivered economic development. So you
can flip the argument around.
Then, somebody else made the point that, whether or not you can have
democracy in a multiethnic state or multinational states. Of course you can. I
live in one, the UK, and India is another one – multi-religious. So that’s defi-
nitely possible. 
Lastly, I’ll remark on Jeff’s particular point regarding what we can do to
shore up European enthusiasm to share in this project of making Iraq a suc-
cess. There was up until now a US mentality that perceived Iraq as a prize that
the US wanted to keep for itself. Now, it is increasingly seen as a burden to
share. So that shift will help, and the Security Council and its resolution this
week is a step in the right direction and will probably unlock some additional
support. But for the Europeans, you have got to use very hard, realistic argu-
ments alongside the transatlantic rhetoric. The hard realistic argument is that
it is in our interests; it will hurt our interests even more than your interests if
Iraq goes wrong.
Joshua Muravchik
I am afraid I can’t answer the one question that was put directly to me, which is
Jeff’s question about the report card. Jeff, you and I are about to go there, and we
would be better equipped to make a judgment then. The one thing that I would
say is that obviously the US is having a harder time than some imagined in Iraq,
but I am not impressed by the criticisms that we should have planed better. One
should always plan better. There was planning; the problem was, that the plan-
ning didn’t necessarily fit the circumstances we encountered. I am not sure if
this is a kind of undertaking that it is possible to plan until you start trying to do
it; we are trying to do something new in that place that hasn’t been done before.
And if you look back at the history of the occupations of Japan and Germany,
which were fabulously successful, there were lots of foolish things done and lots
of mistakes made along the way that got undone and tried again and a lot of
learning by trial and error. And so the fact that we are having some difficulties in
Iraq doesn’t suggest to me that we are failing there.
You can’t build a democracy in a burning house. Well, it is harder to build
democracy in a burning house, which we tried to do in Vietnam and without
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great success. But we did succeed in other situations. For example, we built
democracy in El Salvador in the middle of a quite violent guerrilla war. It is not
black and white. 
As to Mr. Altenburg’s comment that no religion has a monopoly on terro-
rism: this is one of those things that is literally true but meaningless. It may be
that no religion has a monopoly, but in reality there is a tremendous difference
between the incidents of terrorism that emanated from the Islamic world than
from that of any other part of global civilization. There is a huge difference in the
amount; you mentioned a handful, you could have said the Weathermen, most of
them dating to a time when there was a very powerful support system for terror-
ism, the Soviet Union, which encouraged the support of these groups. However,
they are all more or less small potatoes compared to the vast amount of terror-
ism emanating from the Islamic world. It is really not just a matter of the quanti-
ty, but also a matter of the legitimacy. The difficult reality we confront is that ter-
rorism is uniquely acceptable and legitimized today in the Islamic world. So
when Kofi Annan tried, in the wake of 9/11, to bring forward a new UN conven-
tion against terrorism, he was blocked despite putting a lot of his own prestige
on the line. He was blocked by the organization of the Islamic Conference which
would only support a convention on terrorism that said terrorism on behalf of
bad causes is bad but terrorism on behalf of good causes is good – in another
words a convention that was pro-terrorism. And likewise, we have the sort of
poster child of the Islamic world, the PLO, which is an organization whose
whole history is steeped in terror. Week after week we have new proclamations
made by opinion leaders, governmental leaders, and religious leaders in the
Islamic world blessing or condoning so called martyrdom operations. So the
reality is that when we talk about a war on terrorism, we have got a very big
problem and challenge in trying to delegitimize terrorism in the Islamic world.
It is a problem that doesn’t exist anyplace else in the world.
Finally, Dan Shueftan, there were not so many subjects of disagreement
between you and me, except for your focus on pessimism and mine on hopeful-
ness. When you mention the Arab Human Development Report and say that this
group of Arab scholars themselves point to the great failures in the Arab world,
you take that as an index of the failure of the Arab world. But what I see is that
this group of scholars has come forward and made that statement. And that
seems to me to be what’s interesting and new and different. It is not true that for
two hundred years the West has tried to democratize the Middle East; our inten-
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tions in the Middle East were far different from trying to democratize. Moreover,
many other people also chimed in with comments that re-enforced your pessi-
mism and tried to bring us to an appreciation of the difficult realities of this area.
I respect all of that, but one has to see the dramatic revolutionary change that has
happened across the globe in a very short period of time with regards to demo-
cracy. The numbers I said before, which are the Freedom House count of the
number of legitimately elected governments in the world – today, 63 % of the
nations of the world are governed by governments that were elected in open
elections by their citizens. The important thing about that is that only thirty
years ago the percentage was only about 30 %. So the proportion of nations
where they elect their governments has doubled in thirty years. And this is
a tremendous revolutionary change that has touched a lot of places in the world
that people didn’t expect to touch, and maybe it will touch some more.
Last point: with great respect for your point that not all change is change
for the better and that it’s possible to set out trying to democratize a place and
succeed only in destabilizing it and bring in to power a worse dictatorship than
was there before – as happened in Iran and as happened in Nicaragua in the late
70s. My observation is that the most important work for democracy in most
cases is not to try to punish or damage undemocratic regimes, but rather to help
the democrats in those societies. It is not just a matter of destabilizing existing
non-democracies, but it is a matter of trying to strengthen and build up a demo-
cratic alternative in most places. 
Olivier Roy
So how to create the nation? Occupy it? Then you have a nationalist reaction.
I wrote in the New York Times in April that if the American goal is to get
a friendly, democratic, and stable Iraq – forget it. You can pick two of the
terms and be lucky, and if you pick only one, it is a defeat. Now, it is a test of
legitimacy for the ruling council. The ruling council is unanimously against
the call for Turkish troops. But if they are bypassed it means that there is no
Iraqi legitimacy, and that the Americans are in charge. If the Americans give
up the idea of calling the Turkish troops, then of course there will be a lot of
problems in terms of manpower, money and so on. So the situation is quite
complex.
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Of course, there are many issues in the Middle East, but sometimes it is
because of external intervention. If Mossadec had not been toppled in Iran,
Khomeini would have never come to power. And for the Iranians the story
about Mossadec is very important. The statement one man, one vote, once –
it is a good joke, but it never happened. If the Islamic liberation succeeded
in Iran, it was not because of an election; but because there was no election.
It is because a revolution took power. In Algeria, it was a manipulation of the
army to suddenly call for elections in one day. Of course, it was a disaster,
they knew it would be, and that is why they did it, it was sheer manipulation.
The message that is sent by the sentence of Madame Delpech is that an
authoritarian secularist state is better than a possible Islamic state. That it is
the western policy. We have always supported authoritarian thugs against
would-be Islamist, and amongst Islamist, by definition, there are many thugs.
Okay, but the message is that it is more secure not to have democracy. So if
we want to have a democratization in the Middle East we have to deal with
Islamists; if not, all these bad guys will get in, and we’ll have them for a long
time. 
The issue for me is not religion and state. The problem in the Middle
Eastern countries is not Islam as such. It was said that Islam has no nuclear
energy except in Iran. The problem is nobody can have monopoly of Islam.
So to have democratization we need a diversification of the religious field and
this is important. The religious field is here and it is very important, it will
stay. For example, let’s take Turkey. Twenty years ago I had discussion with
some people in Haifa. Their argument was very simple – they said, look, in
Turkey, 80 % of the Turks say that they are Muslims, practicing Muslims. We
are the only party to put Islam to politics so normally 80 % of the population
should vote for us. But we never made more than 20 % because there are
many people who are religious but didn’t want Islam to be a political object
of a political party. What I am seeing now in the Middle East is precisely this
diversification of the religious field. There is no other time that one party
could say, “Islam, it’s me – from Morocco to Pakistan.”
Then, the last point on Islamic terrorism. The issue is not why does Islam
send terrorism. The problem is that the people who complain about the ruling
order now in the world are mainly Muslims. Rightly or not, but it is not by
chance that terrorist are mostly Muslims. As I said, the Islamic terrorism now
is not so much a Middle Eastern phenomena, it has far more to do with what I
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call the Westernization of Islam. Look at biographies of most of the so-called
terrorists and the real terrorists who have been arrested. The new generation
have a Western trajectory. They became born again Muslims in Europe. The
pilots of 9/11, all these guys became born again Muslims in Europe – not in
caves or elsewhere. There are more and more converts now who are coming
to Islamic terrorism. Bin Laden is an heir of the Red Brigades and Carlos.
Carlos did convert in jail, so in this case, it is not Islam which is the core of ter-
rorism, but many people are looking towards some sort of radicalism because
they want to fight and adopt terrorism.
Ariel Cohen
I am far from having the last word because we will return to this subject again
and again and again. We are at the beginning of a protracted conflict with
a threat that is common to the United States, to Western Europe, to Russia, to
India, and to Israel and it is the threat of a permanently mutating and chan-
ging, a very poisonous and radical interpretation of one the world’s greatest
monotheistic religions, one of the three Abrahamic faiths, etc. It is a minority
that has tried to hijack the faith and use it as brainwashing against the West.
Many think that political Islam failed; you said it failed, and it’s safe, but it still
wants to destroy the US. Well, it still not only wants to destroy the US, but it
wants to build what they call the caliphate – the global radical Islamic mili-
tary dictatorship. It’s a meta-project, it’s meta-idea, it’s hard to achieve, and
I’m not sure if they are going to achieve it. However, they’ll try, and one of the
ways they’ll try is by subverting western Europe in undermining the US
including trying to get weapons of mass destruction and attacking the United
States, wear out the Israelis, and killing Indians in their own parliamentary
building. 
Market segmentation is one main point that I have. A long, long time ago,
I started working in audience research at Radio Liberty, which is now based
here in Prague. Looking at how to convey ideas of demo-cracy, open-markets,
and human rights, I see several key audiences. One is the middle class and busi-
ness community, which has been mentioned. Then one that we didn’t talk
about is women; women have to be empowered in these societies. I come from
a conservative think tank that nobody would suspect of being a feminist
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organization, but looking at these societies, if you empower women, it will
change the nature of these societies. And while there are mo-thers who brag
on Palestinian television that their sons or daughters became shahid, suicide-
bombers or murder suicide-bombers, a lot of mothers and fathers will tell
their kids not to do that thing. A lot of Hamas leaders, as it was reported in
Western media claim that their kids are so talented that they need to become
doctors rather than to blow themselves up. Things like that, as a part of this
interaction of ideas, and I don’t want to use the term “war of ideas,” have to be
conveyed to the Muslim audiences. Muslim audiences must hear that the peo-
ple, who send their kids to blow themselves up and to kill the other kids, don’t
send their own children to kill themselves. The other target audience is youth.
The youth can be offered a hope of paradise, of killing themselves and going
to paradise, or given a hope of a successful future on this planet before they
live their natural life span and die. So the economic deve-lopment and educa-
tion is important. If you go and look at the curricula and the educational pro-
fessional standards that many universities, colleges, and high schools are
churning out in the Middle East, they are people without marketable skills. If
these people have a hope for a better future economically, it will make a big
difference.
Finally, I think that it may be an issue of political correctness to say: “Oh,
there’s terrorism everywhere.” The systemic threat to the U.S. today and to
other democracies comes from a specific Jihadi movement. It doesn’t come
from the “IRAs” or other European terrorist organizations; these are very loca-
lized terrorist organizations that did not have radical religious roots. They
were nationalists or they were communists or Soviet-supported or class war-
fare organizations. 
This should be done by Muslims for Muslims. It will not be done by the
West or by the United States. The U.S. and Europe should work together. We
have the resources, we have the technical expertise, we have the broadcasting
facilities, the satellite channels and dishes, the exchanges, education, and the
money. We are not capable of articulating in Arabic, in Farsi, in Pashtu, and in
Dari any of these ideas I am talking about. In democracy, Josh, I think and I
respect your work but respectfully disagree, I think democracy will be sort of
icing on the cake. It’ll be the end phenomenon in the process of changing atti-
tudes and changing values. And it’s a long and painstaking process that we all
should encourage.
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Michael Žantovský
Because of the time constraints, I will wave my last word privileges, but I had
better warn you that after we’ve gone through all this incredible body of wis-
dom, experience and insights, we will be back with another policy paper,
hopefully with Sasha and Jiří so you will hear from me yet.
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Michael Žantovský
For the last couple of days, we had a number of excellent speakers represent-
ing governments, parliaments, or the non-governmental sector from a number
of countries in Europe and in the Middle East. And we had a number of our
friends who are currently out of the government in the United States. What we
have been missing so far was a representative of the current US administra-
tion. Of course, we do have Craig Stapleton here who has been very generous
with his time and wisdom, but we consider him almost native. We also felt the
need to impart a speaker, and I think that on this particular subject, we could-
n’t get anyone better than R. Nicholas Burns, the US permanent representative
to NATO in Brussels. 
Nick is a career diplomat. He has worked for the National Security
Council, which is where I first met him. In the early nineties, he became the
toast of Washington when he became the spokesman for the State
Department and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Policy. And,
very relevant to the issues we are discussing at the conference, he also served
in Cairo and in Jerusalem as a US diplomat at the consulate in Jerusalem and
the US Embassy in Cairo. He’s been a very good and loyal friend to us. The last
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time we saw him here was at the NATO summit in Prague, and I hope we will
see him again soon.
R. Nicholas Burns
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, 
It’s a great pleasure for me to be here and see so many friends and familiar
faces. I want to thank Michael Žantovský and Sasha Vondra for having invited
me. It is a great pleasure. I have been convinced to come, really convinced to
come, by my very good friend Craig Stapleton, who I think has been an out-
standing American ambassador to the Czech Republic in every way. I have
great respect for the job that he has done here. 
Let me also say that I very much welcome the presence of Karel
Kovanda, the Czech Republic’s Ambassador to NATO. Karel is our dean; he is
the longest-serving ambassador at NATO, and the dean has quite substantial
powers over all of the rest of us. I would very much like to thank Karel for
being here today. And finally, Onur Öymen, member of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly, formerly Turkish Ambassador to NATO, one of my best
friends and colleagues, and one of the most effective ambassadors and
spokesmen for Turkey in every job he has had, particularly in the NATO job.
So it’s great to be among friends. 
I don’t have a prepared speech, but I do have some things that I want to
say briefly, and then I would like to encourage a discussion and any observa-
tions you want to make; any questions you want to ask me, I am game, I would
like to respond to them. 
I am sorry I missed the rest of this conference, because I understand just
from talking here that it was a very fine conference with very fine speakers, and
I think it’s an aptly named conference, “NATO and the Greater Middle East,”
because it is towards the Greater Middle East that we in the Bush administration
believe NATO has now to focus its efforts. And I would put it this way: NATO has
been in existence for 54 years. For the great majority of those 54 years, NATO
had one threat – you all know what it was – and our military and diplomatic
strategy was singularly focused on containing and meeting that threat. 
The Prague summit, that was organized so brilliantly by Sasha, and led so
brilliantly by President Havel, was the fundamental turning point, I think, in
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NATO’s 54-year history, because it gave us a new mission. It gave us an entire-
ly new mission. It gave us the sense that we have to restructure ourselves mil-
itarily; it gave us seven new members, who are going to change the Alliance for
the better; and it gave us a strong appreciation that as threats had changed, we
had to change with those threats. 
So, everything that we have done in the Bush administration, led by
President Bush and Secretary [of State] Powell and Secretary [of Defense]
Rumsfeld since that time, has been to try to implement the Prague agenda. And
I think we will be implementing the Prague agenda for a decade: that is how
substantial the change was. All of our 19 NATO leaders met at the Prague sum-
mit – President Havel, President Bush, President Chirac, Chancellor
Schröder – all came together conceptually and operationally, and it’s useful to
remember that, on a common transatlantic agenda. 
The new mission is the most important mission. And it speaks directly to
what you have been talking about here for the last couple of days. And that is
that, obviously during the Cold War, we amassed a huge continental army in
Western Europe to defend Western Europe. NATO’s mandate is still to defend
Europe and North America. But we don’t believe we can do that by sitting in
Western Europe, or Central Europe, or North America. We have to deploy our
conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO’s future, we
believe, is east, and is south. It’s in the Greater Middle East. 
NATO’s future is to deter crises and to respond to crises – whether it’s a
combat mission or a hostage rescue mission or a peacekeeping operation in
that arc of countries where we assume and believe the great majority of
threats to France, and Spain, and the Czech Republic, and the United States
will come from – in Central and South Asia, in the Middle East itself, and in
North Africa. And the threat is, as we all know, this juxtaposition of terrorism
– global terrorism – with weapons of mass destruction, which President Bush
has said, since September 11th, 2001, is the greatest threat affecting the
American people, but we believe also, all the people of the 19, soon to be 26,
countries that embody this alliance. 
This is a fundamental change. I don’t think there’s much of a partisan dif-
ference in my own country, in the United States. If I can just use Ron Asmus,
my good friend, as an example – who is a Democrat – has just written an arti-
cle in Foreign Affairs, which I think everyone should read. If you take out the
first couple of pages, with which I profoundly disagree, where he criticized
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the Bush administration’s policies, and take out his conclusion, with which I
also disagree, criticizing my administration’s policies, in the middle, the great
core of Ron’s argument is an argument that NATO needs this changed mission.
It has to be in the Greater Middle East. I think there’s a lot of resonance in our
country that Democrats and Republicans can come together on. 
How have we proceeded since Prague? In the middle of the Iraq crisis,
when France, Germany and the United States had the most difficult crisis in our
relationships, well, in memory, we agreed – France, Germany, the United States,
the Czech Republic and all the other NATO allies – that NATO should go into
Afghanistan, and take over the UN mandate for the peacekeeping force: which
we did on August 11. We now have nearly 6,000 soldiers there, and we are now
debating an expansion of that force from Kabul – where it’s been for two years
– out to the provinces where everyone believes we must be. There’s no chance
for a long-term peace in Afghanistan without an international peacekeeping
force, which encompasses a region larger than Greater Kabul. The German gov-
ernment took the lead in this debate, which is also significant. It wanted to lead
NATO in this great change, and Germany is prepared within 30 days to put
troops in Kunduz to establish a small provincial reconstruction team, which we
believe should be the model for how we act in Afghanistan in the future. 
So, Afghanistan was the first example: not just that we were ending the
transatlantic crisis – or beginning to repair it, I should say to be more accurate
– caused by the Iraq war, but that we had a common conceptual strategy for
how we had to act in the world. 
Second [example] was in Iraq. Eighteen of the 26 NATO countries, if you
include the seven countries invited to become members next year, have sol-
diers on the ground in Iraq. More will come. I think we’ll be over 20 countries
in a couple of months. NATO also agreed, collectively, to support Poland and
Spain, as they set up their new division at the end of August. We’ve given them
logistical support, intelligence support, communications support, and we gen-
erated the force for this mission. If you look at all the divisions in Iraq, they’re
all led by NATO countries: the United Kingdom, the United States, Poland,
Spain, and Turkey has just decided, very importantly, that it will contribute a
division of troops to Iraq, as well. We’re very pleased, and we congratulate the
Turkish government, and National Assembly on that decision. 
I think that these are true concrete expressions that NATO has recog-
nized that, in addition to dealing with the problems of Europe and the remain-
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ing problems of security in Bosnia and in Kosovo and Macedonia, we have to
be out on the front lines where the problems are. I don’t think this is a momen-
tary tactical decision on NATO’s part. It’s a long-term strategic decision, which
is being forced on us because of the change in security, but which we gladly
accept and embrace. All of us are together on this. 
The other dimension of this strategy in the Greater Middle East is the fol-
lowing: NATO has had a program called “The Mediterranean Dialogue” since
1995, where we engage Israel and six Arab countries, from North Africa as
well as Egypt and Jordan. There’s a lot of talk that we ought to expand that pro-
gram; that we ought to have a greater concentration to seek political dialogue
with the Arab countries, and with Israel. We certainly want to strengthen the
Mediterranean Dialogue, and perhaps to make more of the military content, in
terms of training and exercises, with those countries. I know there’s been
some discussion of that just at this conference. We haven’t made any decisions
at NATO as to whether or not we should do this, but it’s a very live issue. I think
we’ll have a lot of debate on it in the next couple of months, as well, as we
focus on the Istanbul summit, NATO’s next summit, which will be held in the
spring in Turkey. 
Now, if we have a new mission, then we have to have a new military doc-
trine, and we have to have a different set of military capabilities to be success-
ful in this new mission. We were successful in the Cold War because France
and Germany and the United States and Britain, and all the other members of
the old Alliance, were willing to pay the political price to keep several hundred
thousand soldiers in Western Europe. But that was a heavy, tank-based, con-
ventional force, backed up by the nuclear umbrella of NATO itself. 
If we’re going to be successful in peacekeeping in Afghanistan, or war
fighting in a potential crisis somewhere in this arc of countries, or in a hostage
rescue mission somewhere in the future, we have to have an entirely different
set of military capabilities. At the Prague summit we agreed on what they are.
We need strategic lift, because the possible deployments are thousands of kilo-
meters from Germany and from France, and from the heart of Europe. By and
large, while the United States has this ability, the great majority of our
European allies do not. At Prague we decided that we must go out and achieve
that capability. 
Second, we said that we’ve got to have air-to-air refueling, in order to allow
missions of the type we’ve seen over Afghanistan and Iraq during the last two
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years. One example of this: I talked to a Norwegian F–16 pilot – female pilot –
who flew air missions from Kyrgyzstan down into Afghanistan and back during
the war in her F–16. She told me she was refueled five times on that round trip
in combat missions. If we don’t have the air-to-air refueling capacities that the
United States and some other countries have, we cannot be successful as an
alliance across the board in waging, in vast expeditionary missions, long-term
strategic military missions for the future. 
We said that we had to have secure communications, which we lacked
during the Kosovo war, when the Serb army listened in to ground-to-air com-
munications in NATO aircraft. We’ve said that we have to have precision-guid-
ed munitions – more of them, because that made the difference in limiting civil-
ian casualties during the Iraq and Afghan campaigns. We’ve said that we have to
have more and better special forces, because of the type of fighting, and peace-
keeping, which we are likely to embrace in the future. 
All this costs money. It means that European countries especially have to
think through transformation, defense spending, and spending more wisely to
be effective in the future. So, we have a new mission; we are going to have new
military capabilities, led by countries like France, the UK, and the U.S., which, I
would argue, are the countries that have done the most to transform their mil-
itaries and to achieve this kind of expeditionary capability. 
And we have new members: going back to 1999, ten new members, led by
the Czech Republic, and Hungary and Poland; and now seven to add to those
three. We in the United States government look upon these new members, as
President Bush said here in Prague, during the summit, we believe they will
refresh the spirit of the alliance. We think the center of gravity of our efforts is
moving eastward, because of these ten countries. And when the seven coun-
tries come in at Istanbul, 40 % of our members will be formerly Communist
countries. That’s going to change us. Their history, their shared perception of
the world and how to confront security challenges is going to change us, and is
going to change us for the better. 
We believe very profoundly in my government in Washington that these
countries must also be part of the European Union, and that we should not ask
them to choose between those two institutions. We should not ask for loyalty
tests between NATO and the EU. They ought to be part of both. They will
strengthen both. Together, that twin enlargement will make a critical historic
difference in solidifying democracy in all of Europe. 
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In addition to new members, we have new partners. If the strategic objec-
tive that Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterand, President George H.W. Bush and
Prime Minister Thatcher articulated back in 1989, 1990 and 1991 is to be
achieved – one Europe, whole, free, at peace, stable and united – then we have
to have Russia, Ukraine, and the states of the Central Asia region and the
Caucasus as part of that strategic whole. These countries are not likely to be
members of NATO any time soon. But, you can’t construct a durable peace in
Europe that will last without them. And so, in addition to the Prague summit,
we made another strategic decision to embrace Russia in our creation of the
NATO-Russia Council; and to embrace Ukraine, which has been, frankly, a more
gradual, and sometimes fitful, process. Russia has been much more open to a
long-term engagement on a constructive basis with NATO. 
In my government, we believe we need to take a step further, and this
year, as we look toward Istanbul – and Istanbul is an apt place for our summit –
we need to think about not only an extension of NATO influence with the
Mediterranean Dialogue, but in the Caucasus region, and in Central Asia. These
countries have been very important for the efforts in Afghanistan. They don’t
share all the democratic values that we share – we in the Atlantic Alliance – but
they share a strategic perspective that they want to be part of peacekeeping,
and they want to be part of conflict prevention. And so, they’re our partners,
and we ought to work to build that up. 
So, if you put all this together – new partners, new members, new military
capabilities, and a new strategic mission – we have a new NATO. At least figura-
tively, we’ve retired the old NATO, in honored glory, with thanks for the job it
did during the Cold War, but we’re constructing a new NATO for a very differ-
ent time, with very different threats. 
I’d just like to conclude my remarks by posing some challenges for all of
us as Europeans and Americans, as we construct this new NATO. What I just
reviewed were the accomplishments of the Prague summit and accomplish-
ments since the Prague summit – this vast transformation that we’ve undertak-
en. But, I think there are three great challenges that remain for us, in order to
complete the vision of the Prague summit leaders. I would take them as follows: 
First, we have got to complete the military transformation of the alliance.
We’ve done a lot. Just last Wednesday, we launched the NATO Response Force
that was created less than a year ago, on November 21, here in Prague. We
launched it in Brunssum, in the Netherlands. It does not have a full capability,
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but if General Jones is asked by the NATO Council to deploy it tomorrow, he
will be able to. That is a dramatic expansion of NATO’s military capabilities,
one we’ve never had in 54 years – the ability to react very quickly, within a mat-
ter of days, with substantial force in a crisis. 
We created a new Transformation Command in Norfolk, Virginia, to plug
the European countries into the transformation process in the United States
military. We’ve taken a number of steps to strengthen ourselves with new
capabilities. 
But what hasn’t happened are two things militarily. There hasn’t been, I
think, a strategic decision by the European allies to either increase spending
on defense, or, if that is not possible, to spend differently, and to spend more
wisely, so that Europe can have a greater capacity to act, whether it’s in NATO
or whether it’s through the European Union – a process which we very much
support. 
Let me give you two figures. President Bush has received $376 billion
from the U.S. Congress for our defense budget in 2003. Our 18 allies combined
this year will spend $140 billion. Now, that huge capabilities gap in spending
has existed in the Alliance since 1949. It’s not new. But what’s new is that the
premium in military capability is now with advanced technology. It costs
more. So, the actual gap in capabilities is expanding greater than the defense-
spending gap. That’s a true crisis in the alliance. It has to be closed. 
And here, Marc de Brichambaut is here – I should have recognized him
at the beginning – France has been a leader. Britain has been a leader. Norway
has been a leader, and Turkey has been a leader, along with the United States,
in making a national commitment to greater defense spending. It’s a difficult
choice, if you’re a member of parliament, to make that decision between
domestic and foreign priorities. President Chirac has made it, and we thank
him for that. Prime Minister Blair has made it. But a great number of other
allies have not made it. In fact, Germany and the Netherlands have their
defense budgets capped until 2007. I think that’s an issue that, with respect,
our European allies need to look at it. 
The second issue is this. It’s what Lord Robertson is calling a “usability
gap.” There are 2.4 million Europeans in uniform that belong to NATO coun-
tries. 55,000 of them today are deployed outside of Europe and their own
countries, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other
parts of the world, where countries have responsibilities. Our European allies
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are telling us that they are maxed-out: they can’t contribute any more forces to
expeditionary missions. If that’s the case, then about 3 % of Europe’s soldiers
can be deployed overseas. That’s a terrific problem to contemplate. 
If we have to assume that the threat to all of us will require long-term
expeditionary missions in the future, then the Europeans need to increase the
percentage of their soldiers who are physically fit, equipped, trained and
ready to go to places like West Africa, where the French are, or Afghanistan
and Iraq, where many of us are: a true problem to contemplate. That’s the first
challenge for NATO. 
The second is this: to build stronger ties between the European Union
and NATO. I don’t think any of us are satisfied with the present state of rela-
tions between the two organizations. Let me say some positive things about
the European Union, because sometimes the Europeans say that we Americans
don’t say enough that is positive. President Bush and our administration sup-
port the European Union. We support its development and strengthening. We
support a European security and defense policy. We have supported the
European Union taking over the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and it’s
been a great success. We have great respect for the European people and their
leaders, and that you want to be more active in a security and defense sense. It
makes sense. If you look back at the arguments we had in the early nineties
concerning Bosnia, Europe ought to have a greater capacity to act as Europe
when NATO is otherwise not engaged, when NATO has decided not to engage. 
Europe – the European Union and NATO – with its twin enlargement, are
going to make the crucial historical difference in the East. We have a common
security threat, and Europe has a security paper that Mr. Solana floated at the
Thessaloniki summit that is very much in line with what President Bush and
our national leadership have decided is our set of threats. All of that unites us. 
Furthermore, we came together and agreed on seven specific agreements
in March of this year as to how NATO and the EU would act together. Essentially,
this agreement, which is called “Berlin Plus,” says that the European Union will
be helped by NATO in developing its own strength and unity as a defensive and
security force. But the deal is, of course, that the European Union will not seek
to duplicate what we Europeans and Americans have built over five decades: no
new military headquarters to compete with NATO; no new planning authority
to compete with SHAPE, for instance. Imagine our surprise, then, when a
month later, the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg met in
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Brussels and said that they want to create a new European Union military head-
quarters; they want to create a planning authority; a mutual defense clause for
the European constitution; an armaments agency, which is not objectionable at
all on the surface, as long as it doesn’t become a Fortress Europe, vs. a
cross–Atlantic defense trade. 
This is now the crucial issue in NATO-EU relations that we’ve got to work
through. We have a meeting on it tomorrow in Brussels. We’ll continue to dis-
cuss it for months on end. I would boil it down to this, and it’s awfully simplistic
– my apologies to Marc and others for being simplistic in a short set of remarks.
If we can guarantee cooperation between NATO and the EU, and if that is going
to be the spirit and fact of our relationship, we’ll be fine. But, if some members
of the EU want to turn this into a competitive relationship, then we’re going to
have a great disagreement, because we Americans want to preserve NATO. 
We’re not members of the European Union, so we don’t want to intrude
on internal decision-making there. But, we want to preserve NATO as the pre-
eminent security institution in Europe, with first right of refusal as to when
NATO’s engaged. Then, if NATO doesn’t want to be engaged in a crisis, we will
be the strongest supporter of the European Union, and we’ll give the European
Union all the NATO resources – SHAPE and NATO resources – needed to do the
job. This is a terribly important discussion that we’re having. I think we can
have it without emotion, and we should have it without emotion. I think we can
resolve it. Because, I think the great majority of countries in NATO want to pre-
serve a strong and vital NATO. 
My last point on this would be to say that there’s a corresponding argu-
ment made by some Europeans that Europe ought to become a counterweight
to the United States at some point in the future. We Americans absolutely
reject this. We want to maintain an alliance and partnership in one transat-
lantic relationship, with the American military physically present on this con-
tinent, and with the United States fully engaged, along the lines of the policy
that President Bush articulated when he was here in Prague 11 months ago. 
We do not see ourselves as rivals with Europe. We see ourselves as part-
ners and allies. If you look at the new threats, we share those threats. We are
threatened by them together. So, we have to meet them together, not as rivals,
but as one alliance across the Atlantic Ocean. 
The third challenge is to rebuild the transatlantic relationship after the
Iraq crisis. We can do it. I think it’s already underway: we had a 15–0 vote [on
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Iraq] in the UN Security Council the other day. If you look at these threats, if
you look at the global challenges that we face with environmental degrada-
tion, international crime and drugs, and trafficking in women and children,
these are threats we can confront together and we should confront together. I
hope that as we do, we’ll recognize that NATO is vital, and that a strong part-
nership based in NATO remains vital for Americans, as well as Europeans. I
hope that’s a contract that we can agree on as we move ahead in the future. 
Michael Žantovský
Nick will now take questions. Mr. Heller?
Mark Heller
It wasn’t very surprising that you made a passing reference to the Mediterra-
nean Dialogue, but I was a little surprised when you suggested that there was
going to be a focused discussion on deepening and broadening of the Dialogue.
The reason that I was surprised is that, in my limited understanding, it hasn’t
really accomplished very much up until now, and it doesn’t appear to promise
very much in the future. I am wondering if you can tell me why I’m wrong.
R. Nicholas Burns
Thanks for your very easy, softball type question. You are right in one impor-
tant respect and that is that a number of us who sit on this council with Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauretania, are a little bit frus-
trated and feel that there is too much talk and not enough action. By action, I
mean a deepening of our military relationship – not as allies, because we are
not allies, but as friends. We’ve done some military exercises; for example, we
made a very important port visit to Algiers by NATO vessels last year. We also
have training for Arab and Israeli officers in doctrine and consultations in
transformation at our NATO defense colleges. These are things that Arab coun-
tries and Israel need as much training in as we do. While we have no official
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proposal from the US government on this, we’re still very actively thinking
about the Med dialogue in Washington. Also, a number of the allies have come
forward and said, “We want to see an expansion in terms of the functions of
the Mediterranean Dialogue and the programs.” Not coincidentally, most of
the Mediterranean allies in NATO, Turkey, Italy, Greece, France, Spain, and
Portugal are leading the proposals that we do more. We haven’t agreed on
a formula yet. We only have one choice and that is to go forward. If NATO is to
have a greater role in broad terms in the Greater Middle East then we ought to
have greater relationships with those nations as well. I think that they are seek-
ing it. The Arab countries have come forward and said that they want to do
more. Israel has been a very active participant that wants to have a better rela-
tionship as well. I agree that we haven’t done extraordinary things over the last
eight years, but it’s been a start, and we ought to build on it.
Jan Žižka
I am Jan Žižka from the Euro Magazine here in Prague. My original question
was about what you said to the NATO ambassadors this week because there
has been a lot of media coverage and it was not very clear. To what extent is
your fear of the duplication of the EU and NATO resources related to the cur-
rent talk about the changing position of the United Kingdom? It seems that the
United Kingdom is coming closer to the position of France and Germany.
R. Nicholas Burns 
Thank you for the question: it gives me the opportunity to comment on a very
unfortunate situation that occurred at NATO this week. We are a military and
political organization, and we have classified meetings every week. We don’t
talk to the press about what we discuss privately. Unfortunately, one delega-
tion did. Not only that, but also they quoted some people, including me.
Moreover, they did it in a very unhelpful way because it was distorted. I am not
going to comment on what happened behind those closed doors because
we’re not allowed to. We have a contract among the nineteen allies that we talk
frankly together, but we don’t try to complain about each other publicly. 
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I will say this, we, as Americans, have no stronger partner at NATO than the
United Kingdom. There is no problem between the United States and England. I
was spokesperson for the State Department for a couple of years, so I’m accus-
tomed to this. In my experience, the press almost always gets it right; moreover,
the international press covering NATO has pretty much always been on base in
discussing what we’re doing. This week some of the articles, such as Thursday’s
Financial Times piece, were one hundred percent wrong; there is no conflict
between London and Washington. We have no closer partner in discussing,
behind the scenes, ESDP and NATO’s reaction to it than the United Kingdom.
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut
We have had a very good conference here, and I think that we have reached a
broad agreement among ourselves that there are some very major and diffi-
cult challenges. We have also identified that the Greater Middle East is an
extremely tricky region and that whatever we might aim at achieving will
require a lot of thought, caution, and some very serious and hard preparation.
I have noticed that you have put great emphasis on the Istanbul Summit, so,
perhaps, in the spirit of the vision of the Istanbul Summit, you might want to
give us a little bit of the analysis from the administration on how you see the
perspective that you would like to emerge from the Istanbul Summit in terms
of the relationship of the Alliance and the region. It’s a very open question.
We have just tested among ourselves how delicate and important those things
will be. We have not necessarily reached a consensus that we should burden
NATO with too many of those responsibilities. Some say that it needs time to
digest the progress that it has achieved and that shouldering it with very
tough challenges at an early stage might not be the best thing to do. Still there
is a sense of urgency, and it is important to understand in what direction the
US is thinking. 
R. Nicholas Burns
I would just say this, we are going to carry on a productive conversation about
NATO/EU relations and the development of the European Security and
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Defense Policy. However, you have to understand that we are going to act vig-
orously to protect NATO’s interests as we see them. I think that as we talk
around the table we can see that the great majority of allies want NATO to
remain strong, vital, and the preeminent institution and want a cooperative,
not competitive, relationship with the EU. Our opposition to Teruven and to
the sons and daughters of Teruven that have sprouted since April is that it
would unnecessarily duplicate what we already have and that it would be cost-
ly. Moreover, we don’t think it will be entirely effective. What Secretary Powell
said the day after these proposals were announced is that what Europe needs
is more capabilities not more headquarters. We remain convinced of that. So
we hope that we can break through any disagreements and agree on a vision
forward that would have NATO remain vigorous, strong, cooperative, not com-
petitive, with the EU.
Second, the press has not focused on the fact that France has made a
major contribution to the NATO response force. And Mark and I were togeth-
er with Minister Alliot-Marie and Secretary Rumsfeld in Colorado Springs ten
days ago, where I think they agreed that the French and the Americans need
to be together as the leaders of this response force, and we are very pleased
about Paris attitude. 
Third, I think that you are right. We need to approach Afghanistan with
a great deal of humility. Being effective in Afghanistan is, perhaps, NATO’s
greatest challenge in fifty-four years. We don’t have any immediate plans to
send forces throughout the entire country, but we have agreed in principle
that we ought to expand beyond Kabul. The Germans are leading the way. I
think that other countries will quickly come forward with ideas, and we ought
to support those ideas, and slowly build a more capable NATO to help Presi-
dent Karzai and to help stabilize Afghanistan. 
Regarding Istanbul, our President has not yet decided on the blueprint of
what we seek to achieve, so I can’t give that to you today. I can generally say
that we are very pleased that Turkey has volunteered to host the summit
because there is no more important ally in NATO than Turkey. The commit-
ment that Turkey has made to Iraq is quite impressive and valuable, and the
fact that the summit is going to be in Turkey speaks to this fact. It’s a natural
coincidence that our conceptual agenda is leading NATO out of Europe and
North America and towards the Greater Middle East where Turkey, of course,
has more experience than the rest of us. 
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And so I think that ought to be the theme, NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq
and building all of our relations with the countries there and in between to
expand NATO’s influence in that region.
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Summary
The key challenge for NATO in the 1990s was whether to accept the call for
“out of area” missions. Since Bosnia and Kosovo this has been no longer
a question. After 9/11/2001, the main question remains whether – in the con-
text of fighting international terrorism – NATO should “go global,” and if so,
what should be the rationale, the scope and the goal of such a mission.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that there exist powerful rational
arguments for a mission of NATO in the Greater Middle East.1 At the very
least, the idea deserves an honest and thorough discussion among the Allies. 
The main rationale for NATO’s engagement in the Greater Middle East
lies in the very nature of threats emanating from the region – terrorism, proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), poor or irresponsible gov-
ernance (failed or rogue states), often with virulent anti-American and anti-
western rhetoric as the sole coherent policy, as well as local conflicts with
global repercussions. Allies should take up the gauntlet and make an effort to
design not only a common strategy but also to agree on joint measures with-
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in NATO itself. a failure of the U.S. and Europe to face up to these challenges
would be detrimental to security on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The following seem to be the possible scenarios and their consequences:
1. Both for the U.S and the EU, it is a policy option to bypass NATO2 in pur-
suing their security goals. However, it would be equal to giving up on the
political potential of the Alliance. Therefore it is the least desired option,
especially for new NATO members since it would devaluate their hard
won membership, and consequently relegate NATO into oblivion.
2. To turn NATO into a common toolbox3 that is to be used either by the
U.S. – in building coalitions of the willing – or by the EU – in providing
muscles for CESDP ambitions – seems to be a tempting “middle-of-the-
way” option for some. However, it would put a constant pressure on
NATO’s cohesion.4 Sooner rather than later, we might find that many of
the tools in the box are broken, or even worse, that the toolbox is empty.
3. If enough political will is present, NATO could serve as a proven frame-
work for building a coherent strategy and providing joint or at least com-
mon capabilities. In this case, NATO would maintain an independent
ability to project power in order to protect the interests of its members
in NATO-led “out of area” operations. We tend to view this option as
an imperative task for the Alliance. However, we could be risking possi-
ble overstretch.5
At this moment, there prevail obviously different policy approaches on the
two sides of the Atlantic: the U.S. tends to rely on ad hoc coalitions (or multilat-
eralism a la carte) rather than on the Alliance, whereas some Europeans view
this as unbounded U.S. unilateralism that should be countered. It is NATO that
can bridge this potential transatlantic rift – the U.S. should perceive NATO as
a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a pri-
mary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. It seems to be clear that
using NATO is advantageous both for the U.S.6 and European7 NATO members.
Introduction – NATO after Iraq
The fact that the Iraqi operation was conducted by a ‘coalition of the willing’,
outside of NATO structures, is often interpreted as a failure of NATO.8 Others,
e. g. Richard Lugar, vehemently oppose this view.9
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NATO Secretary General Robertson has recently addressed the key ques-
tion10 – why should NATO be involved in stabilizing Iraq? Other analysts11 have
concluded that Iraq created another political challenge for NATO members. As
a matter of fact, difficulties in postwar management in Iraq have led the U.S. to
seek broader support materialized in military contributions12 and providing
greater political legitimacy.13 In principle, few U.S. policy-makers would like to
see the U.S. as a lonely global policeman14 supported by various ad-hoc coali-
tions.
So far, the role of NATO in Iraq has been limited.15 NATO’s involvement
in postwar Iraq extends only to provide logistical support to the Polish-led
division of the multinational stabilization force. Nevertheless, NATO has been
always dealing with current principal threats, as has been recently manifested
in its takeover of peace operations in Afghanistan. It is no wonder that a dis-
cussion about the future of NATO’s role in Iraq and the Greater Middle East is
looming.16
NATO in the Greater Middle East – Key
Questions
This paper addresses the topic from the following angles: the nature of new
security threats, NATO’s capacity to cope with them, the “out of area” concept
and its geographical and resource limitations, the possible role for NATO in
Iraq or in the Middle East peace process based on NATO’s niche capabilities,
potential political implications of NATO’s Middle Eastern engagement, and,
finally, the possible “democratizing” effect of NATO’s involvement.
1. TERRITORIAL CORRELATIONS / CONTEXT OF NEW SECURITY
THREATS – TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION, FAILED AND ROGUE
STATES
The end of the Cold War changed the very substance of European security.
Territorial defense against a massive military conflagration in Europe ceased
to be the main concern of the Alliance. Wars in the Balkans and accelerated
trends toward autonomous European security capabilities forced a drastic
change in the security policies of NATO. 
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After Kosovo new threats emerged into prominence. Terrorism, prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, concern about
failed or rogue states (non-cooperating states or states of concern, non-state
actors, etc.) – these threats seem to dominate any post 9/11 analysis of the inter-
national security environment. As a consequence, the geopolitical focus moved
beyond Europe,17 or at least to its periphery. The emphasis has shifted from
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty towards dealing with non-traditional threats.18
Inevitably, this has raised concerns of some NATO members – both old19 and new
– fearing that the exclusive club is losing its prestige by diluting its commit-
ments.20
The Greater Middle East21 (GME) seems to be a conundrum of the above-
mentioned threats in the potentially most explosive combination.22 Moreover,
GME is the region where both America and Europe share fundamental inter-
ests,23 although – due to various differences – they do not necessarily agree on
the policies to pursue these interests. However, there is a powerful incentive
to come to an agreement since “neither the U.S. nor Europe can fix the Greater
Middle East by itself.”24 In any case, “NATO’s ability to deal with new threats
faces an early test in the Middle East.”25
2. HOW CAN NATO REACT? WHAT CAN THE ENLARGED NATO OFFER
IN DEALING WITH NEW SECURITY THREATS?
The concept of collective defense (Artical 5) has not outlived its relevance.
Solidarity among liberal democratic states in defending common values and
interests remains vital for the future of democracy. NATO has to maintain its
core functions even as it is advancing new ones.26 The nature of the new
threats deserves an appropriate response: “To combat transnational terrorist
networks effectively, NATO should more closely resemble a network itself.”27
The conceptual answer to the new challenges is territorial enlargement,
although that has been motivated also by other factors, and functional exten-
sion27 or expansion.28 Any future enlargement of NATO remains geographical-
ly confined to the Euro–Atlantic area. However, if NATO is to assume a global
role, it cannot do so without closely cooperating with non-European allies
(e.g. Australia). In principle, NATO should keep the door open to all eligible
allies30 (e.g. Israel). Any functional expansion requires intra-alliance consen-
sus – the current position of NATO is reflected in the Strategic Concept adopt-
ed at the Washington summit in April 1999.
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2.1 The Shift From Military to Non-Military Roles (‘Nation Building’)
The new security environment is often characterized by the growing rele-
vance of non-military31 and non-state factors. Some analysts argue that NATO
and the EU should divide labor as if the non-military tasks were solely the EU
business,31 whereas others think that NATO is also capable of nation building
tasks.33 NATO’s contribution to the democratic transformation in Central and
Eastern Europe as well as to similar transitions in some of the older member
states – e. g. in cultivating civilian control of armed forces – cannot be denied.
This might be of utmost importance in societies where the military serves as a
backbone.
The question arises whether the EU is better equipped for the so-called
soft security tasks or whether it is simply making a virtue of its inability to deal
with the hard ones. It is unclear why European NATO members should be
ready to offer more capabilities under the EU flag than they are offering as
a part of the Alliance. 
In this context, it is important to argue that NATO rather than the U.S. –
EU format should remain the main framework of transatlantic security coop-
eration. It is obvious that NATO provided the necessary political element in
containing the Soviet military threat. Coping with the current threats again
requires the kind of political legitimacy that can best be secured through
NATO.
On a deeper level, it could be argued that NATO – as the traditional
repository and defender of “western” values: liberal democracy, free market,
rule of law – should be the appropriate vehicle for responding to the new non-
traditional threats since they seem to be targeted against this very body of val-
ues rather than against any single country, specific territory or specific policy.
3. IS NATO’S “OUT OF AREA” CONCEPT APPLICABLE IN THE
GREATER MIDDLE EAST?
The main question considered during the 1990s was whether NATO had to
expand and accept new missions beyond defending its own territory. As
Richard Lugar argued in the early 1990s “NATO has to go out of area, or out of
business.” However, NATO strategic and conceptual documents (Rome
Declaration of 1991 or Madrid Declaration of 1997) kept referring to European
or transatlantic security. The Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington sum-
mit in April 1999 reflected the growing awareness of the changed global secu-
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rity environment.34 Terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 showed how urgent the ques-
tion about the place of NATO in the global security system really was. 
3.1 Should NATO ‘Go Global’?
No consensus on this question has been achieved.35 The debate about the glob-
al role for NATO has on the one hand revealed a growing awareness of global
challenges,36 inhibited on the other hand by fears of overextending NATO’s
obligations37. Talbott38 and Kugler39 tried to formulate a balanced view by
rejecting global ambitions of NATO. In recent years, opinions among NATO
members have shifted significantly: even NATO’s Secretary General suggested
that the once unthinkable is no longer taboo.40 After 9/11, Afghanistan and
Iraq, one may witness a new dynamism of this debate and some go even fur-
ther by calling unreservedly for a global NATO.41
3.2 The Greater Middle East as a Key Global Challenge?
As we mentioned earlier, the Greater Middle East is the most prominent source
of mutually correlated threats at the intersection of vital interests. Not inciden-
tally, the region is denoted as the Rubik Cube.42 Emerson & Tocci identified four
main interrelated crises in the GME – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, threats of
Al-Qaeda, the crisis over Iraq and the overall development of the region, or
rather the lack thereof. However, due to their preferences for the UN, the US
and the EU engagement, the authors have assumed only a minor role for NATO
in the region. Others suggest that any engagement of former European colonial
powers in the region may raise old fears and resentments.43
3.2.1 NATO and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been traditionally viewed as the very
source of Middle Eastern instability. In the past, one might come to the conclu-
sion that without solving this conflict one cannot envisage stability in the
Middle East. At the same time, before the occupation of Iraq one could not
realistically expect a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many
Israelis still think that that conflict management is the best possible outcome).
Rolling back Iraq changed the strategic map of the whole Middle East and
paved the way for the Road Map – a new attempt to move the Israeli-
Palestinian track forward. In fact, the Pandora box of GME has been opened in
a different way than expected. 
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The truth is that without international engagement the Israeli-Palestinian
relations are likely to deteriorate even further.44 The idea of international mon-
itoring of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is supported from various policy
perspectives:
1. NATO peacekeeping role after the settlement45
2. UN or NATO presence as crisis management46
3. U.S.-led trusteeship47
Any international presence would be highly sensitive for Israel and it is
perceived with caution in Washington, too. On the other hand, Palestinians
consistently call for international involvement as a counterweight to Israel. So
far, Europeans have preferred to be involved as the EU in the Quartet format
(US, EU, Russia, UN) rather than going through NATO. However, one cannot
exclude the possibility that at a certain stage of future settlement NATO –
alone or in concert with others – might contribute politically rather than mil-
itarily on the ground. 
There is also a defensive rationale for channeling any western involve-
ment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through NATO. A dual-track (US, EU) or
a multiple-track (US, EU, UN, and Russia) approach might in the course of time
transform the so far differing perspectives into conflicting ones, with disas-
trous consequences both for the Atlantic cohesion and for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict itself.
3.2.2 NATO and the Gulf – Iraq
The Persian Gulf is of primary concern to NATO allies because of two reasons:
proliferation of WMD and securing energy supplies.48 It seems that Americans
are more aware of the coincidence of NATO member countries´ interests in
the Gulf and see more European engagement as desirable.49 It is the European
reluctance that stands in the way of more allied cooperation in the Gulf.50 As
was shown in the Iraqi case, some Europeans do not subscribe to the U.S. poli-
cies in the Gulf. Nevertheless, in the current circumstances the way for NATO
to the Gulf leads through Iraq.51
4. POTENTIAL ROLE FOR NATO AND ITS TOOLS
The key question is whether there are any niche capabilities that neither the
EU nor the US alone can provide. What may be the unique contributions of
NATO in the GME? Are they primarily in the military or in the political areas?52
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NATO can provide political legitimacy to stabilization and democratiza-
tion in the GME. Nevertheless, there will be always a tendency toward using
selective formats (e.g. Quartet, Contact Group, etc).
There is the remarkable military record of NATO in planning and run-
ning peacekeeping operations including post-conflict stabilization and
reforming security structures.53 Suggestions have been made to use this
expertise in the GME.54
It is a matter of further discussion whether NATO is capable of providing
assistance in nation building and promotion of democracy. Here again, Iraq is
a test case.
In 1990s NATO has developed a spectrum of tools to deal with the exter-
nal challenges it has faced: enlarged cooperation forums (NACC, EAPC),
NATO+1 dialogue (NRC, NUC, Mediterranean Dialogue), partnership pro-
grams (PfP) and even procedures for future membership (MAP). Patterns of
dialogue and cooperation, of sharing best practices and standards, and of pro-
viding assistance are firmly rooted in the NATO culture. Possible ways of using
some of the existing models in the GME region should be considered. NATO
should offer a modified PfP program to some of the countries in the region.
Whether this may include even a long-term perspective of membership
remains to be discussed. The weak point in applying the above-mentioned for-
mats – which were designed for Europe – in the GME is the following: what
kind of sufficient incentives – apart from the membership perspective – can
NATO offer in reforming the security system in the GME? Security consulta-
tions or partnerships not involving full membership do not seem sufficient,
especially for some of the smaller democratic or democratizing countries of
the region. The problem is that the “added value” of a NATO security involve-
ment as opposed to a US security guarantee is at the moment not very high.
That, however, can and should change in the course of time.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NATO ENGAGEMENT IN THE GME (IRAQ,
PALESTINE) – CEMENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS OR DESTROYING NATO’S
COHESION?
NATO could obviously neglect global aspirations in its further development.
The consequence would be the loss of global significance.55 All depends on
policies of member states. The most poignant expression of this fact comes
from the U.S.56 If NATO takes up global challenges – initially in the GME region
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– it would be a serious test of its interoperability and cohesion. It would have
inevitable implications for planning57 and decision-making procedures58 with-
in the Alliance, which present some member states with an undoubtedly sen-
sitive dilemma. Authorization of planning procedures and weakening of the
principle of unanimity are definitely explosive subjects for political discus-
sions within NATO. However, the alternatives seem to be even worse. The risk
of bypassing or marginalizing NATO is evident. Deepening of the Atlantic rift
over NATO would be detrimental to both its shores. There is a way out – the
U.S. should perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Euro-
peans should use NATO as a primary multilateral venue for cooperation with
the U.S. Thus NATO will be able to deal with the most urgent current crises
starting with the Greater Middle East.
To search for a global role for NATO just so that it has some kind of a role
would be both wrong and destined to fail. a freedom-loving alliance, just like a
freedom-loving country, should not seek adventures abroad, “in search of
monsters to slay.”59 However, in the case of GME, the monsters are already very
much there. To address their threats is thus not a question of expanding or
transforming NATO’s mission but rather a question of the continued vitality of
its original mission and purpose.
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USAID, The World Bank, The U.S. Government, and Radio Free Euro-
pe/Radio Liberty. He has frequently testified before committees of the
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published over 300 pieces and sits on a number of advisory and editori-
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He represented the Czech Republic on the UN Security Council in 1994
and 1995, serving as the Council’s President in January of 1994 and in
April of 1995. In 1996, he served as Vice-President, and from January to
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Planning Department. He has served as a counselor to the Turkish
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tures and seminars at leading institutions in Europe and the United
States, and is the author of numerous articles and books.
JAN RUML is a senator in the Senate of the Czech Republic currently serving as
vice-chairman of the Senate. Mr. Ruml has held a number of positions in
the public service of the Czech Republic including roles as former
Minister and Deputy Minister of the Interior, as a member of the
Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, and as a Deputy of the Parliament of the
Czech Republic. Mr. Ruml is co-founder of the Union of Freedom, a polit-
ical party of which he was the first leader. Mr. Ruml was also a signatory
to Charter 77.
ZE’EV SCHIFF has been covering strategic developments in the Middle East for
Haaretz for almost 50 years. He has covered every war and every major
Israeli military operation since the Six-Day War. Recently, he has written
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Palestinian truce. He was co-author of “Israel’s Lebanon War,” (1984) and
“Intifada” (1990), and recently had a paper published by the James Baker
Institute for Public Policy, titled “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The view
from Israel.” Schiff is currently a senior fellow at the Washington Insti-
tute for Near East Policy. Earlier this year, he was the recipient of the Haim
Herzog Prize for special contribution to the state of Israel.
CRAIG ROBERTS STAPLETON has been the U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic
since 2001. Prior to assuming his duties in the Czech Republic, Mr. Stap-
leton was a real estate executive, serving since 1982 as President of Marsh
and McLennan Real Estate Advisors, Inc. Mr. Stapleton previously served
on the Board of Directors of a number of publicly traded U.S. companies,
including Alleghany Properties, Cornerstone Properties, Security Capital
Corporation, Sonoma West, and T.B. Woods. He was a partner of Presi-
dent Bush in the ownership of the Texas Rangers from 1989–98. He served
on the Board of the Peace Corps under President George H. W. Bush.
CYRIL SVOBODA is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic, an appointment he has held since 2002. From
1998–2002, Mr. Svoboda was Chairman of the Petition Committee
of the Czech Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies. Since January of 2001,
he has been the Chairman of the Committee for the Rules of Procedure
and Immunity of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Between 1992–1996, Mr. Svoboda was Deputy Minister of Justice
of the Czech Republic. In 1996, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs for issues related to EU accession. Svoboda has been a mem-
ber of the European Commission for Democracy through Law since 1994
and has, since 1997, been the Commission’s Deputy Chairman. 
JIŘÍ SCHNEIDER is the head of the Policy Planning Department at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, a post he has held several times:
1993–1994, 1999–2001, and since the beginning of 2003. In 2002,
Mr. Schneider served as an International Policy Fellow at the Open
Society Institute in Budapest. From 1995–1998, Mr. Schneider served as
the Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Israel. Mr. Schneider is a for-
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mer MP of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (1990–1992). Prior to
1989 and his entry to public service, Mr. Schneider was employed as
a forestry surveyor. He serves as a part-time lecturer at Charles
University, New York University in Prague, and to PSSI’s Robinson-Martin
Security Scholars Program. Mr. Schneider is a member of the PASS Board.
ALEXANDR VONDRA is the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for
Security Policy. From 2001–2003, he served as the Czech Government
Commissioner for the Prague Summit of NATO. From 1997–2001,
Mr. Vondra served as the Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the Uni-
ted States. From 1993–1997, Mr. Vondra served as First Deputy Minister
of International Affairs of the Czech Republic. He served as Foreign Po-
licy Advisor to President Václav Havel (1990–1992). Vondra, a co-founder
of the Civic Forum movement and a signatory and former spokesman for
Charter 77, participated in the activities of Czechoslovakia’s democratic
opposition, focusing on editorial work in the samizdat and cooperation
with opposition groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Mr. Vondra is cur-
rently the Coordinator of PASS and the GMF Transatlantic Fellow.
MICHEAL ŽANTOVSKÝ is the Czech Ambassador to the State of Israel and the for-
mer Coordinator of PASS. In 1996, he was elected to the Czech Senate for
a six-year term. During his tenure as Senator, he was elected three times
to serve as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Security. He was also twice elected to the presidency of his political
party, the Civic Democratic Alliance. Between 1992 and 1997, Žantovský
served as first the Czechoslovak Ambassador, and later the Czech
Ambassador to the United States. From 1990 till 1992, Mr. Žantovský
served as Press Secretary and Spokesman for President Václav Havel. As
a journalist, translator and writer, he was a founding member of the Civic
Forum and a founding member of the Czech chapter of P.E.N.
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